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PREFACE
When

re~lecting

on the sales of Ayn Rand's novels The

Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, the
o~

~ormer editor-in-chie~

the New American Library (Signet Press), commented:
Once or twice a year, we reissue these books • • • and
I'm not talking about a printing o~ 10,000. These books
are reprinted in runs o~ 50,000 and 100,000 copies.
What this means is that every year, 100,000 new people
read The Fountainhead. o • • Other than with Fitzgerald
and Hemingway • • • this just doesn't happen.l

Bennett

Cer~,

long-time head

o~

Random House, observed: "It's

remarkableJ

In all my years o~ publishing, I've never seen
anything like it." 2 The Nathaniel Branden Institute (NBI),
o~~icial disseminating agency3 ~or Objectivist materials,

attracted about 5000 students and provided materials to 40,000
others throughout North America.4

lEd Kuhn as quoted in E. Ephron, "A Strange Kind o~
Simplicity," The New York Times Book Review, (Hay 5, 1968),
p. 8. Unless otherHise indicated, all ellipses used in this
study are mine.
2Bennett Cer~ as quoted in Barbara Branden's biographical essay, "Who Is Ayn Rand?" in Nathaniel Branden, \fuo
Is Ayn Rand? (New York: Paperback Library, 1968), pp. 189-91.
3Branden and Rand severed all personal and pro~ession
al relationships in May o~ 1968, the NBI also ceasing operations then. Now, Dr. Leonard Peiko~f o~~ers taped lectures
on the history o~ philosophy (including Objectivism) which
are available on a rental basis. See: The Ayn Rand Letter, I,
No. 7 (January 3, 1972}, 4., and II, No. 8 {January 15, 1973),
6 f'or details.
4Nathaniel Branden, "A Report to Our Readers--1965,"
The Objectivist Net-rsletter, IV, No. 12 (December, 1965), 57.
iii
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The rather enthusiastic public acceptance of Objectivist philosophy suggests\that it could (at least potentially)
change the current of American intellectual thought.
tivism

ex~~ines

Objec-

and analyzes most aspects of American life

including business and industry, government, the arts and, to
be complete, formal education.

This study will examine the

educational implications of Objectivism.
Objectivism's consideration of formal education assumes
two forms:
nuL~

(1) the construction of what the ideally educated

ought to be, and (2) a critique of current school practice

insofar as it obstructs achievement of that ideal.
Because Rand is both novelist and philosopher, she
often employs techniques of the former to develop the latter.
Using the dramatic intricacies of plot and character, she
postulates her concept of the educated man as one dedicated
to rational self-interest, self-esteem and cognitive excellence.

He is an ideal which ought to be achieved, ultimately

suggesting that the school ought to promote the virtues be
holds dear.
This study will consider as its primary end the following:

to examine the Randian concept of the educated man

including the nature of the value changes which ought to occur
if he be truly educated.

Such an investigation, of course,

will be primarily a normative one.

As a required corollary,

the Objectivist critique of present-day school practice will
receive attention since Rand regards current formal education
as obstructing the actualization of her educated 'ideal.'

iv

structurally, i,he Introduction orientates the reader
to Objectivism, provid'l,ng biographical data significant to
'.·\

R~~d's

intellectual development.

The model of her educated

man will also be outlined, and objections to the model's
structure will receive attention.

The second chapter expands

concepts outlined in the Introduction relating to the intellectual antecedents of Objectivism.

Of primary importance is

Aristotle's philosophy and Rand's own theory of art, to which
she attaches significant educative value.
With the third chapter, the reader will study the metaphysics, epistemology and axiology of Objectivism.

All three,

but especially the ethics, kaleidoscope to form the educated
man.

Of special concern is the ethics, for in order to be

formally educated as a morally responsible being;; Ra.Ylcl' s edu_-

cated man exists as a practitioner of a specific code of
values.

Since many of these values conflict with accepted

Christian ethics, attention will be devoted to their operation within Objectivist ethics.
Chapter four essentially consists of a critique of
Objectivist philosophy, especially noting areas which might
obstruct the actualization of her educated man.

Since Objec-

tivist ethics postulates as virtues concepts such as pride
and selfishness, attention will be given to Rand's use of
definition.
The next two chapters are specifically educational in
nature.
to

mea~

Throughout them, the word education should be taken
formal education, i.e., schooling on the elementary

v

and/or higher levels.
education,

:Chapter :f'i ve critiques American :f'ormal
j

epeci:f'ica~l~

noting hm-1 Rand believes it obstructs
\

..

the graduation of' her educated man.
violence on the

c~pus

Issues such as student

and the wel:f'are state mentality of' :f'or-

mal education receive consideration in the light of' what
principles of' Objectivist ethics they interdict.

Chapter six

defines what Rand thinks the school ought to be doing to :f'urther Objectivism's normative ends.

Throughout these chapters,

attention is given to educators whom Rand endorses, including
Aristotle and Montessori.
The :f'inal chapter assesses Objectivism's contribution
to :f'ormal education in America and o:f'fers possible means of'
dealing with obstructions to its being utilized by schoolmen.
Suggestions :f'or :f'urther research will be provided.
Those attempting to study any phase of Objectivism
are con:f'ronted with a variety of' obstacles, all
make the task a di:f':f'icult one.

combi~ing

to

Perhaps the most signi:f'icant

hurdle to be overcome is the problem of' source material.
Rand, perhaps because of' her experience with Branden,
generally re:f'uses to grant interviews, especially with those
who disagree with any of' Objectivism's conclusions.

Conse-

quently, the researcher must rely exclusively on published
materials.

Fortunately, they contain su:f':f'icient re:f'erences

to educational matters to make an investigation worthwhile.
Primary source materials o:f'ten used in this study include the
novels Atlas Shrugged (1957), and The Fountainhead (1968).
Direct commentary on educational issues may be :round in the
vi

.f"o11owing books:

For the New Intellectual (1961), containing

excerpts f'rom the majOr novels; Canitalism: The Unknown Ideal
\.
\

(1967), a moral defense of laissez-faire Capitalism; Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (1969), explaining the Objectivist theory of concept formation, and The Romantic Manifesto
(1971), explaining the Objectivist theory of art and its educational importance.

Of special interest is The Virtue of

Selfishness (1964), dealing with Objectivist ethics, and The
New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution (1971), consisting
of" extended commentary on American formru. education.
Additionally, Rand's three journals (all published by
the Objectivist), The Objectivist Newsletter (1962-1965), The
Objectivist (1966-1971), and The Ayn Rand Letter (1971-date),
contain i'requent references to education, and at>e cited
throughout this study when appropriate.
A problem exists with Nathaniel Branden's writings.
His published materials, including frequent articles in The
Objectivist Newsletter and The Objectivist, may be used without reservation.

Following their separation in May of 1968,5

Rand has categorically refused to endorse any of his published
material.

Consequently, one must proceed with extreme caution

when citing such books as his The Psychology of Self-Esteem
(1969).

Material published by Branden after 1968 is used only

when there can be no mistruce as to its consistency with
5For details of the separation, including Rand's
reasons for initiating the break, see chapter one, p. 2.
vii

Objectivist thought.6

Since his book Vlho Is Ayn Rand?

(co-

authored vlith his wife) first appeared in 1962, it may be used
without reservation.
In view of the above, enough primary source material
exists· to warrant the feasibility of an investigation of Objectivism and American education.

Secondary source material

cited in the text has been selected according to
ditions:

th~ee

con-

(1) when Rand has specifically endorsed the figure

in her writings-Aristotle and Nontessori, for example, (2)
when the

v~iter

is an established scholar whose material pre-

sents a mature and sophisticated evaluation of American schools
--Job~

Holt, Charles Silberman, and (3) when the material pre-

sents a critical analysis of Objectivism itself.
tw~ce

here are two books:

Of imporby

Albert Ellis, and With Charity Tovrard None by William 0 1 Neill.
Both books begin with the premise that Objectivism is unsound
philosophically, and then proceed to build a case, with varying degrees of success as will be established throughout this
6For example, in The Psychology of Self-Esteem, Branden
writes: "Although I am no longer associated with !1is s Rand,
I welcome this opportunity to acknowledge the invaluable contribution which her work as a philosopher has made to my own
thinking in the field of psychology. I indicate, throughout
the text, specific concepts and theories of Miss Rand's
philosophy, Objectivism, which are crucially important to
my own ideas. The Objectivist epistemology, metaphysics and
ethics are the philosophical frame of reference in which I
write as a psychologist." See: Nathaniel Branden, The
Psychology of Self-Esteem (New York, Bantam Books edition,
1971), p. ix.

viii

study.7
Even given a s\U'ficient amount of primary source
\

..

'

material, a researcher still treads on shaky grounds.
extends little

s~pathy

Rand

to anyone discussing Objectivism un-

less he receives 'official' sanction to do so.

Individuals

who have written without it have faced litigation.8

Rand's

lawyer, Henry Mark Holzer specifies:
• • • the specific formulations of Ayn Rand's discoveries,
as well as her fictional creations, constitute her property
and fall under the protection of the copyright laws • • •
(which prohibit the) use of extensive quotations from
someone else's work--even when credit is given--if they
constitute the major part of the new work • • • • Thus, if
in your own work you make a brief reference to the work
of Ayn Rand, you must tru{e scrupulous care to separate
your own views from hers and to ascribe to her only those
statements which she has actually made. In other words,
do not paraphrase or summarize what you think amounts to
Miss Rand's position in any given issue; set forth what
that position is--just as she has stated it.9
Throughout this study, references to ideas specifically not
the author's and pertaining to any aspect of

Objecti~ism

are

7see: Albert Ellis, Is Obfectivism a Religion? (New
York: Lyle Stuart, 1968), pp. 9- 3, and \·lilliam O'Neill, \-lith
Charity Toward None (New York: Philosophical Library, 197rr;pp. 3-4. Of the two, 0 1 Neill 1 s is the more scholarly and
sophisticated. work.
8 see: "Court Upholds Use of Author's Name in Blurb,"
Publishers' ltleekly, CLXXXXV (Ivlarch, 1969), 35, and "But You
Can Do That, 11 Publishers' Heekly, CLXXXXV (Hay, 1969), 23-24.
A blurb is a short quotation from a review which appears on
the jacket of a book. \fuen one appeared on Chaos Below Heaven
by Eugene Vale containing Rand's name, the latter sued under
the provisions of a New York Law, charging invasion of privacy.
Rand won the case, but on !-1arch 18, 1969, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed the decision.
9Henry Mark Holzer, "A Statement of Policy," Part II,
The Objectivist, VII, No. 7 (July, 1968), 14. My brackets.
Italics in original.
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cara~ully ~ootnoted.

Although the author has tried to present

Objectivist philosophy as Rand
in chapter

~our--reserved

with which he disagrees.

de~ines

it, he has--especially

the right to examine areas

o~

it

In so doing, care has been exer-

cised not to inaccurately state Rand's position.
Finally, a word concerning documentation.

Many of the

books by Rand cited in this study contain articles which
first appeared in some

o~

her journals,

Newsletter and The Objectivist.

chie~ly

The Objectivist

When such articles are used,

the footnote refers the reader to the book in which they are
reprinted.

This policy has been adopted

chie~ly

because the

books are more readily available to the general public than
the journals.
As a student of Objectivisms this writer believes the
philosophy of Objectivism can sustain substantial contributions to American educational practice.
that belief follow.

X

The specifics of

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
While a student at the University

o~

Petrograd in

Russia, Ayn Rand, a history major, studied ancient philosophy under

Pro~essor

N. 0. Lossky, an authority on Plato.

During an oral examination, he discerned her dislike for
Platonic Idealism.
Plato, do you? 111

11

He asked,

You don't seem to agree with

She replied, "No I don 1 t • • • • My philo-

sophical views are not part

o~

the history

o~

philosophy yet.

But they will be."2
Much later and in America, she realized her dream and
today, her published works include the novels Anthem, We the
Living, The Fountainhead, Atlas Shrugged and the philosophical publications The Romantic

Mani~esto,

The Virtue

ishness, For the New Intellectual, Capitalism:

o~

Self-

The Unknown

Ideal, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, and The New
Left:

The Anti-Industrial Revolution.

sold over eight million copies.

To date, they have

Un~ortunately,

as critic Dora

Jane Hamblin observes,
It has been ~ar too easy, and too much fun, ~or everyone
book reviewers to philosophers to economists to poke

~rom

lBarbara Branden, 11 \fuo Is Ayn Rand?," in Nathaniel
Branden, Hho Is Ayn Rand? (New York: Paperback Library,

1968), p. 132.
2 Ibid.

-

1

2

.f"un at her excesses,. The general hilarity has obscured
the issue, which is deadly serious.3
\

\

As the following pages\will hopefully make clear, Ayn Rand
should indeed be taken seriously.
Although it is not intended here to write a biography
of Rand, 4 a knm-rledge of her childhood and academic career
will provide data crucial to an understanding of Objectivism.

Three significant developments helped to form her

intellectual character:

early academic interests, atheism,

and the adoption of America as home.
Early Academic Interests
Ayn Rand was born on February 2, 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Her biographer notes that mathematics first

aroused her interest, because "in its rigorous, demanding
clarity, she found a constant and exhilarating intellectual
challenge."5

Probably as a result of witnessing the Russian

revolution which cost the family their business,6 Rand de3nora Hamblin, "The Cult of Angry Ayn Rand," Life,
LXII (April, 1967), 92.
4Interested readers should consult Barbara Branden's
biographical essay, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," in Nathaniel Branden,
Who Is A~ Rand?, pp. 119-191. Rand broke with the Brandens.
in Hay, r6B for their alleged philosophical inconsistencies.
For details see: Ayn Rand, "To Whom It May Concern," The
Objectivist, VII, No. 5 (May, 1968), 1-8. Her letter therein
is dated, September 15, 1968.
5Barbara Branden, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," ~ 121.
6Rand's parents were Jewish merchants, When the
revolutionary forces confiscated the business, Rand and her
family faced starvation for several years. Her novel, We
The Living describes revolutionary Russia. Of it she wrote,
~I want to say that We The Living is as near to an autobiog-

3
veloped a loathing .for,, Connnunism and all .forms o.f collectivism.

"I lmew it was ~vil," she said.7

More significantly

'·

perhaps, she began to seek a

t~pe

o.f man more worthy, more

heroic than the t4ugs who murdered Czar Nicholas II and mutilated him and his .family.

Turning .fram mathematics, she

.found such men in the novels o.f Victor Hugo,8 men heroic in
stature, and dedicated to truth and justice:
It was (.for Rand] the discovery o.f a world o.f unprecedented scope and grandeur, o.f magnificently ingenious
plots, o.f inexhaustible imaginativeness, of an exalted
sense of li.fe, of man seen as a hero. It was a world
swept .free o.f the commonplace, and the trite--a world
dedicated to the exciting, the dramatic, the important.9
Thus Rand developed a taste in fiction .for the heroic man,
the moral crusader.

This type o.f novel, referred to by lit-

erary historians as Romantic .fiction, is characterized by
"strong interest in action • • • o.ften based on love, adventure, and combat. nlO

As will be seen, her concept o.f adven-

ture and combat is intellectual and philosophical.

Atlas

raphy as I will ever write. It is not an autobiography in
the literal, but only in the intellectual sense. The plot is
invented, the background is not." See: We The Living (New
York: The New American Library, Signet Press, 19S9), p. ix.
The novel contains vivid descriptions o.f the starvation and
brutality o.f Communist Russia.
?John Kobler, "The Curious Cult o.f Ayn Rand," The
Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIV (November, 1961), 12. ---

~ihen the antecedents o.f Objectivism are discussed,
.attention will be' given to Hugo's sense o.f the heroic as it
influenced Rand.
9Branden, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," p. 126.
Italics in original.
A

p.

'brackets.

l~villiam Thrall, Addison Hibbard, and c. Hugh Holeman,
Handbook to Literature (New York: Odyssey Press, 1960),

425.

~~

4
shrugged has been described as an epistemological detective
story, with heroic characters the protagonists.
In March of 1964, when interviel'red by Playboy magazine,
Rand spoke of her interest in Victor Hugo and a modern writer,
Mickey Spillane:
PLAYBOY: Are there any novelists whom you admire?
RAND: Yes, Victor Hugo.
PLAYBOY: \fuat about modern novelists?
RAND: No, there is no one that I could say I admire among
the so-called serious writers. I prefer the popular literature of today, which is today 1 s remnant of Romanticism.
My favorite is Hickey Spillane.
PLAYBOY: Why do you like him?
RAND: Because he is primarily a moralist. In a primitive form, the form of the detective novel, he presents
the conflict of good and evil, in terms of black and white.
He does not permit a nasty gray mixture of indistinguishable scou..'!"ldrels on both sides. .He presents an uncompromising conflict.ll
Rand's heroic ideal, her concept of an educated man, is primarily a moralist.

Hank Rearden, Ho-v1ard Roark, John Galt-

all of her heroes are crusaders against moral depravity;
what values they hold will be considered at length.
Ayn Rand entered the University of Petrograd in 1921,
majoring in history.

While there, she studied ancient philo-

sophy under the Platonist, Professor N.

o.

Lossky, 12 but came

to reject his idealistic orientation in favor of the realism
of Aristotle.

Rand recalls:

In college I had taken history as my major subject, and
philosophy as my special interest; the first--in order to

'

llAlvin Toffler, (Interviewer), 11 Pla4boy's Interview
with Ayn Rand," Playboy, XI (March, 1964), 0.
12Branden, "Who Is Ayn Rand?," pp. 131-32.

5
have a £actual knowledge o£ man's past, £or my £uture
writings; the second--in order to achieve an objective
definition o£ my values • • • •
I have held the same philosophy I now hold, £or as
far back as I can remember • • • • 1:·1y philosophy, in
essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with
productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute.
The only philosophical debt I can acknowledge is to
Aristotle. 1 J
Aristotle remains the only philosopher whom she acknowledges
as having any influence on her thinking.

Rand combines the

Romanticism of Hugo and Spillane with Aristotelian metaphysics, epistemology and axiology--the moral philosophy,
however, more uniquely her own, but the two agreeing that
happiness constitutes the legitimate end for man--to produce
her concept of man as a heroic being.
Atheism
In addition to her interest in mathematics and admiration for Hugo and Spillane, another important idea contributed to Rand's intellectual development.

Between 1918 and

1921 Rand concluded that God could not exist.

She believed

the concept of God degrading to man, forcing him to live up
to a moral standard he could never possibly achieve, but at
the same time incurring punishment for failure to do so.
Rand's atheistic position is a significant reason why
Objectivist ethics have been criticized.

Western civiliza-

tion remains, at least in name, committed to the Christian
13Ayn Rand, Atlas Shru~ged (New York:
can Library, Signet Press, 19 7), p. 1085.

The New Amari-

6
ethic, and consequently rejects anyone who proposes an ethical system counter to Christian moral philosophy.
In chapter rour, when problems with Objectivism are
discussed, space will be devoted to Objectivism and atheism.
At first glance, rew would be willing to commit their children
to a philosophical-ethical system which rejects God as immoral.
America
In 1925, Rand's entire lire changed when relatives
orrered the chance

or

coming to America:

At nine-thirty one evening, early in 1926, she boarded
her boat at Le Havre • • • • Eight days later, she stood
on a pier at the Hudson River, tears running dmm her
race, looking through the lightly falling snow at the
sky-scrapers or New York City • • • •
She arrived in New York with rirty dollars in her
nurse-and the outlines or seventeen nlavs and novels in
her mind. She spent two days looking~atuthe buildings
and the glittering electric signs or the greatest city in
the world, the city that was her symbol or everything she
admired in lire.l~
For Rand, New York represented one
to the mind
that many

or

or

man.

or

the greatest monuments

It is signiricant to note, thererore,

her heroes are businessmen, industrialists and

architects--men 't-lho make such a city possible.
After an intense struggle--The Fountainhead, for example, was rejected by twelve publishers for being too 'intellectual•--her literary and philosophical fame caught hold.
She became a United States' citizen and in 1921, married an
actor Frank 0 'Connor, to vihom she ded:Lca ted Atlas Shrugged.

14nranden, "t'lho Is Ayn Rand?" p. 137.

7
Thoy now reside in New York.
O'Connor's ini\ial impression of his future wife's
'··
character is revealing:
one of the most striking things about her • • • was her
complete openness--the absence of any trace of deviousness. The total honesty. You knew that it would be
inconceivable for her ever to act against he~ own principles • • • • She never wondered if she was going to
succeed. The only question was how long it would tru{e.l5
This description not only reflects Rand's character, but
could also describe Dagny Taggart, Hank Rearden or any of
her fictional heroes.

Honesty, devotion to one's principles,

and love of productive work are three virtues she wishes any
educated person to possess.
In summary, Ayn Rand's intellectual development resulted from the following positive and negative influences:
positive--a love of mathematics, logic, Bomantic fiction and
Aristotle; negative--any form of collectivism including Communism and a disbelief in God's existence.
For Rand educational theory is a problem to be considered when constructing a comprehensive world view.

Ob-

jectivism deals with most aspects of American life including
government, economics, business, culture, and, to be complete,
education.

She relates her philosophy to education by direct
commentary in her three journals, 16 her purely philosophical
l5Frank O'Connor quoted in Barbara Branden, Ibid.,

pp.

143-44.

'

-

16Rand's journals include the following: The Objectivist Newsletter which ran from 1962 to 1965, when it became
a magazine called The Objectivist. This lasted until September, 1971 and was then replaced oy The Ayn Rand Letter, the

8
works, and the novel.

Using the dramatic intricacies or

plot and character, she depicts the educated man as one dedicated to rational selr-interest, reason, selr-esteem, and
cognitive excellence.
Berore continuing, two objections to the Randian model
or the educated man must be considered.

Critics have argued

that, (1) such men as envisioned by Rand could never exist
and (2), her heroes are viciously cruel people who delight
in hate and destruction.

Obviously this study would termin- .

ate here ir either charge remained unchallenged.

Parents

would hardly commit their children to a value change in the
race or such objections.
The case ror unbelievability perhaps is best stated in
Is Objectivism a Religion? by Dr. Albert Ellis, who observes
in this connection:
Ayn Rand's heroes in her novels--such as Howard Roark and
John Galt--are utterly impossible humans--or rather superhumans. They have no rlai-ts, and they are literally out or
this world • • • • It is even questionable whether it can
be correctly claimed that Roark, Galt and the other Randian heroes and heroines are ideal rigures, who obviously
do not exist today, but who might come alive tomorrow.
Could they? I doubt it: They are just not human. Moreover, ir they did exist, it would perhaps be unrortunate;
ror some or their "ideal" characteristics consist or
latter still in print. The rirst two publications, edited
by Rand and Branden until Nay, 1968 when he lert, contain
articles written by Rand and others interested in Objectivism. The Ayn Rand Letter is written usually by Rand, with
an occasional contributor. All three publications contain
rrequent rererences to education and will be cited throughout this study when appropriate. Additionally, Rand has
written a play entitled Hight or Januarr 16th. Excepting
the journals and Introduction to Objectlvist Epistemology,
all are available in paperback from Signet Press.

9
stubbornness • • • and abysmal intolerance and dogmatism.l7
When arguing that Roark and Galt do not exist today, Ellis
is correct, but ignores the fact that they could (and ought)
to exist given the educative value of Objectivist ethics.
Significantly Ellis fails to cite Rand's "The Goal of My
tvriting," in his text.

Importantly, it clarifies Rand's

intent in creating characters such as Galt:
This is the motive and purpose of my writing: the projection of an ideal man. The portrayal of a moral mal,
as my ultimate literary goal, as an end in itself--to
which any didactic, intellectual, or philosophical values
contained in a novel are only the means • • • • My basic
test f'or a..'1.y story is: "Would I want to meet these characters and observe these events in real life? • • • Is
the pleasure of contemplating these characters an end in
itself'? 11
It's as simple as that. But that simplicity involves
the total of man's existence. It involves such questions
as:

lfua.t kind o£ men do I v.ra_l!t to see

i'Yl

real li:Le--a11.d

why? What kind of events, that is human actions, do I
want to see taking place--and why? • • •
It is obvious to what field of human knowledge all
these questions belong: to the field of ethics. What is
the good? What are the right actions for man to take?
What are man's proper values?
Since my purpose is the presentation of an ideal man,
I had to define and present the conditions which make him
possible and which his existence requires. Since man's
character is the product of his premises, I had to define
and present the kind of premises and values that create
the character of an ideal man and motivate his actions;
which means thaf I had to define and present a rational
code of' ethics. 8
When creating characters, she deals with heroic individuals
(as the protagonists, of course) who act according to a
17Albert Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion? (New York:
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1968), p. 254. Italics and quotation
marks in original.
18Ayn Rand, "The Goal of My vlriting," Part I, The
Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 10 (October, 1963), 3~
Italics in original.

10
i

specific code of valuas--Objectivist ethics.
cated to "the glory

o'!'

\_~

man.nl9

They are dedi-

She argues that a man is the

product of what values he chooses to accept.

Since her ideal

man does not yet exist, her novels create him by showing the
value changes that will have to occur if he is to exist.
Rand describes art as, "the indispensable medium for
the communication of a moral ideal,u20 which implies the
existence of a specific one which characters either endorse
or reject.

Because the moral ideal here portrays man as

heroic, her protagonists naturally will live according to a
code of ethics necessary for the achievement of that ideal.
Thus they may be believed insofar as they practice (in this
case) Objectivist ethics.

Rand's and Branden's own thoughts

en charact,ariza.ticn are important r.Ler-e, the former noting

that,
Characterization is the portrayal of those essential
traits which form the unique, distinctive personality
of an individual human being.
Characterization requires an extreme degree of selectivity. A human being is th& most complex entity on
earth; a writer's task is to select the essentials out
of that enormous complexity, then proceed to create an
individual figure, endowing it with all the appropriate
details down to the telling small touches needed to give
it full reality. The figure has to be an abstraction,
yet look like a concrete; [sic) it has to have the universality of an abstraction;-arid, simultaneously, the
unrepeatable uniqueness of a person.21
19Ayn Rand, "The Goal of My \vriting," Part II, The
Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 11 (November, 1963), ~
20Ayn Rand, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," in The
Romantic Hanifesto (New York: The New .American Library,Signet Press, 1971), p. 21.
21Rand, "Basic Principles of Literature," Ibid., p. 52.
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Branden elaborates on 'iwhat is meant by essentials:
They [her heroes] 'are projections of man as he might and
ought to be; they fr'e projections of the human potential •
• • • Ayn Rand does not ask: Do such men exist? She
asks: Should such men exist? • • • [Her] principle of
characterlzation is • • • to present a character by means
of essentials,· that is, to focus on the actions and attributes which reflect the character's basic values and premises--the values and prenises that motivate him and
direct his crucial choices • • • • To characterize by means
of essentials is to focus on the universal-to omit the
accidental, the irrelevant, the trivial, the contingent-and to present the fundamental motivational principles
which are potentially applicable to all men.22
By selecting the essentials, the principles which govern a
character's actions, Rand creates heroes or villains depending on whether or not they achieve moral excellence.

Thus,

critics who argue unbelievability ignore the criteria defined
as essential for character creation.
John Galt, the principal hero in Atlas Shrugged, dominates the novel.

The entire novel challenges the reader

(and characters in the novel itself) to learn his
and beliefs.23

id~ntity

Its first words, "Who is John Galt?" launch

a fascinating and brilliantly written epistemological mystery.

Later in the novel, Galt himself, in a 35,000 word

speech, provides the answer to his identity, as well as to
the nature of the moral code he practices.

As such, it

22Branden, "Hho Is Ayp. Rand?, p. 81.
italics in original.

Brackets and

23A careful reading of Atlas Shrucged reveals that
its several protagonists are unable to dlscern the nature
of Galt 1 s mission and thus, at first, act to thwart it. The
infallibility charge, therefore, cannot be sustained. It
results from a misreading of the novel. ~~at is significant, however, is that the protagonists continue to respect
and seek the truth.
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provides a valuable insight into Rand's concept of the educated man:
:Hy morality, the morality or reason, is contained in a
single axiom: existence exists--and in a single choice:
to live. The rest proceeds from these. To live, man
must hold tl~ee things as the supreme and ruling values
of. his life: Reason-Purpose-Self-esteem. • • • These
three values imply and require all of man's virtues, snd
all his virtues pertain to the relation of existence and
consciousness: rationality, independence, integrity,
honesty, justice, productiveness, pride • • • • Did you
want to know who is John Galt? I am the first man of
ability who refused to regard it as guilt. I am the £irst
man who would not do penance for his virtues or let them
be used as the tools of my destruction. I ma the first
man who would not suffer martyrdom at the hands of those
who 1.-rished me to perish for the privilege of keeping them
alive. I ru;l the first man who told· them that I did not
need them, and until they learned to deal "I-Ii th me as
traders, giving value for value, they would have to exist
without me, as I would exist without them; then I would
let them learn whose is the need and whose the ability-and if human survival is the standard, whose terms would
set the way to survive • • • • I swear--by my life and my
love of' it-that I wilJ never live for the sake of another
man, nor ask another man to live for mine.24
·
In brief, that selection from Galt's speech describes the
virtues, terms and conditions to which a rational man must
adhere if he is to approach the Randian concept of the educated man.
Critics such as Ellis have argued that such men as
John Galt could never exist; they are superhuman creatures
who never err, never commit one act of

L~orality

(according

to their own code), and re£use to recognize that man will
often choose the evil, even when trying to accomplish good. 25
But, the fact which Ellis refuses to recognize is that a man
24Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pp. 944, 957, 993.
2 5Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion?, pp. 179-96.
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who aspires to live

a~.

a John Galt might indeed err, as some

characters in Atlas S('lrugged do.

In.fallibility is not a

\

necessary condition here, but cognitive awareness is, meaning
that "Since man must act, his survival requires that he
apprehend26 reality, so that he may regulate his behavior
. 1 Y• n27
accor d ~ng

In other words, we may never be John Galts,

but if we choose to think, to set proper values, to consciously remain aware of reality, and to recognize and correct any errors in our thinking, then we are living properly.
So infallibility is not required; the willingness to think is.
Lastly, the charges of cruelty and hate require refutation.

If these charges are true, then the Objectivist

view of an educated man ought not to exist.

VJriting in

Commonweal. Patricia Donegan states the case:
Hiss Rand's book [Atlas Shrugged] is hardly acceptable as
a novel and her premise proceeds from hate. She deplores
the idea of Original Sin and considers "pity" immoral.
Nowhere does she use the word "compassion." She envisions
reward completely on the basis of merit, and this merit
is judged only by intelligence and ability. Charity and
humility have no place in the author's scheme of things.
The destruction of the weak to the advantage of the strong
is applauded. It is dispiriting to think of an outpouring
26Jiost realists choose to use the words correspond to,
rather than apprehend. For example, Van Cleve Ilforr~s wr~ tes
that the key to Real~st epistemology is, " • • • seeing to it
that our statements about the world we live in do in fact correspond tp the way things really are." See: Philosopht and
the American School (Boston: Houghton r·1ifflin Co., 196 ) ,
pp. 145-46. N.B.: Horris, though an Existentialist by conviction, has wr~tten about other philosophies.
27Nathaniel Branden, The Psvcholog~ of Self-Esteem
(New York: Bantam Books Inc., 1971), p. 7. Italics in
original.
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of hate on this scale on any audience. 2 8
Objectivism indeed rejects the concept of Original Sin as
immoral, but hardly out of hate.

Hebster 1 s Third New Inter-

national Dictionary defines Original Sin as follows:

"hered-

itary. sin or defect often held in Christian theology to be
transmitted from one generation to the next and inherited by
each person as a consequence of the original sinful choice
made by the first man of the human race."

John Galt speaks

of the term in his speech:
A sin without volition is a slap at morality and an insolent contradiction in terms: that which is outside the
possibility of choice is outside the province of morality. If a man is evil by birth, he has no will, he can
be neither good nor evil; a robot is amoral. To hold,
as man's sin, a fact not open to his choice is a mockery
of morality. To hold man's nature as his sin is a mockery of nature. To punish him for a crime he committed
before he 1-ra.s born is fl. mockery nf' jns tice ~ To hold him
guilty in a matter Hhere no innocence exists is a mockery
of reason. To destroy morality, nature, justice and
reason by means of a single concept is a feat of evil
hardly to be matched.29
Galt (and Rand) refuse to accept30 any code which would divorce moral culpability from free choice, for how can one
sin if he cannot choose?

If men are guilty by nature, then

no morality is possible to them.

Thus, the rejection of

28Patricia Donegan, "A Point of View: Atlas Shrugged,"
Commom-Ieal, LXVII (November, 1957), 156. Ny brackets.
29Rand, Atlas Shru~, p. 951.
3°The following, from the Richmond Times-Dispatch and
reprinted in The Objectivist, suggests that even chlldren
cannot accept Original Sin: ":r-rrs. A. T. Dinw·iddie asked her
Sunday school class what •you must do before you obtain forgiveness of sin.r There was a pause. Finally one 6-year old
timidly held up his hand and said: t Sin. 1 11 See: The Objectivist, VI, No. 3 (March, 1967), 14.
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Original Sin probably i_stems from a love of man and his poten~

tial for the heroic. \
\

..

Donegan next argues that Atlas Shrugged regards pity,
compassion, and charity as immoral.

A careful reading, how-

ever would reveal that what Objectivism rejects is altruism,
defined by Webster as "uncalculated consideration of, regard
for, or devotion to others' interests • • • •
consideration Rand totally eschews.

11

Uncalculated

More than once, she has

cautioned readers not to confuse altruism with benevolence
or ordinary human kindness:
Many people believe that altruism means kindness, benevolence or respect for the rights of others. But it means
the exact opposite: it teaches self-sacrifice, as well
as the sacrifice of others, to any unspecified ipublic
need"; it regards man as a sacrificial animal. 3
That is what Objectivism rejects--that man must (uncalculated
consideration) sacrifice his own self-interest as a moral
obligation:

"Do not hide behind such superficialities as

whether you should or should not give a dime to a beggar,"
Rand writes.

"That is not the issue.

The issue is whether

you do or do not have the right to exist without giving him
that dime.u32· Altruism derives from the premise of need-that one's need constitutes a moral claim on any producer,

31 Ayn Rand, "Theory and Practice," in Capitalism:
Unknown Ideal (New York: The New American Library, Slgnet
Press, 1967), p. 135.
32 Ayn Rand, Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the
:Hodern Horld, reprint of a lecture delivered at Yale University {February 17, 1960), Brooklyn College (April 4,
1960), and Columbia University (May 5, 1960). (New York:
The Objectivist Inc., 1960), 5. Italics in original.

The

16
who then becomes bound to satisfy it.

The moral issue in-

volved is this:
•• that a man has no claim on others (i.e. that it is

~ot their moral duty to help • • • and that he (one in

need] cannot demand their help as his right) does not
preclude or prohibit good will among men and does not
make it L~oral to offe) or to accept voluntary, nonsacrificial assistance. 3
one therefore remains free to provide whatever aid he wishes
to give to those less fortunate, provided he is not forced
to do so.34

In With Charity Toward None, William O'Neill

challenges the Objectivist definition of altruism noting,
"It is, in essence, the type of self-gratification which is
achieved by identifying oneself with, and subsequently participating in, the well-being of others on a psychological
level."35

But, O'Neill ignores an essential concept-

volition.

Of course one may derive gratification from help-

ing another, thus boosting his self-esteem, but the pleasure
soon dissipates if assistance becomes sustained obligation.
In fact, the very reason a benevolent (not altruistic) individual may find helping another pleasurable is because he
respects human dignity enough to want to voluntarily get involved.
Nathaniel Branden provides the philosophical distinc33Ayn Rand, "The Question of Scholarships," The Objectivist, V, No. 6 (June, 1966), 11-12. My brackets. Parentheses in original.
34It is for this reason that Objectivists reject the
welfare state. One is .forced to help those in "need" indefinitely. Thus the virtue of productivity becomes a vice,
.for the more a man produces, the more is available to loot.

35o 'Neill,

With Charity Tmvard None, pp. 201-02.
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tion between

altruism~nd

benevolence:

The literal philos~phical meaning of altruism is: placing
others above self. \As an ethical principle, altruism
nolds that man:mllst make the welfare of others his primary
concern • • • • A morality that tells man that he is to
regard himself.as a sacrificial animal, is not an expression of benevolence or good will • • • • Benevolence, good
will and respect for the rights of others proceed from an
opposite code of morality; from the principle that man the
individual is not an object of sacrifice, but an entity
0 ~ supreme value; that man exists for hi~ 6 own sake and is
not a means to the ends of others • • • •
Altruism, then, turns man into a sacrificial animal waiting
helplessly for the first claimant in need to feed upon him
by right.

Benevolence, however, has as its
regard for the right of man.

pro~ound

out of respect

~or

Hen help one another

the value of a human life (their own and

the person being helped), and not because they are
do so.

a:

~oundation

~creed

to

In an emergency situation, a man may properly risk

his life,

~or

benevolence.

example, to save children in a fire--this is
But, to have the victims of the fire then

claim that their rescuer must support them

inde~initely

since they have no home is altruism.
Thus, Rand's heroes are not unfeeling brutes who take
pleasure in destroying the weak as Donegan would have us believe, but people of

sel~-esteem

who respect the value of a

human life enough to not turn that value into a vice.

When-

ever there is a sacrifice, there is usually a victim.
Finally, Donegan suggests that Rand bases reward only
36Nathaniel Branden, "Benevolence versus Altruism,"
The Objectivist Newsletter, I, No. 7 (July, 1962), 27.
Italics in original.
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on the principle of m~rit or achievement.

This observation

distorts the principl'e of achievement as the foundation for
\,
\

human rights.

Especially here, there is no excuse for misin-

terpretation because Rand herself has addressed the issue in
clear, precise language when replying to a reader who asked
.about the connection betHeen reward and achievement.
notes:

She

"One loves a man's character, not his achievement;

one loves that in his character which made him capable of
.
n37
ac.1ev1ng.
h.

Thus, reward is contingent upon the type of

character that makes productive achievement possible.
John Galt, Hank Rearden and Rand's other fictional
heroes, then, are men and women dedicated to rational selfinterest, self-esteem and cognitive excellence, virtues
:me.kine; productive e.chjeve:ment poss:i.blf'!e

They are; in Rand's

words, the "new intellectuals," who are
• • • willing to think. All those who know that man's
life must be guided by reason, those who value their own
life and are not willing to su~render it to the cult of
despair in the modern jungle of cynical impotence • • • •
He will be an integrated man, that is: a thinker who is
a man of action. He will know that ideas divorced from
consequent action are fraudulent, and that action divorced
from ideas. is suicidal. He will knovr that the conceptual
level of psycho-epistemology30--the volitional level of
reason and thought--is the basic necessity of man's survival and his greatest moral virtue. He will know that
37Ayn Rand, "An Answer to Readers," The Objectivi·st,
VI, No. 3 (March, 1967), 13. Italics in original.
38psycho-epistemology is defined as: the study of
man's cognitive processes from the aspect of the interaction
between the conscious mind and the automatic functions of the
subconscious." See: Ayn Rand, 11 The Psycho-Epistemology of
Art," in The Romantic :Hanifesto, p •. l8.
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men need philosophy for the purpose of living on earth.39
Her educated man is a philosopher, meaning one dedicated to
reason, purpose, and self-esteem with their corresponding
virtues of independence, rationality, integrity, honesty,
justice, productiveness, and pride--all of which have special
meanings for Objectivists.

In stressing these virtues as

necessary for her educated man to practice, Rand demands a
change in human values, which ought to occur if his goal of
living on earth is to be realized.
SUMMARY
Philosopher-novelist Ayn Rand's interests include
Aristotle, Hugo's concept of the heroic, history, and mathematics~

In repudiating all forms of collectivism and the

moral evil of altruism, she has posited her concept of the
educated man, a "new intellectual" dedicated to reason, purpose and self-esteem.
Characters such as Hank Rearden, Howard Roark and
especially John Galt are profoundly moral men, men who Rand
thinks ought to exist.

Far from being inhuman or cruel,

these men dedicate themselves to the glory of man as a heroic
being.
This paper will deal with Rand's concept of the ideal
man, her educated man, and his potential for existence.

The

39Ayn Rand, "Introduction," For the New Intellectual
(New York: The New American Library, Signet Press, 1961),
pp. 50-5lo Italics in original.
·
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second chapter will discuss the intellectual antecedents

o~

Objectivism, and the third will develop in more detail the
metaphysics, epistemology and axiology

o~

Objectivism.

\

'\
CHAPTER TWO

THE ANTECEDENTS OF OBJECTIVISM
The first chapter suggests that Objectivism developed
!'rom ideas and concepts Ra..'1d formulated while a student.
Chapter two examines the question of influence 1 in more detail by studying the effect of:

Aristotle, Hugo, Spillane,

and the Social Darwinists, Herbert Spencer and vJilliam
sumner, upon Rand's Objectivism.
Aristotle's influence may be considered as threefold:
metaphysical and logical, educational, and aesthetic.

The

word Objectivism means that reality exists independeniJly
{i.e., is objective) of man's mind.

In expressing his belief

1 The question of influence presents many problems, and

is often extremely difficult to validate. First of all, influence should be taken to mean influence in a positive sense.
The ~efinition presumed throughout is Gottschalk's: 11 a persistent shaping effect upon the thought and behavior of hunan
beings, singly or collectively." Similarity of ideas does
not in itself constitute influence. Many factors such as
tradition, similarity between two cultures, etc. could account for two writers expressing like ideas.--rrProof must
be provided that the later writer was in fact exposed to the
ideas of the earlier one. 11 See: Louis Gottschalk, Understanding Historl (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1969),
pp. 245-54. Th1s chapter suggests that the above influences
shaped Rand's thinking contingent on the following questions
being successfully answered: Did Rand read the material concerned? Did she accept all or only part of what she read?
If accepted, do the ideas appear in her own v-rri tings and if
so, to what extent do they shape her thought? If these
questions can be satisfactorily answered, then the probability
of influence exists.
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in an objective reality, Aristotle takes issue with Plato's
dichotomy of shadows and forms, and suggests instead that
what the senses perceive constitutes true reality:
Now the view that neither the sensible qualities nor the
sensations would exist is doubtless true (for they are
affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata
which cause the sensation should not exist even apart
from the sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something
beyond the sensation; for that which moves is prior in
nature to that which is moved • • • • 2
of the senses Aristotle writes,-" • • • we do not regard any
of the senses as Wisdom; yet surely these give the most
authoritative knowledge of particulars. 11 3

Thus he concludes

that particular objects exist in reality, comprehended by
the mind through the senses.

As will be discussed shortly,

Rand accepts the same conclusions.
Aristotle believes that reality could be known through
four causes:

material, formal, efficient, and final,4 since

all men, when contemplating the nature of reality, seek
" • • • to deal with the first causes and the principles of
things."5

Such for Aristotle constitutes wisdom.

Rand

speaks of this when dealing with a man's ability to form
concepts:

w.

2 Aristotle, Metaphlsics, lOlOb 32-37. Trans.
D. Ross. Parentheses 1n original.
3rbid., 98lb 10-11.

4By way of example: If a man makes a coin, the material
cause
is the gold out of which it is made, the formal cause
.,.1S the shape the coin takes, the efficient cause is the man,
and the final cause is the purpose for which the coin is·made.
5Aristotle, Metaphysics, 98lb 29.

23
concepts of materials are formed by observing the differences in the constituent materials of entities.
(Haterials exist only in the form of specific entities,
such as a nugget of gol~ • • • • ) The concept of "gold,"
for instance is formed by isolating gold objects from
all others, and then abstracting and retaining the
material, the gold, and omitting the measurements of the
objects • • • in which gold may exist. Thus, the material, is the same in all the concrete instances sub~umed
under the concept, and differs only in quantity.b
The gold, then, exists independently of the mind and is perceived by the senses as Aristotle, likewise, would have it.
The principle of concept formation has as its base an independent reality.

The mind ignores specific (material) ex-

amples of gold, and abstracts the form.

~vi thout

the concept

of causality concept formation would be impossible in Randian
epistemology.
Aristotle's conception of reality involves the following specifics:

substance, form and matter, act and potency.

In Book VII of the Netaphysics, he discusses the concept of
substance defining it as a real entity, 'tvhich actually exists:

"that which 'is' primarily is the 'what• • • • • n7

We may observe how the Objectivist theory of concept formation develops from this:

a substance (gold) exists.as an

entity including its dimensions (accidents) which may be
separated from it only by a process of cognitive abstraction,
but may not exist apart from it.

Of course, all of the above

is contingent on the existence of an objective reality.

Both

6Ayn Rand, Introduction to ob·ectivist E iste:n?loQ"

(New York: The ObJect~v~st Inc., 1
original. Parentheses in original.

7Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028a 14.

ItaJ.~cs

ill
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philosophers, then, deny the concept of innate knowledge.
Aristotle divides substance into two categories:
form and matter.

The form of something, permanent and last-

.
is that which makes it what it is.
J.ng,

Form means type:

• • • the artist makes, or the father begets, a 'such'
out of a 'this'; and when it has been begotten, it is a
rthis such' • • • • And when we have the whole, such and
such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is
callias or Socrates; and-they are different in virtue of
their matteS (for that is different), but the same in
form • • •
Related to form is the principle of actuality or the existence of an object.

Substance (form) is actuality; it is

vThat an object actually is in reality.
Hatter is that which assUllles a given form and that
which makes any change possible, i.e., the raw material (the
goldj out of which is produced the coin.
is the principle of potentiality.

Related to matter

That is, an object has

the 'potential' to become 'actualized' by assuming a definite
form; therefore change occurs when potency becomes actualized.

Notes A. H. Armstrong:

• • • whenever a potentiality is coming to be actual there
is always an actual being existing in full actuality from
the beginning of the process which can be recognized as
its cause.9
Thus, potency is acted upon by an existing actuality, the
efficient cause, thereby bringing about change.
Aristotle's contribution to philosophy rests in his
directing " • • • attention to the world we actually experi8Ibid.,.l033b 22-24, 1034a
~

5-B.

9A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philoso(Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 81.
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ence, turning away f'rom the tendency to concoct other worlds
presumably more real than the one we wake up to every day.nlO
Rand's contribution to philosophy is of' like importance.
In accepting Aristotle's metaphysical position, Rand
outlines several principles including the f'ollowing:
My philosophy, Objectivism, holds that:
1. Reality exists as ~~ objective absolute--f'acts
are f'acts independent of' man's f'eelings, wishes, hopes or
i'ears.
2. Reason {the f'aculty which identifies and integrates tte material provided by man's senses) is man's
only means of' perceiving reality, his only source of
know~edge
his only guide to action, his basic means of'
surv~val.

11

In dif'f'erent words, Aristotle says the same thing:

that

reality is objective, not spiritual, and that entities exist
which the mind, via the senses, may come to understand.
Technically, hmvever, Aristotle states that the mind consists of' an active and potential power.

The potential {or

receptive) mind is only capable of' synthesizing sense data
(referred to, therefore, as the common sense), but the final
act of synthesis

(~)

must be peri'ormed by the active mind.

This higher or active power is uniquely man•s.
The Randian concept of metaphysics is related to her
second point as i'ollows:
Existence exists--and the act of grasping that statement
implies tHo corollary axioms: that something exists
which one perceives and that onH exists possessing consciousness. • • • ivhatevel' the degree of' your knoviledge

----------·------

1°van Cleve I'1?:r7i~, ~.h).l~h;y and ~:he Amar_tcru1 School
Houghton Mliflln Lo., 1)61 , p. ~6.

(Boston:

llAyn Hand, "Introducing Objectivism," Tl:?_£_~~ivis:!?,

Hm·rsletto1•. I, No. 8 (August, 1962), 35"
....._,
···<~·-·-

"'"t ..·---~-- ,•

or:LgJ.nal.

ParentllorJos ln
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these two-existence and consciousness-are axioms you
cannot es·cape, these two are the irreducible primaries
u.e. ~ metaphysical) implied in any action _you undertake • • • • Whether you know the shape o~ a pebble or
the s~ructure or a solar system~ the axioms remain the
same: that it exists [independent or t~ mind] and that
you know it tvia the senses and reason]. 2
In other

words~

to survive on earth, one must knoH that an

objective reality exists ("something exists which one perceives"-Rand; "but that the substrata which cause the sensation sh01;tld not exist even apart rrom the sensation is
impossible 11 -Aristotle), with survival contingent on the
degree to Hhich the mind corresponds to what is real.

To

evade reality is to derine the wish or wh±m as the real,
thereby leading to epistemological and metaphysical chaos.
Although Objectivist metaphysics will be discussed later in
more detail, sufrice it to say that f'or no"fl, Ra..."'l.d believes
(as does Aristotle) that an objective reality exists, and
that man must use his reason ir he is to live as a man.
Objectivism derives intellectual ballast not only
f'rom Aristotle 1 s metaphysics, but also rron his OJ?ganon, the
logical treatises.
(A

:o=

Specirically, the princ:iple of' identity

A) and its metaphysical implications are of' vital sig-

niricance to Rru1d:
The LaiJ of' Identity (A is A) is a rational man•s paramount consideration in the process of determining his
interests. He kn01vs that the contradictc•ry is the impossibJ.e ~ • • ho does not permit himself' to hold contr·adicto:r-:y values, to pursue contradic to:r>y goals. • • •
~~he som•co o:f man 1 s rights is • • • the .law oi' identity.
12
Ayn Rru1d, "This Is John Galt Speak5_ng, n in For tho
l'!_cnJ Intel1ectual (NeH York: The Ne1v American I,ibrary, s~c;not
Pross-;-J.lJoll, pp. l2L~-·25. Hy brackets. Italics in original.
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.A is A and man is man. Rights are conditions of exist
ence required by man's nature for his proper survival. 13
Because Objectivist ethics--the value system to which her
educated man ought to aspire--is contingent on the principle
of identity, it becomes necessary to determine Aristotle's
use of the principle, and whether Rand.correctly interprets
its use.
Aristotle notes, " • • • it (substance] has no con~
trary.

What could be the contrary of any primary substance,

such as the individual man or animal?

It has none.ul4

In

other words, A =A--the substance man is the substance man.
Related to this principle is what Aristotle terms, "the most
certain principle of all," the principle of. contradiction,
or the principle of identity in negative form.
ciple of contradiction states,

11

•••

The prin-

that the same attri-

bute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the
same subject and in the same resnect.u15
Rand has much to say about these principles.

\,Jhen

addressing those who choose to evade reality by wishing
something to be the real, John Galt comments:
Whatever you chocse to consider, be it an object, an
attribute, or an action, the law of ide:1ti ty rereains the
same. A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the sar::.e time, it cannot
1 3Ayn Rand, "The 'Conflicts • of Ncr:' s Interests," in
The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: The New American
L:fbiary;-·signetfiress;·l964), p. 51. ItaJics in original.

14Aristotle, Catef!vJ:•ies, 3b 24-:?6.
Edghill.

My brackets.

15~td., l005b 18-20.

Trans. E. M.
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freeze and burn at the same time. A is A• • • • The restriction they (those who seek to deny the law and thus
evade reality] seek to escape is the law of identity.
The f:r:>edom they seelc is freedom from the fact that an A
will remain an A, no matter what their tears and tantrums • • • • An honest man does not desire until he has
identified the object of his desire. He says: 1 It is,
therefore I want it.• They [the evaders] say: 1 I want
it, therefore it is.tl6
It becomes apparent that the Objectivist view of reality
rests on the axiom:

A is A--man is man and existence exists,

regardless of the wish.

In the context of Objectivism, then

the law is a moral law and those who evade reality by substituting wishes (I want it, therefore it is) for what is,
and act upon those suppositions as if they were real, deny
reason as man's absolute and proceed to force others to conform to the.ir private reality.

For exaraple, l-rhen students

threaten to riot unless their demands are met, Rsnd argues
that they vTish the right to force the university to conform
to their mm private version of reality.

But, just as a

leaf cannot at the same time be a stone, so their personal
versions of reality cannot at the same time constitute Hhat
is really real.

The rebelling students thus violate the

Principles of Identity and Contradiction.

She vrri tes:

In ordor to live, man must act; in order to act, he must
make choices; in order to make choices, he must define a
code of values, he must knoH what he is [rational] and
Hhere he is (objective rea1ity1-i.e., he must know his
o-vm natu1~e (including his means of knowledge) and the nature of the t:miverse in which he acts • • • • He needs

----------16H8.nd,
II?-.~_£_;L1e~_!:ua!,

This Is John Galt Speakim~."
in For the-NeH
. .::>,
pp. 125, 150, 155. My brackets.
11
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,Ehilosophy. 1 7
For now, the where is important.

For Rand, man lives in an

Aristotelian universe, which implies a definite epistemological construct--namely that man's mind is competent to understand and deal with the 1-.eali ty implied in the metaphysics.
In so doing, a man makes choices which suggest a specific
code of values.

The educational implications are signif'i-

cant and will be discussed in future chapters.
One of Objectivism's critics, Albert Ellis, denies
the validity of making the law of identity a moral concept,
and suggests an improper application of the term:
It is notable that where the objectivists are constantly
quoting Aristotle's Law of Identity in an effort to prove
that anyone lvho in any way lives ""Ti th compromises and
· contradictions is horribly immoral • • • , Aristotle himself did not use the Law in this manner. On the contrary,
in regard to human affairs, he constantly espoused what
has come to be lr..nown as the Aristotelian mean-that is,
conduct that is moderate and avoids extremes or excesses.
• • • The Lav-1 of Identity Has devised by Aristotle as a
logical measure to demonstrate when two propositions are
contradictory. It does not necessa1•ily imply, hmvever,
that it is wrong or terrible for contradictions to exist.lb
Again, Ellis is only partly correct for although Aristotle
does indeed suggest the golden mean (Nicomachean Ethics,
Book II, Chapter VI) as a guide for conduct, in the MetaPhJsics he speaks of the consequences of holding contradictions.

First, stating the principle of contradiction (the

17 Ayn Rand, 11 Philosophy and Sense o1'"' Life, 11 in The
Romant:i.c J'Tanifesto (lJm·l York: The Nei·J Am.e1·ican Library;SJ.gnot Press 1 1971), p. 30. Hy brackets. Italics in
o.riginal.
lc3r..lb
I"' Ob ~cc
·· t.lVJ..Sr.~~_::_~_:._J..gJ..on.
.
R 1 • •
?
( New Yor k :
~~
er t 1",1 J J..• ....c..< , _:.';
Lyle Stum't, 1968), pp. i9"2-':13. It~:LLJ.cs J...a orrglnal.
,L', ••••
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negative of the principle of identity),
• • • the same attribute cannot at the same time belong
and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect • • • it is impossible frr any one to believe the
same thing to be and not to be • • • ,19
he next proceeds to identify the type of man who would deny
it, and what consequences l-rould result:
But if all are alike both wrong and right one who is in
this condition will not be able either to speak or to say
anything intelligible • • • and if he makes no judgment
but 'thinks' and 'does not think,' indifferently, what
difference -vdll there be between him and a vegetable?20
It would appear, according to Aristotle himself, that the
principles of contradiction and identity have profound moral
consequences, for to evade them is to evade judgment, which
is to evade thinking, which is to cease to be a man.

In ac-

cepting the metaphysical position of Aristotle and his law
of identity, Ha...'1.d has defined the premises to which her educated man ought to adhere.

He is one who accepts the exist-

ence of objective reality which cannot be contradicted or
evaded.
Aristotle's concept of the educated man should be examined to determine whether Hand accepts it.

Because he did

not write a speciric educational document, it becomes necessary to deter•rnine his educational beliefs by consulting the
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.

The discu.ssion will be

limited to the nature of happiness (the good) and education's
role :in helping man to achieve it.

----·-------19 Aristotle, tJiotarhxsics, l005b 18-20, 23-24.
2oibid., 1oo8b 8-13.
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In the Politics, Aristotle notes:
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his
attent:on above all to the education of youth; for the
neglect of education does harm to the constitution • • • •
That education should be regulated by law and should be
an affair of state is not to be denied.21
Rand does not completely endorse Aristotle's thinking, and
here is an example of disagreement.

Although she emphati-

cally rejects state control of education,22 opting instead
for a privately operated and administered school system, she
does believe along with Aristotle that politics as method of
inquiry must not be divorced from ethics, and that both have
a practical aim.

Writes D. J. Allan:

• • • namely the promotion and maintenance of human
happiness • • • likeviise the purpose oi' lecturer and student is not merely to learn the truth, but to improve men
and make them happier.23
21Aristot1e, Politics, 1337a 11-14, 33-4.
B • Jot-Tett.

Trans.

22This point, vihich runs counter to the American educational practice of common schooling for all, will be considered when Objectivism and American educational practice
is discussed. The case for a private educational system is
stated by Nathaniel Branden. See: "Intellectual .Ammunition
Department, 11 'l'he Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 6 (June,
1963), 22.
23rt is important to understand what Aristotle means
by happiness. The Greek word is eudairnonirt, meaning good
demon. \-Jhat Aristotle does is to change tGo concept from an
external one (demon) to an internal one, thereby making man
hilnsE)lf' responsible for his own happiness; not some external
force. The educational implications are s5. enificant:
11
•
..
• when heavy responsibility for the course of' human
affairs is shifted to its human origin, e{lacation takes upon
itself enormous activities." See: Robel~i!; s. Brumbaugh and
Nathaniel H. Lawrence, Philosophers on Education: Six Es!lay~~
on ~}]8 Foundf:i.tion of 1.1estern 'l hou.r>;ht (Bost..:m: Houghton,
Nii'1'11.n Co .. 1 196.5), pp., 5I~-55. Hand accep'i:;s this position,
noting that man must create his own happiness through tho.o.xercise of reason, engaged in productive work. For seloct1on
1
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To this end Objectivism completely subscribes as the rollowing, from Anthem, makes clear.

A character speaks:

I know not ir this earth on which I stand is the core of
the universe or ir it is but a speck of dust lost in
eternity • • • • For I know what happiness is possible to
me on earth. And my happiness needs no higher aim to
vindicate it. My happiness is not the means to any end.
It is the end. It is its own goal. It is its own purpose.24
It remains to be determined whether Rand and Aristotle mean
the same thing when speaking of happiness for both merely
valuing happiness as man's end would not be enough grounds
for suggesting influence.

Aristotle attempts to discover

the relationship man has to happiness by determining the
function of man.

He writes:

What, then, can this function be? It is not life; for
life is apparently something that man shares with plants;
and we are looking for something peculiar to him. We must
exclude therefore the life of nutr•i tion and growth. There
is next what may be called the life of sensation. But
this, too, apparently is shared by man with horses, cattle
and all other animals. There remains vJha t I may call the
active li.fe o.f the rational part o.f man's being • • • •
The .function o.f man then is activity of soul in accordance
with reason, or not apart from reason.25
Aristotle thus believes that man's function, unique to him
as man, is rational activity.

The active mind actualizes

what potential man ha.s f'or living as man, Rnd f'urther serves
to control emotions.
quoted above, see: D. J. AlJ.an, The Philo[wphy of Aristotle
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), J::p. 123-2~--2LJ..Ayn Hand, Anthem (NeH York:
Signet Press, 1946)-;--pp--;--123-25.

The HeH American Library,

25Aristotle, Nicomnchean Ethics, 1097b 33-35, 1098a
1-3, 6-7. Trans. James 0elidou:------
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Proper activity for Aristotle must be learned through
the educative process.
question:

Of particular concern here is the

"What kind of education will produce the disposi-

tions desired by a given individual? • • • n26

Aristotle

concludes that the best kind of education should have as its
goal the aim of all men--happiness, the best and noblest
activity in the world, namely the performance of intrinsically excellent activities.
are intrinsically excellent?

But what activities of the soul
Aristotle speaks of arete,

commonly translated as virtue, but meaning more accurately,
excellence depending on knmvledge.
of the intellect:

There are two virtues

(1) theoretical wisdom (sophia) and (2)

practical wisdom (phronesis).27

These could be acquired,

he believes, through education, chiefly ·the lecture method,
but not without some activity on the learnerts.part.

Sophia

is concerned with permanent and objective moral truths which
men must come to knov-r by study.

Sophia, however, must oper-

ate in conju...'1c tion with phronesis, an application of' the
f'ormer to a particular situation.
Although Rand does not use precisely these same words,
she does consider cognitive developmen·t to be man's best and
noblest activity:
Rat:i.onality is man 1 s basic virtue, the source of' all his

----·------·--26uLL1:tam Prankona, Three Historical Philosophies of'
Educa t:ion ( Glen-v~iew, Illino1s: Scott, !:<"O:re"Sman and Company,
196 5 ;-; P:' 19 27Brtl.rnbaugh and LaHrenco,
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other virtues. Man's basic vice, the source or all his
evils, is the act of' unf'ocusing his mind, the suspension
of' his consciousness, which is not blindness, but the
ref'usal to see, not ignorance, but the ref'usal to know.
Irrationality is the rejection of' man's means of' survival. • • • The virtue of' Productiveness is the recognition of' the f'act that productlve work lS thg process by
which man's mind sustains his life. • • • 2
Thus, intellectually excellent activity consists of' using
one's reason by engaging in productive work.

Rand believes

that man needs both theoretical wisdom (philosophy) in order
to live as a man, and practical wisdom (proper conduct) in
order to live as a moral being.

Both philosophers consider

reason a virtue, and--as later chapters will suggest--Rand
is extremely critical of' American education f'or its f'ailure
to provide moral leadership f'or young people.
Aristotle also considers morally excellent activity,
calling it virtues of' character such as prudence and justice.
These are contingent upon, and cannot operate without
phronesis.

The virtues hailed by Rand as proper to any edu-

cated man include:

rationality, independence, integrity,

honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride.

These will be

considered Hhen Objectivist ethics are exam.ined.
A clear relationship betl-;een intellectually and moral-

ly excellent activity is established by botr1 Aristotle and
Rand, the former noting:

---------·---

28Ayn Hand, "The Objectivist Ethics, f' in The Virt~
of Selfishness, pp. 25-26. Italics in original. Other
phi1o:Jopti8rs-fncluding Hegel and Kant v;ould also identify
cognitive development as man's noblest activity. Rand, hoHever, rejects thoir interpretations as destructive. Interested readcr·s should consult the :introductory essay in ~
The Now Intellectual, PPo 10-57.

_____
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• • • that since moral virtue is a state of character
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire,
therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire
right, if the choice is to be ~ood, and the latter must
pursue just what the former asserts • • • • This is why
choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect
or without a moral state • • • • 29
Man, in acting to achieve happiness as his final end, must
use his reason in the choice-making process.

Since right

choice implies some moral standard, the latter becomes a
necessary condition in the life of a moral man.

Both Rand

and Aristotle require a rational evaluation of activity, with
Rand also noting that the decision to be rational involves a
value judgment, namely the worth of the mind.

Writing in

this connection, Nathaniel Branden observes:
Objectivism locates man's free will in a single action
of his consciousness, in a single basic choice: to focus
his mind or to suspend it; to think or not to think • • •
man has the nm-1er to regulate the actio:q of his ~ ~
SCTo'USrie"S"'S; Han has the p01.-1er to exercise his rational
faculty--or to suspend it.30
One who chooses to evade thinking, to ignore his reason,
ceases to engage in intellectually excellent activity and
lives as a vegetable, to use Aristotle's metaphor.

For Rand

and Al,istotle survival is far from automatic; a man must
think to survive, and that requires consciously sustained
choice.
Criteria determining morally excellent activity,
thinks Aristotle, arise only in a social context, :for
29Aristotle, Nico::nachoan Ethics, 1139a 22-26, 32-33·
30Na th2.niel Branden, 11 Intellectual An1!YllL.'1.i tion Department, li ~:'he Ob,-iectivist Newsletter, III, No. 1 (January, 1961+) 1
3. Italics :i.ri.·- orTginal.
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n • • • by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with
other men we become just or unjust.n31
actions that moral states arise.32

It is .from social

The principle developed

by Aristotle to govern this activity is known as the golden

-

mean.
For Aristotle, one must never33 be disposed to act in

either deficiency or excess, and it is the runction of the
educative process to cultivate behavior in accordance with
the golden mean.

D. H. Allan explains how:

A good character is a whole set of • • • dispositions; in
order to produce it, you must make your pupil take up the
right attitude under your directiop, until he can do so
spontaneously and from knowledge.34
For example, we may observe that there exists a mean between
the excesses of confidence and cowardice, namely bravery.

A

man may be conrident and lacking in fear, thererore rash, or
rearful and lacking in confidence, therefore a coward.
port~~tly,

however, the learner must act to be moral.

ImIn

31Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter I,
p. 953.

32Here is another instance where Rand and Aristotle
disagree, tho formel' not sharing tho latter's enthusiasm for
man as servant of the state. Branding such an anti-democratic attitude as collectivistic, she postulates instead
the belief that mor•ally excellent activity, while operative
in a social context, derives .from reason-the only ethical
absolute Ob,iectivism recognizes •.
33Al~is totl8 qualifies this noting:

11

•
•
• not every
action nor every pas.sion admits o.f a mean; for some have
names that already imply badness, e.g~, • • • adultery,
theft, murdel' . • • • It is not possible then, ever to be
right Hi tb. regard to them; one must aluays be Hrong. 11 See:
Nicomaclw_an Ethic~, Book II, Chapter IV.

3L~fl.llan, 'l'l~~P~Y o.f Aristotl~, p. 128.
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other words,

• • • moral virtue consists in observance or the Mean by
or conduct actually approved or condemned according to prevailing standards.35
instar~es

For Aristotle--and here again Rand disagrees--standards of
behavior which the child learns as he intellectually matures
are set by the state as a means or
tutions.36

preservL~g

its own insti-

For the sake or clarification, we may briefly

outline the Objectivist concept or a just state:
The proper functions or a government fall into three
broad categories, all or them involving the issues or
physical force and protection of man's rights: the
police, to protect men from criminals--the armed-s8rVlces, to protect men from foreign invaders--the law
courts, to settle disputes among men according to obJeCtlve laws.37
All other governn1ental activities, other than those specified above, are therefore irmnoral if the government chooses
to engage in them, since so doing involves the·violation of
someone•s rights.
It should be noted that Aristotle's use of the "golden
mean" as man's proper guide to moral conduct conflicts with
Randian ethics.

Aristotle

co~nents:

Again, ho".·rever much all things may be so 'and not so'
still there is a more or less in the nature or things;
for He should not say that two and three are equally
even, nor is he rrho thinlm four things are five equally
35rt.?_id .. , p. 13o.
36Thomas Davidson, Aristotle and Anc:i.ent Educational
Ideals (:Hew York: Burt Pranki1n, l9b9), p. 179. See aiso :.
Aristotle, Politics, Boolc VIII.
~'he

net

37 Ayn Hand, 11 'l1 he Nature of Government, n in Capitalism:
Unknm:n Idoal (NoH York: The Ne·H American Library, SigPress;19b'ff; p. 3~J~. Italics in original.
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wrong with him who thinks they are a thousand. If' then
they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less ln>ong
and therefore more right. If' that which has more of' any
quality is nearer the norm, there must be some truth to
which the more truer is near • • • and we shall have got
rid of the unqualified doctrine which woulg prevent us
from determining anything in our thought.3
Here, Aristotle argues that in human conduct, a man's actions
may be "less wrong and therefore more right."

In other

words, in any given dispute, the parties concerned may each
argue their actions to be morally justifiable.

For example,

one 1-1ho steals rather than work certainly is more wrong than
a man who steals a loaf of' bread to f'eed his starving child.
But, concluding that A is A, good is good and bad is
bad, Ayn Rand disagrees with her philosophical hero.

In an

article entitled "The Cult of r-1oral Grayness," she voices
her conviction:
One of the most eloquent symptoms of the moral bankruptcy
of today's culture is a certain fashionable attitude to"t-lard moral issues best summarized as: "There are no
blacks and whites, there are only grays." • • • Before
one can identify anything as "gray," one has to knov;r what
is black and what is white. In the field of morality,
this means that one must first identify what is good and
what is evil. And when a man has ascertained that one
alternative is good a...'Yld the other evil, he has no justification for choosing a mixture • • • f'or choosing any
part of that which one knows to be evil.39
Several factors are bothersome.

Aristotle's doctrine of the

mean, which he favors over the law of identity as a moral
guide, appears more applicable to a broader range of ethical
pr·oblems than the latter, which would be sul'ficient if all
38Aristotle, }'~si?_~, 1008b 32·~37, l009a
39Ayn Hand,

1~_ws1Bt~~'
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of man's moral dilemmas were clear cut.

But, common sense

and experience indicate that many decisions a man must make
involve a certain amount of goodness on both sides.
Rand's own economic thinking comes an example.

From

She f'avors

laissez-faire capitalism over the welfare state, since the
former respects individual rights, while the latter implies
stealing from those who produce.
the questic•n of orphans arises.

All well and good, until
Obviously they are too young

to work; yet under laissez-faire Capitalism no public money
may be spent to aid them, for A is A and socialism in any
form is immoral.
Rand herself seems to sense this dilemma when arguing
that voluntary charity violates no Objectivist ethical guideline.

Yet, is not voluntary charity a mean betv-reen the ex-

treme of laissez-faire Capitalism and the welfare state?

To

carry the example further, we might imagine the existence of
orphans not Han ted by anyone.

vlha t becomes of them?

It would

appear that some sort of public aid would have to be forthcoming.

Relying on the golden mean, then, one may be an ad-

vocate of capital ism and totally anti--..;elfa.re state and
therefore a laissoz-.fairo Capitalist, or an advocate of the
welfare state and therefore totally anti-capitalist, a
socialist.

But, the mean between the two is voluntary aid,

Hi th government aid one stop closer to the vTolfare state.
He must remomber, however, that Aristotle argues
against some actions
mean.

{murder~.)

as never admitting to a

In such cases, the principle of identity remains in

full operation, warning men that they cannot fake reality by
substituting their own wishes
they act as
there~ore,

function

i~

the real.

their dreams were reality.

the principle

~or

~or

o~

identity

At no time may
In many cases,
an invaluable

per~orms

man, warning him that contradictions ought not

to exist, but there are occasions when the golden mean is
clearly more rational, as Rand implies when advocating voluntary charity.
It should be noted that Aristotle considers morally
excellent activities to be excellent because
trinsic qualities.

~·Je

o~

their in-

learn to act virtuously by seeking

the good through contemplation and morally virtuous activity.
This has important implications
Aristotle notes in Book II

o~

~or

the educative process as

the Ethics:

Actions then are called just and temperate when they are
such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is
not the man who does these that is just and temperate,
but the man who also does them as just a~d temperate men
do them. It is well said, then, that by doing just acts
that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate
acts the temperate man; without doing ~hese no one would
have even a prospect o~ becoming good.~O
John Burnet observes that the concept

o~ per~ormance

lies at

the heart o~ Aristotle's whole phil~sophy o~ education.41
One acquires virtue by practicing the types
Hhich produce virtue.

o~

activity

In other words, a good man is one who

acts morally, which is Hhat Rand means when she says that a
40Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, lOO_s'b
br•idge:

5-12.

}_IJ·Joh.1"1 Rurr!Gt, ( ed.), Aristotle on Education
Cam.bridge University Pross, 19""6'7}, p. 46~

( C&"':l.-

philosopher is an individual who acts.
The Poetics of Aristotle must also be examined to determine if influence exists.

In The Romantic Manifesto, .a

book devoted to her theory of art and literature, Rand defines art as, " • • • a selective re-creation of reality
according to ~artist's metaphysical value judgments."42
This relationship between art and metaphysics is interesting
and signifi.cant .43

Rand quotes the f'ollowing which appears

in the Poetics,
• • • the distinction between historian and poet is not
in the one writing prose and the other verse; • • • it
consists really in this, that the one describes the thing
thaif4has been, and the other a kind of thing that might
be.
She then continues, noting that
The place of ethics in any given work of art depends on
42Rand, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art:" in The
Romantic Hanifesto, p. 19. Italics in original.
43For additional evidence, see Ayn Rand: "The Goal
of !1y Writing," The Objectivist Newsletter, II, No. 10
(October, 1963), 38-40. She notes therein: "There is a
passage in The Fountainhead that deals with this issue: the
passage in '\vhich HoHard Roark explains to Steven Hallory why
he chose to do a statue for the Stoddard Temple. In writing
that passage, I was consciously and.deliberately stating the
essential goal of my m·m work: 11 • • • I think you're tho
best sculptor we've got. I think it, because your figures
are not what men are, but Hhat men could be-and should be.
Because you've gone beyond the probable and made us see what
is poBsible, • • • your figures are more devoid of contempt
for huraani ty than any 1vork I 1 ve ever seen
your figures
are the heroic in man • • • • Your figures are not what men
are, but what they could be-and should be.n This line will
make it clear whose great philosophical principle I had accepted • • • • 11 She means Aristotle, and goes on to cite the
above passage from the Poetics.
¢

44Aristotlo, Poetics, ll.J-5lb

••
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the metaphysical views of the artist. If, consciously or
subconsciously, an artist holds the premise that man possesses the power of volition, it will lead his work to a
value orientation. • •• An art work may project the
values man is to seek and hold up to h~ the concretized
vision of the life he is to achieve. 4~
The relation of ethics to art as defined by Aristotle becomes
the principle used by Ayn Rand in her novels.

Believing that

art's function is to select the essentials necessary for a
given value change (Objectivist ethics) she proceeds to create an

ide~·.l

man.

Both philosophers, in harmony for the most

part, see art's purpose as presenting an ideal man.

This is

the reason why she refers to herself as a Romantic Realist.
\men G. E. R. Lloyd in his study of Aristotle comments:

11

• • • it is an important part of Aristotle's doc-

trine that the poet and the artist represent things not
merely as they are, but as they might be and as they should
be,rr4 6 one could substitute Rand for Aristotle without violating its spirit.
What then may be said of Aristotle and Ayn Rand?
Were the latter 1 s v1ri tings and beliefs influenced by the
former?

It is this writer's belief that Aristotle's influ-

once is persistent and shaping.

lve ·have sho-vm that Rand

1-vas exposed to Aristotle's thought; that she accepts him as
the only philonopher i·Jho influenced the development of Objectivism.

Beliefs accepted include:

an objective reality,

45Hand, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," p. 23.

h6a. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Grm..rth and Structure
of His Thour;ht ( Crunbridge: Cambridge lJ'YiJ.vor·s-rty Pr•es s,
T9GS""), pp. Z/Tf-?5.
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the principles of identity and eontradiction, rationality as
man's essential characteristic, man's end on earth should be
happiness, and the concept of morally oriented art.

There-

tore, despite the fact that Rand rejects Aristotle's belief
that the state should control the educative process, reasonable evidence does exist that Rand 1 s knowledge of Aristotle
influenced the development of Objectivism.
The second area of investigation is the Romantic movement in literature.

Although evidence seems to support in-

fluence, the matter requires further consideration.
As a distinct and recognizable movement, the
of Romanticism remain difficult to trace.

or~gins

However, literary

historians usually mark the 1790's as the beginnings of the
Romantic movement in English,47 for in 1798, Coleridge and
Wordsworth published their Lyrical Ballads, the preface to
which set down characteristics of the new verse.48
Because a denotative definition of Romanticism seldom
satisfies anyone, the term may be best described by suggesting
several characteristics, the chief of which is individualism.49
47For evidence which justifies the 1790's as the beginnings of Romanticism in English literature, consult David
Perkins, ( ed.), English Romantic t•Jri ters (Nmv- York: Harcourt
Brace and World,-r9b7), pp. 1~
48The preface appeared in the 1800 edition.
49These include: individualism, worship of nature,
exoticism, nationalism, and disillusiomnent... \-Then all or
most are present, the literature is usuall~r said to be Romantic. See Rod l'l. Horton and Vincent Hopper, Backgrounds of
European Literatm:>e (New York: Appleton-Ce:ntury-Cro.fts,
'I'9W), pp. )bl-61}.-
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The Romantics regarded the wel.fare o.f the ;individual, not
of the state or group, as the primary object .for consideration and sought a society which would allow the most
complete .freedom o.f action, both political and social.5°
Individualism best appeals to Rand, who argues that Romanticism derives its essence .from the concept o.f volitional consciousness, which allows man to choose his own values.

In

order to keep them, he must ~ properly.51
But, a serious problem arises .for anyone .familiar
with Romantic literature.

Objectivism has been discussed in

terms of its fidelity to Aristotelian Realism.

Most literary

historians, however, see Romanticism as essentially an emotional reaction against the rigid rationalism of Classicism.
Discontent found expression in anti-rational, anti-industrial
moods characterized by one critic as a lack of concern,
• • • uith portr•aying a rational or external world; it
is very much concerned with portraying the world from the
vantage point of the personality of the writer • • • it
is largely this pOiver to set forth one's individual emotions, personal ideas • • • which distinguishes this temper from the classical and from the realistic.52
Moody, emotional and imaginative53 reactions hardly seem consistont with Objectivism's strictly realistic temper, espe50rbid., Po 361.
51Ayn Rand, "VJhat Is Romanticism?," in The Romantic
Manifesto, pp. 64-65.
5 2 Addison Hibbard and Horst Frenz, (eds. ), Writers o.f
.!_he \·!estern Ho:r.>ld (Boston: Houghton Hifflin Co., "196-rT;-Po

J9>.

53The classic study of the Romantic mind and the faculty of imaeination, complete ~lith supernatural and emotional
trappings, is: John L. Lmv-es, The Road to Xanadu(Cambridgo,
Mass.: Riverside Press, 1927). 'l'he &ubject of the book is
Coleridge 1 s imaginD.tion as it influenced his composition.
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cially when they o.ften conflict, even when describing the
same event.54
Still another characteristic of Romanticism which appears to conflict with Objectivist principles is the desire
of the poet or novelist to escape the harshness of present
reality, longing instead for a more utopian existence, either
with Nature or in the past.

Thus, Coleridge could write of

pleasure domes and scared rivers.55

As if in validation,

many of the major English Romantic poets le.ft England, seeking adventure in foreign lands.

Lord

Byron~

for example,

died in Greece, fighting for that country's independence.
For a philosophy which prides itself on the principle that
one must face reality and never evade it, Objectivism seems
strangely inconsistent with the Romanticism of Byron,

~'lords-

worth and Coleridge.
F. L. Lucas even attempts to define Romanticism in an
Aristotelian context, and concludes much the same, at least
54For example, in September 1802, Wordsvwrth wrote of
London: "Earth has not anything to show more fair: I Dull
would he be of soul who could pass by I A sight so touching
in its majesty: • • • 11 In the sa...llle month and of the same
subject: "r·1iltonl thou shouldst be living at this hour: I
England hath need of thee; she is a .fen I Of stagnant waters;
altar, S't-Tord, and pen, I Fireside, the hel'c-ic wealth of all
and bower, I Of inward happiness • • • • 11
It matters little to Wordsworth that the reactions to
London in the same month conflict; rather 't-Jhat is signif'ioant
is that the poet .feels different emotions each time he looks
at the city, and expresses himself accordingly. Another sign
of conflict appears in the .first poem. Usually, the Romantic
poets scorned city life, seeking escape to the wilds of' nature. Thus, Word::n-mrth 1 s praise seems out of' place.
55The poem is "Kubla Khan."
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by implication:

"Romantic literature," he writes, "is a

dream-picture of life; providing sustenance and fulfillment
for impulses cramped by society or reality.u56

Now if

Aristotle indeed would have defined Romanticism that way, it
appears that when Rand classifies herself as a Romantic, she
cannot at the same time logically support Aristotelian philosophy.

Emotionalism as a basis for individuality, subjec-

tivism, and evasion of reality do not even appear to be Objectivistic, much less Aristotelian.
Rand, however, appears to be aware of the traditional
characteristics of Romanticism, and counters the contradiction in tvro ways.

First, she defines herself as a Romantic

Realist, and secondly completely disagrees with the literary
historians• description of Romantic art.
What is a Romantic Realist?
te1~s

At first glance, the

appear contradictory, but all one need do to resolve

the apparent illogic is read her novels and writings on the
nature of art.

As suggested above, she believes Romantic

literature recognizes the principle that man possesses the
faculty o:f volition, this " • • • a function of man•s rational faculty."57

Because the Romantics failed to identify the

relationship between volition and reason, they linked it to
emotionalism, thus (according to Rand's analysis) perpetrating their own decline and fall headlong into Naturalism,

56p. L. Lucas, The Decline and Fall of the Romantic
];_9-eal {New York: Macmillan Co$, 1937}, pp"7' 35-36.
57Rand,

11

\-lhat Is Romanticism?" p. 71 ..
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which she regards as presenting a degrading view
creature without volition.
be thought

o~

Romanticism

there~ore

o~

man as a

should not

exclusively in terms of emotional responses and

the supernatural, but rather as a literary movement designed
to reveal the heroic potential of man.
Although most literary historians such as Baugh and
Lowes would probably disagree with this interpretation, a
few of them do not rule it out entirely.

Lucas, for instance

points out that it is dangerous and often misleading to think
of Romanticism in terms of rank opposition to Classicism.58
And John Lowes, in his

master~ul

study of Coleridge's "The

Rime of the Ancient Mariner," a poem complete with ghosts,
ghost ships, and supernatural horrors, notes that behind the
horror a foundation of logic appears:

the mariner sins, as

punishment the Albatross is hung about his neck, the ship's
crew suffers as a result of the killing of the bird, and the
mariner is finally redeemed, but i'orced to tell his story as
punishment.

Lo1..res observes:

But the train of' cause and consequence is more than a
consolidating factor of' the poem. It happens to be life,
as evePy huma."'l being lmoHs it. You do a i'oolish and evil
deed, and its results come home to you. And they are apt
to f'all on other3 too., You repent, and the load is lif'ted from your soul., But you have not thereby escaped your
deed. You attain f'orgiveness, but cause and ef'fect work
on unmoved, and lifo to the end may be th~ continued reaping of the repented deed's results • • • • ~ 9
l1any convicts in prison Hill validate that statement.

Even

58Lucas, The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal,

pp.

h?-8.

59Lowes, ~ad;..~X:ana~, pp$ 270-73.
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after his release with the so-called "debt to society" paid,
the ex-convict cannot very often .find a good job.60
Thus, although Rand does not employ all the conventions or characteristics of supernaturalimn, her novels may
be classified as Romantic in that they depict heroic individualisn and .freedom, but in a rational context.

This con-

text must be understood if we are to appreciate her admiration .for Victor Hugo.

Of his characters, she writes:

Do not look for familiar landmarks--you won't find them;
you are not entering the backyard of "the folks next
door, 11 but a universe you did not know existed. • ••
You are about to meet a race of giants, who might have
and ought to have been your neighbors.
Do not say these giants are "unrealn because you have
never seen them before • • • • It was not his [Hugo 1 sJ
purpose to show you what you had seen a thousand times
before. Do not say that the actions of these giants are
"impossible 11 because they are heroic, noble, intelligent,
beautiful-remember that the cowardly, the depraved, th~
mindless, the ugly are not all that is possible to man.bl
For these reasons the argument that Romantic fiction courts
the unrealistic is dismissed as not being the issue.
is, however, is that such men ought to exist.

1.Jhat

Literature

60coleridge himself, in Ch~ter XIV o.f the Biographia
Literaria, comments in this connection: 11 • • • it was
agr'eed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and
characters supernatur·al or at least ·romantic; yet so as to
transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of' truth su.fficient to procure for these shadows of'
imagination that v:illing suspension of disbelief for the
moment • • • • Hith this vioH, I wrote "The Ancient Hariner."
See: S. T, Coleridge, BioGrnphia Litoraria, Chapter XIV in
David Per·kins, (ed.), English Homr..ntlc ""'vir:LTers, p. 452. The
Homan tics, then, oftenUse the supornatur~a1, the emotional
or• the bizarre to convoy sol:J.O truth about the nature of man.
It is too nn::teh an oversimplification to conclude that Rcmanticimn means emotionalism which means irrationality.
61Ayn Hand, "Introduction i;o Ninety-Three," in The
Jioman tic }fanif'esto, pp. 119-20. As the titJ.e suggests-;--:Rand
"n:;ote thO:C.~trocJuction to Hugo r s novel.
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need not consist in merely presenting man as he is, but indeed can present him as he ought to be, and such a presentation implies no metaphysical violation.
Barbara Branden reports that the character Rand most
admires in her favorite Hugo movel, Les Miserables, is
Enjolras, " • • • the young leader of the insurrectionists,
who dies fighting on the barricades. • • • n62

Hugo tells

us his thoughts as he and an outnumbered band continue to
fight:
They are positive • • • • For, and this is beautiful, it
is always for the ideal, and for the ideal alone, that
those who devote themselves do devote themselves. An insurrection is an enthusiasm. Enthusiamn may become anger;
hence, an uptaking of arms • • • • And men sacrifice themselves for these visions, which for the sacrificed, are
nearly always illusions, but illusions with which, after
all, the whole of human certainty is mingled. • • • Hho
knous? They will perhaps succeed. They are the m..i.nority;
they have against them an entire army; but they are defending the right, the natural law, the sovereignty of
each over h~mself, which allows of no possible abdication. • • • 3
"The sovereignty of each over himself.n

This essential cap-

tures the significance of Hugo for Ayn Rand.

Although

Enjolras meets death, it becomes a magnificant thing, a sy.mbol of the heroic.

Her Jom1 Galt or Dagny Taggart could do

no less, for they too recognize the primacy of the individual:

his mind, his creative powers, and his potential for

greatness.
62Barbara Branden, 11 \fuo Is Ayn Rand?," in Who Is AYll,
Ra.nd? (New York: Paperback Library, 1968), p. 126.
63victor Hugo, Les Niserables, trans. by r1. Jules
Gray, Part V, Volume v-;-Book I (Philadelphia: George Barrie
and Son, 189 3 ) , pp.. lhl~.-45.
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Rand believes that in contemporary literature all
traces of Romanticism have vanished, her admiration extending only to Mickey Sillane, creator of the detective Hike
Hammer.

Speaking of detective fiction as practiced by Spil-

lane, she comments:
Detective fiction presents, in simple primitive essentials, the conflict of good and evil; that is the root of
its appeal. l-Uckey Spillane is a moral absolutist. His
characterizations are excellent and drawn in black-andwhites; there are no slippery half-tones, no cowardly
evasions, no cynicism--and no forgiveness; there are no
doubts about the evil of evil. • • • His hero, Mike Hammer, is a moral avenger, passionately dedicated to justice,
to.the defense of the wronged, and to the destruction of
ev~l.6 4
In reading his One Lonely Night65 one may readily observe
Hammer in his role of moral crusader.

Briefly, the novel

concerns the detective's attempt to retrieve top secret documents stolen by a Communist spy network operating clandestinely j_n America.

In so doing, Hammer encounters an assort-

ment of Russian agents, all cast as totally vile, about whom
he makes his intentions quite clear:
Gladow spoke. The aides spoke. Then the general spoke.
[all Red agents]. He pulled his tux jacket down when he
rose and glared at the audience. I tffarnmerJ had to sit
there and listen to it. It was propaganda right off the
latest Moscow cable and it turned me inside out. I -vmnted to feel the butt of an M-1 against my shoulder pointing
at those • • • up there on the rostrQ~ and feel the pleasant impact as it spit slugs . • • •
Sure, you can sit dm·m at night and read about the
hog·Hash they hand out. Haybe you t re fairly intelligent
64Ayn Rand, 11 Revimv- of The Girl Hunters, 11 The Obiectivj.st Nm-rsletter, I, No. 10 (October, 196Z),pp. 42, [i:.
65nand consider•s this novel one of his best, especially in light of Spillane's uncompromising stand against
Conmnmism.
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and can laugh at it. Believe me, it isn•t :funny. They
use the very thing we build up, our own government ~gd
our own laws, to undermine the very things we want.
Later, Mike actualizes his :feelings by machine-gunning several Reds and watching them die in agony.

Hammer believes he

has a moral obligation to kill them:
There's no shame or sin in killing a killer. David did
it when he lmocked of'f' Goliath. Saul did it when he slew
his tens o:f thous-ands. Thera's no shame to killing an
evil thing. 6 7
Hammer, in killing the Communists, recognizes that evil is
evil and can be given no mercy, and thus wins the
of' Rand.

a~~iration

It should be recalled here what was observed con-

earning the relationship between the law
"golden mean."

or

identity and the

Hanrm.ar considers Communism to be completely

ru1d totally a moral abomination, treating " • • • man as a
sacrif'icial animal to be immolated :for the bene:fit of' the
group, the tribe, the society, the state.n68

Here, the law

of' identity remains in f'ull operation--evil being evil.
Rand's heroes show as little toleration :for the evil
in this world as Hammer, although expressing their dissatisf'action, f'or the most part,69 in intellectual terms, which
lead to action, but not with machine guns.

The detective

66Hickey Spillane, One Lonely Night (Ne1.-1 York:
Juncr·ican Library, Signet Press, 1951), p. 79. My
brackets.

The

New

67~., p. 110.
6Bnand, 11 Consex•va.tism:
'I ho Unknown Ideal, p .. 195.

An Obituary, '1 in Capital ism:

1

69The qualif'ication is included i'or reasons uhich will
be made clear in chapter i'our.
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novel, of course, is less intellectually sophisticated than,
for example, Atlas Shrugged, but the moral zeal in both is
unmistakable.

An example of this zeal fran The Fountainhead

finds Howard Roark (the protagonist) accosting those who
would have the welfare state:
Man cannot survive except through his mL~d. He comes on
earth unarmed. His brain is his only weapon. • • • But
the mind is an attribute of the individual. There is no
such thing as a collective brain. There is no such thing
as a collective thought. An agreement reached by a group
of men is only a compromise or an average drawn upon many
individual thoughts. It is a secondary consequence. The
primary act--the process of reason--must be performed by
each man alone • • • • No man can live for another. He
cannot share his spirit just as be cannot share his body •
• • • The man who attempts to live for others is a dependent. He is a parasite in motive and makes parasites of
those he serves. · The relationship produces nothing but
mutual corruption.70
Randts heroes wage a philosophical war agaLnst corruption
and-in this case-socialism and altruism.

But, the dedi-

cation to an ideal is just as pronounced as Mike Hammer's
hatred for the Communists.
In their respective novels, there exists some evil
which must be overcome:

Communism, altruism, sacrifice,

etc., and against these evils their heroes never waver until
victory is achieved.
mantic literature.

For Rand, this is the essence of RoHer heroes are men who ought to exist,

wb.o ought to fight to rid the world of moral evil and in so
doing> advance their own conception of the good.71
70Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead (New York: The New
American Library, Slgnet Pl•ess;-·r%"8), pp. 680-81.
7lunmoly., Objectivist philosophy.
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In sum, we may observe that when Rand defines Romanticism, she means (at least) the following:

(1) Man as in-

dividual, a being of volitional consciousness, is the basis
for Romantic art, (2) Freedom and individualism are predicated not on emotionalism, but on reason, and (3) Heroes are
larger than life and ought to exist.
Are there sufficient grounds, therefore, to claim influence?

For the affirmative we may argue that Rand has

read the Romantics (for her Hugo and Spillane) and has written a book, The Romantic Manifesto, which outlines her theory
of literature along Romantic lines.

She views man in a he-

roic capacity, but bases his heroiffm on rational individualism; not emotionalism or subjective reaction.

Finally, we

have sho-vm that although Roman tic literature often favors
emotionalism and the supernatural, Romantic writers such as
Coleridge often have a rational message to convey using the
Romantic motif as a vehicle.

Romantic poetry, then, may not

be as alien to reason, logic and order as a first reading
might suggest.
But, serious difficulties do exist which challenge
influence, especially if the above named characteristics of
Romru1ticism are considered essential.

Rand's definition of

Romanticism and her analysis of Romantic ii1dividualism would
probably not be accepted by most literary critics.

Those

such as Horton, Lowes and the Romantics the!nselves consider
emotior~s

to be a major characteristic, a vjew which Rand

considr::rably modifies 1-rhen presenting her definition.

Al-

I

II
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though Lowes argues that logic may be at the foundation of
coleridge's poetry, he attaches supreme significance to the
poet's use of the supernatural and the emotional reactions
used in the creative process.
tends to reverse the emphasis.

In her novels, however, Rand
Too, her heroes are not

skeptics, but the Romantics often are.

"Pleasure domes"

often evaporate when confronted with the harshness of reality.
Toda.v, Spillane is characterized as a popular writer;
not a Romantic, but Rand still prefers the Romantic classification.

Now as literary critic, she is of course entitled

to so classify Spillane, provided substantiating evidence can
be found.
Lastly, her position that Romantic writers miscalculated by not identifying the relationship between volition
and reason, turning as if through ignorance to emotionalism,
is not generally accepted.

Indeed, the "turningn often was

a matter of conscious and deliberate choice.
Thus, we may conclude--except for Hugo where definite
influence exists-that Rand was influenced by the Romantic
school-~provided,

and this is essential, we recognize that

her conception o£ Romanticism is often at odds with established critics.
We may observe in this context that Rand's use of
definitions creates headaches for any researcher.
Ellis is quite critical of what he calls hor

11

In £act,

•••

highly

tautological thinking, rr7 2 'vhich he beliovos invalidates much
72Ellis, Is Objectivism A Religi~?, p. 217.
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of Objectivism.

For example, merely because Rand calls her-

self a Romantic according to her own definition of Romanticism, does not necessarily mean she is one.

Obviously the

question of definitional use requires careful attention and
will therefore be considered in chapter four.
Finally, Rand's relationship to the Social Darwinists
must be considered.

At first glance, men such as Herbert

spencer and William Sumner seem to have much in common with
Rand.

All three accept laissez-faire Capitalism, oppose the

welfare state, and defend the concept of negative government.
But, as commonality itself does not prove influence, we must
examine the case for possible influence in more detail.
Herbert Spencer, an Englishman, achieved his greatest
popular.i ty in the decades following the Civil Har.

His

ideas found considerable acceptance across the,Atlantic, for
it was during this period that America began to transform
herself into an industrial democracy.

Great factories in

the north had produced the weapons of war needed to defeat
the agrarian south.
fit quite well:

11

In such a setting, Spencer's philosophy

Spencer's was a system conceived in and

dedicated to an age of steel and steam engines, competition,
exploitation, and struggle."73
According to Spencer, evolutionary progress characterizes the development of societies, with primitive ones
soon (as a result of internal conflict) acquiring military
73nichard Hof'stadter, Social Darwinism in American
_Thoup;ht (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955),'"1)-:-Js;-.
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sophistication.

This military society, still unstable how-

ever, eventually evolves into an advanced industrial state,
founded on laissez-faire Capitalism.

Although virtual per-

fection exists at this stage, Spencer reasons that altruism
will mark the culmination:
perfect as humanly possible.

then society will be as nearly
The evolutionary principle be-

bind his theory states that,
Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant
durins-whicb the matter passes
from a (relativelz) indefinite, lncoharent homogeneltx
to a Trelatively) definite, coherent heterogeneity • • • • 74

dlsslpatlon-o~motion;

Implicit in this important principle are the following concepts with which Rand 'tvould agree:

(1) individual rights-

homogeneity to heterogeneity, (2) private ownership of
property--socialism implies homogeneity, (3) negative role
of government--laissez-faire outlook.
For Spencer, such a society cannot be achieved easily, for it requires the competitive restructuring of the
environment.

When defining the nature of competition,

Spencer notes that a member of society cannot exclusively
devote himself to a special activity

11

•••

unless those

for whose benefit he carries on his special activity in excess, give him in return the benefits of their special ac74Herbert Spencer, First Principles (New York: D.
Appleton and Co., 1910), p:-)b(. The-deffr1ition includes
the v.ropd 'relatively' twice. Spencer added this qualification to malce it clear• that " • • • Evolution must be regarded as falling between two ideal limits, neither of which is
roached." He believed that 11 relativity 11 characterizes all
our lm01.-1lede;e. See "Appendix A" to First P1•inciples,
pp., 513-16.
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. it•J.e s •
tJ.V

?5

Competition, the heart

or

laissez-raire Capi-

talism, must be ruthless, to the extreme that the unrit be
eliminated, ror:
• • • the rorces at work will exterminate such sections
mankind as stand in the way, with the same sternness
that they exterminate • • • herds or useless ruminants. 76

or

Although he did not oppose voluntary aid ror the poor,
Spencer thinks that

i~

government, through the welrare state,

tries to help those in need, then nature's laws will be
thwarted, thereby creating catastrophe.

Further, the ex-

istence of the unrit can only serve to lower the moral and
intellectual tone

or

society since they limit productive

achievement and thwart competition.
America's most significant Social Darwinist was
Willirun Sumner, whose contribution to social thought results from a synthesis of three concepts:

(l),the Protes-

tant ethic, (2) laissez-faire Capitalism, and (3) natural
selection.
Strongest in New England, the Puritan ethic proves
quite compatible with capitalism in that they both stress
hard -vwrk and dedication to material prosperity which, for
the P1u•i tan, was a sign of inward holiness.

This relation-

ship, Rand completely ignores.
Laissez-faire Capitalism, believes Sumner, is the
75nerbert Sponce:r•, 'l'he Study of Sociologz ( NevT York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1910), p. 303.
·
76nerbert Spencer•, Social Statistics (New York:
Appleton and Coe, 1910), p~e;.-----

D.

58
most sophisticated economic system because it alone rests on
the principle or survival or the fittest.

He writes that

competition invariably results in " • • • courage, good
training, intelligence, perseverance,n77 qualities operative
only in a society based on the contract relationship:
A society based on contract is a society or free and independent men, who form ties without favor or obligation,
and cooperate without cringing or intrigue. A society
based on contract, therefore, gives the utmost room and
chance for individual development, gud f'or all the selfreliance and dignity of a free man.7ti
Rand would totally endorse that statement, believing that
the contract relationship is one in which men are treated as
rree agents; not slaves or the welfare state, which thwarts
those or ability.

Believing in social determinism, Sumner

concludes that the evolutionary process is a slow one; therefore man cannot force change which can only occur according
to nature's plan over a period of centuries.

Such a posi-

tion tends to lessen the po-v1er of the mind to institute
change.
In an important essay entitled "The Forgotten Man,"
Sumner discusses the true intent of socialistic reformers:
As soon as A observes something vrhich seems to him to be
wrong, from -vrhich X is suffering, A talks it over with B,
and A and B then propose to get a law passed to remedy
the evil and help X. Their law always p1•oposes to deter77Hillia...l1 Sumner, "The Challenge of I• acts, 11 in The
.Qh_~_;u:~i£_Of Fa9ts and Other Essays (Nevl Haven:
Yale University Press, 19fl~), p. 67.
1

78tvilliam Sumner, Hhat Social ClassoE: Owe to Each
Otho:P (New Haven: Yale Universlty Press~ 1')~
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mine what C shall do ror X. • • • 79
The true intent

or

course, is to practice altruism, which as

we have seen, involves the suf'rering
man

c.

or

the innocent, here

To quote Rand, A and B " • • • assume a halo

or

vir-

tue by giving away goods • • • by making others (C) pay ror
the luxury of [their] pity. n80
Finally, we must consider Sumner as an ethical relativist.

In Folkwavs, his major sociological work, he out-

lines the belier that when men rirst act in consort to survive, they rind that certain activities or ideas work more

successrully than others:
The struggle to maintain existence was carried on, not
individually, but in groups. Each prof'ited by the other's
experience; hence there was concurrence towards that which
proved to be the most expedient. All at last adopted the
same way for the same purpose. Hence, the ways turned
into customs and became mass phenomena.tll
With the passage of time, these customs or f'olkways acquire
moral validity, the violation of which by any member
group incurs punishment.

or

the

Thus folkways become mores--that

is, morally binding on the group.

Sumner argues that because societies difrer from
country to country, so also do the folkways and mores produced by them.

Thus,

11

•••

the real process in great

bodies of men is not one of deduction from any great prin79r,vi11irun Sumner,
,gpttel];

~Im~a."l.(~-_Q_ther

11

The Forgot ten Han, 11 in The ForEssay~ (New Haven:
Yale University

Press, 19b91, p" 4."66.

80Rand, Atl~.. SlJ:r'ugged, p. 540.
8lwilJ.iam. Snmr1er, _folbrays (lie"L·J" York:
1940), p. 18.

Hentor Books,
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ciple or philosophy or ethics, • • • but one of minute

...

efforts to live well under existing conditions. • • • n82
Because tne mores vary according to the survival needs of
the given society, then human conduct cannot be contingent
on objective moral principles.
As suggested, there is much in Sumner and Spencer
which seems compatible with Objectivism including:

{l)

laissez-faire Capitalism, {2) the negative role of government, (3) individual ownership of property, (4) the contract
system, (5) opposition to socialism and {6) sympathy for the
"forgotten man."

Indeed, the sympathy is great enough to

prompt one critic to observe:
All in all, she (Rand] is probably the most thoroughgoing
advocate of laissez-faire capitalism ever to set pen to
paper • • • • If you could multiply Herbert Spencer by
\villiam Graham Sumner, you would get Ayn Rand. 83
If an accountant could check the multiplication, however, he
would find an error.

Although they and Rand are similar in

the areas mentioned above, their reasons for support are
quite different.

vlri tes Rand:

Herbert Spencer, another champion of capitalism, chose
to decide that the theory of evolution and of adaptation
to environment was the key to man's morality--and declared
that the moral justification of capitalism was the survival of the species, of the human race; that 'Hhoever was
of no value to the race had to perish; that man's morality
consisted of adaptinn; oneself to one's social envirorrn1ont,
and seekinn; One IS O"tvn happineSS in the Welfare Of SOCiety;
and that the automatic process o:f evolution would eventu82Ibi<_l., p. ~~-9.
83r.f. Stanton Evans, "The Gospel According to Ayn
Hand," National RevieH, XIX (October, 1967), 1059. My
brackets.
-

-,r
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ally obliteratg the distinction between selfishness and
unselrishness. 4 ·
Of course, Objectivism rejects the belief that altruism
could eventually replace capitalism in the evolutionary
development of the race.

Hmvever, the major distinction

made between Rand's justification or capitalism and Spencer's
is that Rand's is moral, while Spencer's, biological.
title or her book, Capitalism:

The

The Unknorm Ideal, means

that laisse·z-raire Capitalism is a moral ideal yet to be
achieved.

In

"~fua t

Is Capitalism?," she defends her thesis:

Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition
of individuil rights, including property rights, in vThich
all property is prJ.vately 01-mea • • • • The moral }Ustilication of capitalism does not lie in the altruist claim
that it 1•epresents the best way to achieve nthe common
good." It is true that capitalism does • • • but this is
merely a secondary consequence. The moral justification
of capitalism lies in the fact that it is the only system
consonant with man's rational nature, that it protects
~an'~ su8~ival qua man, and that its ruling principle is
JUStJ.ce . .?
Rand sees capitalism as consistent with man's moral right to
function as a rational individual, a moral being and not
merely a biological unit in the race.

In this connection,

Objectivism would also reject Spencer's belief that the
tmfit should be eliminated, arguing.that individual men
have no moral obligation to support them but certainly no
rieht to exterminate them.
The concepts stu"vival of the fittest and social deter8

p. 37.

~and,

"Introduction," For The Ne11 Intellectual,
Italics in original.

85Rand, 11 \Vbat Is Capitalism?," in Ganitalism:
Unkno-vrn Ideal, pp. 19-20. Italics in origii1.al.

The
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minism need qualirication rrom an Objectivist point

or

view.

survival of the rittest could be interpreted to mean might
makes right with the implication

or

death to the weak.

Objec-

tivism, however, sees the rittest as those who choose to be
rational by engaging in productive work to achieve happiness.
Further, since the concept implies the aggressive use

or

force, Objectivism would reject the term and any of its
implications.
Rand and Sumner are compatible in wishing to resurrect the forgotten man, but certainly disagree regarding his
nature.

Specifically, she rejects the concept or social

determinism, which Sumner uses to imply that man's mind is
incapable of altering nature's evolutionary laws.86

Rand,

as v.re have often noted, sees man as a :rational creature very
capable of molding the environment to suit his needs.

Of

course, the method ror so doing implies, for Objectivism,
individual rational achievement and not any form

or

social-

ism.
Lastly, Objectivism rejects Sumnerts belief that
morality is relative.

Although recognizing that customs or

folkways might vary from nation to nation, Rand would also
assert that man's nature does not vary.

His potential for

ra.tiom·.,_l achievement is contingent on1y on volitional choice,
regardless of national origin.
On the basis of this evidence, we may conclude that,
861Villiam S1mmer, 11 The Absurd Effort to Hake the 1Vorld
Over, in l-Jar and Other Essays (NeH Haven: Yale Univel'Si ty
P1•ess, 1970}, pp. 209-lOe - 11

I,

I
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despite the similarities between Sumner, Spencer, and Rand,.
that Rand was not influenced by the rormers 1 writings.
ilarity

or

Sim-

ideas does not constitute inrluence.
SDM1-1ARY

In this chapter, we have attempted to validate the
suggestion that Rand was influenced by Aristotle, the Romantics, and the Social Darwinists.
Investigation substantiates that Objectivism is inrluanced to a large degree by Aristotle's philosophy.

This

influence, persistent and shaping, places Aristotelian
philosophy and Objectivism in firm intellectual contact.
It is further suggested that they fail to agree on some
points, including man and his relationship to the state,
the doctrine of the golden mean as·it relates to the principle of identity, and the nature of government.

Rand's

acceptance of his theory of art is also demonstrated.
Although Rand has read certain Romantic writers and
has a book on the theory of Romantic composition, we can
only determine tentative influence as her definition of
Romantic art is often at odds with established critics.
Her ailiniration for Hugo has been documented, but her classification of Spillane as a Romantic is at best an idiosyncratic classification.

Rand and the Romantics at least

agroe, however, on the point that art should reflect the
he:r•oic in man.

A problem regarding Rand's use of defini-

tion ar:i.ses here, which Hill be exandned in chapter four.
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Lastly, it was established that Objectivism was not
influenced by the Social Darwinists.

In fact, Rand rejects

these thinkers for their failure to defend capitalism in
moral terms.

Although she and the Social Darwinists speak

in terms of loyalty to capitalism, opposition to the welfare state, and the negative role of government, similarity
in intellectual content does not prove influence.
It is hoped that this background will provide a
clearer understanding of Objectivism by placing it in intellectual perspective.

The next chapter will consider the

philosophy of Objectivism, and it is that to which we now
turn.

CHAPTER THREE
THE HETAPHYSICS, EPISTEMOLOGY AND AXIOLOGY
OF OBJECTIVISM
This chapter will discuss the philosophy of Objectivism thereby providing the background necessary to effectively
understand Rand's educational position.

Attention will be

devoted to the metaphysics, epistemology, and especially the
axiology of Ob j ec ti vi sm.

The a.."'lCiology merits special con-

sideration because Rand's educated man must subscribe to an
ethical code which at times counters Christian morality.
Included in this chapter will be a discussion of the
concept, sense of life.

It requires special consideration

prior to an analysis of the metaphysics, for the metaphysics
cannot be fully understood without discerning how Rand integrates sense of life into her philosophical system.
Sense of life is defined as:
A sense of life is a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics, an emotional, subsconsciously integrated appraisal of man's relationship to existence. It sets the
nature o.f a man's emotional :r•osponses and the essence of
his character.l
Sonse of' life
------

then precedes a philosophy of' life, and con-

stitutes an emotional, pre-conceptual estimate of one's view·
lAyn Hand, !!Philosophy
Ro~nantic Hanifesto (Hci'T York:
Sigi1et Pr·oss, 1971), p. 25.
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Sense of Life, 11 in The
'l he NeH American Lib1•a:r•y,

£tnd
1
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himsel~

and the world.

Rand notes that an individual, prior to understanding
what metaphysics means, " • • • makes choices,

~orms

value-

judgments, experiences emotions and acquires a certain
implicit view o~ li~e."

2

The result o~ such activities is

that one's,
. • • subconscious mechanism sums up his psychological
activities, integrating his conclusions, reactions, or.
evasions into an emotional sum that establi.shes an habitual pattern and becomes his automatic response to the
world aroQ~d him. What begins as a series or single,
discreet conclusions • • • becomes a generalized ~eeling
about existence, an L--nplici t metaphysics vli th the compelling motivational pmver o:r a constant, basic emotion-an
emotion which is part o:r all his other emotions and.
underlies all his experiences. This is a sense o~ li:re.3
The nature o:r the emotions evoked is contingent on the individual's view

o~ pimsel~.4 In other words, what conclusions

one reaches depends on lltthat which is important
•that kind

o~

universe which is right :ror

~'

to~' r

or:

in which I

would f'eel at home. ,u5
Essentially, then, "the key concept, in the

~ormation

of' a sense of' lit"e, is the term 'important, 1 nb because
important,
• • • pertains to that aspect o:r metaphysics which
serves as a bridge between metaphysics and ethics: to
a .fundamental view o~ man t s nature. That vieH involves
the ans"Hors to such questions as Hhether the m1iverso is
kno1-mble or not, uhether man has the pmv~)r or choice or
not, whether he can achieve his goals in life or not.
The ansv-Ters to such questions are 11 metaphysical value2 Ib. '
__2:.£·, p. 26.

---

3Ibid.

Italics in original.

27.

Italics in original.

5Ibid., p. 28.

Italics in original.

4Ibid., p ..

6 Ibid.
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judgments, 11 since they fo:rDl the base of ethics. 7
The concept sense of life is vital to any consideration of
Rand's educational position.

The school must assume the

responsibility of providing a secure environment, thereby
helping the child develop emotionally sound reactions which
are crucial to making proper value judgments.

In other

words, the learner should feel that he is in a secure and
predictable universe.
Sense of life perhaps may be best described in terms
of art.
sense

The artistic process is controlled by the artist's

of~:

• • • what an art work expresses, fundamentally, under
all of its lesser aspects is: "This is life as I see
it." The essential meaning of a--viewer's or reader's
response, under all of its lesser elements is: "This
is (or is not) life as I see it. 11 8
-In other words, the artist presents his view

o~

man and o.f

existence as developed from his sense of life, now fully
matured into a philosophy of life.9
In order to live as a man one must, according to Rand,
be able to smoothly make the transition from being guided by
a

~~

of life to being guided by a philosophy of life.

She writes:
By the time he reaches adolescence, man's knowledge is
suf'f'icient to deal with broad funda.."llentals; this is the
period Hhen he becomes aware of the need to translate
7Ibid.
BRand, "Art and Sense of' Lif'e," in The Romantic
Hanif'esto, p. 35. Italics in original.
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his incoherent sense or lire into conscious terms. This
is the period when he gropes ror such things as the meaning of lire, ror principles, ideas, values and, desperately, ror selr-assertion. An~--since nothing is done
• • • the result is the frantic, hysterical irrationality
or most adolescents, particularly today. Theirs is the
agony of the unborn--of minds going through a process or
atrophy at a time set by nature for their growth.lO
Rand thus believes that our present society ignores the means
required to actualize the transition.

She argues that edu-

cation should help the child become an adult by assisting in
the transition from sense of life to philosophy of lire.
One or the reasons Rand speaks so harshly or contemporary
American education is because or its railure to carry out
that important task.

As the transition ought to occur in

elementary school, it should come as no surprise to learn
that Objectivism focuses attention on the elementary educative process, especially endorsing Montessori.
vle may noH turn our attention to a treatment of Objec-

tivism.

In 1vlho Is Ayn Rand?, Nathaniel Branden outlines, in

brief, the philosophy's essentials:
In metaphysics, it is the principle that reality is
objective and absolute, that it exists independent of
anyone 1 s consciousness, perceptions, beliefs, .,..d.shes,
hopes or fears-that 1vhich is, is what it is-that
"existence is identity 11 -that A is A. In epistemology,
it :i.s tho p1•inciple that man's mind is competent to
achieve objectively valid kno-vlledge of that Hhich exists.
In ethics, it is the principle that values proper to man
are objectively demonstJ.'able.ll
The philosophy of Objectivism assie;ns man a unique place· .in

---------------------lODna..,1
' d.,

tl ~
pl.•
1ll

1 osop h y an d

s en so

of

L.11.,... e, II p. 2°/.

llNathaniel Branden, Hho Is Ayn Rand'?
Paperback Library: 1968), p. 49.

(New York:
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the universe because of' his capacity f'or rational.thought.
Animals, of' course, are incapable of' the capacity f'or noninstinctual perception which only man enjoys.
consciousness is not automatic.
worst enemy because he

11

•••

But man's

He of'ten acts as his own
is the only living entity

born without any guarantee of' remaining conscious at a11.12
Objectivism rests on the basic premise that the most f'undamental choice which man makes is "the choice of' lif'e or
death.nl3

Thus, man can either think or suspend thought.

Rand's metaphysical system is based on the so-called
~

of' Thought as advanced by Aristotle.

Specif'ically, the

principle of' identity, the law of' contradiction, and the law
of' causality require comraent.
The principle of' identity stipulates that an entity
is itself' and remains itself'.
a given context.
chair is chair.

It cannot theref'ore change in

In other words, A is A, man is man and
Related to this principle is the law of'

contradiction (the negative of' the principle of' identity).
Aristotle regards this laH as n • • • the most certain principle of' all ••

~

that regarding which it is impossible to

be mistaken. 11 14

He defines it as f'ollows:

" • • • the same

att:.t:>ibute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to
12Ayn.Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics,n in The Virtue
of Self'ishness (New York: The NeH' American Library, S~gnet
Pr·ess~-1964J,p. 19.
13rbi£o, p. 21.
14Aris totle, l·1o tap~ysics, 1005b 11-12.
!

!I

,•1
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the same subject and in the same respect. 11 15

Thus, one can-

not logically believe the same thing to be and not to be, ror
A is not _1ot-A.
The principle or identity and law or contradiction
rorm the m-etaphysical base or Rand 1 s philosophy.

Her pro-

tagonist John Galt, when addressing the American people,
condemns them ror their railure to grasp the meaning or the
principle or identity and law or contradiction:
A lear ca~~ot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be
all red and all green at the same time. • • •
Are you seeking to knoH v-1hat is wrong with the world?
All the disasters that have wrecked your world came from
your leaders' attempt to evade the ract that A is A••
A contradiction cannot ltist. An axiom is itselr, and so
is the universe • • • •
Galt's speech is intended to be a philosophical summary or
Atlas Shrugged's dramatic activity.

Thus, the "disasters"

result rrom the railure or individual characters to respect
the Aristotelian laws mentioned by Galt.
An example will illustrate Galt's meaning.

The United

States as portrayed in Atlas Shrugged races economic (and
moral) collapse.

Too long abused, scorned and exploited by

the advocates of welfare socialism 1-1ho control the government, a group of competent industrialists

~~rike,

w·ithdraw

rrom society, leaving ·t;he country to the mercy of those who
claim the right to dominate their minds. 1 7 Dagny Taggartl5Ibid., l005b 18-20.
l6A:vn Rand, Atlas Shrur;r;ed (New York: The New American Libral'Y, Signet Pl'oss, 19'5"!), pp. 9l.!.O-it.3.
17The strike do vice is a metapho1•. Atlas Shrugged
illustrates Hhat races America in the futurei1' the country
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an industrialist and Rand's central
the time

or

~emale

the rollowing conversation,

moral necessity ror the strike.

protagonist--at

~ails

to grasp the

Attempting to persuade

industrialist Ken Danagger not to abandon his business, she
asks,
"You have decided to retire? To give up your business?"
"Yes."
"Does it mean nothing to you now?"
"It means more to me no1.-1 than it ever did be~ore."
"But you're going to abandon it?"
"Yes. • • • "
"Do you realize what your retirement will do to • • • all
the rest or us, whoever is lert?"
"Yes I realize it more rully than you do at present.nl8
From Dagnyrs perspective, Danagger appears to be violating
the law
love.

o~

contradiction:

A is not not-A, love is not not-

In other words, how could Danagger, who loves his

business 1rdsh to aband.on it-an act.ion certainly implying
non-love?l9

But, as Galt explains throughout his speech,

contradictions cannot exist.

Dagny's error is her

to understand Danagger's reasons ror retiring.
text

or

~ailure

In the con-

the entire novel, his actions are quite logical, as

continues to drirt toward socialism. For a summary or the
ethical principles involved in the decision to strike, the
reader should consult Atlas Shrugged, pp. 616-27. Therein
is explained the moral evil implicit in the welf'are state
advocate 1 s basic conviction: .from each according to his
ability, to each according to his need.
18 Ibid., p. 419.
19It is important to note that no one rorces Danagger,
or any of' the industrialists to retire. Danagger's decision
is absolutely non-coerced. It is a .freely made, voluntary
decision.
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na.gny, he rselr, will discover.20

or

The law

causality argues that no rinite being can

exist without a surricient cause or reason.

or

rour causes:

Aristotle spe"lks
material, rormal, erricient, and rinal. 21

Here, the erricient cause is important.

Speaking

or

it,

Aristotle notes:
• • • it is not likely that either rire or earth or any
such element should be the reason why things manirest
goodness and beauty • • • nor again could it be right to
intrust so great a matter to spontaneity and chance.
When one man22 said, then, that l'eason was present • • •
as the cause and order or all arrangement, he seemed
like a sober man. • • .23
Thus, man's reason constitutes the erricient cause.
Galt

co~~ents

John

in a similar manner:

are the cause or all the values that you covet, we who
perrorm the process or thinking, which is the process o:f
derining identity and discovering causal connectaons. \ole
taught you to know, to speak, to produce • • • • 2

~ve

In Atlas Shrugged, the :following de:finitions o:r man, as
o:ffered by leading antagonists, represent violations o:r the
law of causality:
1·1an? 't-lha t is man? He's just a collection or chemicals
with delusions of' grandeur." "A miserable bit or protoplasm, f'ull of ugly little concepts and mean little
emo·t;ions • • • II
Dr. P1•i tchett
11

20For details which explain the nature or Dagny's
discovery by resolving the co;tradiction, see Galt's speech
in Atlus Shrue&ed, pp. 963-80.
21Aristotlc, r1etaph:ysics, 98lb-984b.
22The man is Anaxagoras, an Ionian philosopher who
settled in Athens in 450 DeC.
23Aristotle, Netaphysics, 98l.t-b ll-17.
2L~nancl, Atlas Shrugged, p. 963.

Italics in original.
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"The purpose of' philosophy is not to seek lmowledge but
to prove that lmowledge is impossible to man." ·.
Dr. Pritchett
"Man is not open to truth or reason. They cannot be
reached by rational argument. The mind is powerless
against them."
Dr. Stadler
" • • • what's a human being?" "A weak, ugly, sinf'ul
creature born that way • • • so humility is the one
virtue he ought to practice • • • • Pride is the worst
of' all sins."
Mr. Taggart
"People don't want to think."
Dr. Ferris25
These are the leaders whom Galt castigates f'or their f'ailure
to respect the law of' causality.

By ref'using to recognize

that reason is the ef'f'icient cause responsible f'or man's
creative achievements, they bring about the eventual decline
and fall of America.

Atlas Shrugged vividly portrays that

decline, and offers man an ethical alternative~-Objectivist
ethics.
Rand's interpretation of' the Laws of' Thought f'orms
the metaphysical basis of Objectivism.

As such, the laws

have significant ethical as well as metaphysical implications.

Because of' their application to ethics, the philos-

ophy has been criticized.

Albert Ellis and \iilliam 0' Neill

both object to Rand's use of' the Lm1s of' Thought.

O'Neill

charges that she ignores the f'act that "logic relates to the

.

formal context of discourse, and not to the specif'ic values
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attached to the particular terms involved.rr26

Ellis' objec-

tion is similar:
Aristotelian logic is merely a system of consistent
labeling; it is not descriptive or nor does it say anything about external reality. • • • russ Rand unrortunately keeps jumping rrom label to reality, and unthinkingly conruses the two.27
Rand replies by questioning the need ror a logic that bears
no relationship to reality and that cannot be used by man to
further his survival.

Defining value as "that which one

acts to gain and/or keep,n28 and logic as "the art or noncontradictory identification,n29 she proceeds to relate them
in a decisional context:
Nobody "decides." Nature does not decide_;_it merely is;
man does not decide, in issues or knowlea.ge, he merely
observes that which is. Uhen it comes to applying his
knowledge, man decides what he chooses to do, according
to what he has learned, remembering that the basic principle or rational action in all aspects of human existence, is: "Nature to be cornm---aiided, must be obeyed. 11 30
This means that man does not create reality and can
26\-Jilliam 0 'Neill, ~Vi th Charity Toward None (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1971), p. 132.
27Albert Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion? (New York:
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1968), pp. 229-30.
28Rand, nrrhe Objectivist Ethics, 11 p.

15.

29Ayn Rand, "':Phis Is John Galt Speaking," in For The
Intellectual (Nev-r York: :I'he New American Libl'ary, Signet r:r:ess-;-19617, p. 126.
Nevr

30This ph~aRo is Francis Bacon's. See his: Novma
11
.4phorisms Concerning the Interpretation o.f Nature
and the Kingdom c.f F!a.."1., 11 iii: 11 Hun1an lmowlodge and human
poHer meet in one; for where the cause is not kno1m the
effect cannot be produced. Nature to be coi;;ro.andod must be
obeyed; and Hhich in contemplation i.s as the cause, is in
operation as the rule. 11 E .. Burtt, ed., The Enr.;Jish Philosop~ers From Bacon to r1ill ( NeH York:
Hodern Lrbrary, 1939),
p. 28.

.Qr~:t.:~:

15
achieve his values only by making his decisions consonant with the f'acts of' reality. Who "decides"? • • •
AnY man who cares to acquire the appropriate knowledge
and to judge, at and f'or his ~~ risk and sake. What is
his criterion or judgment? Reason. What is his ultimate
f'rame of' ref'erence? Reality. If' he errs or evades, who
penalizes him? Reality.31
In using his reason to make value judgments, man must have
some operational means at his disposal.
means are the Laws of' Thought.

For Rand, such

Operationally contingent

upon an objective reality, they f'unction as man 1 s guidelines.
By implication, any f'orm of' subjectivism--the attempt
to f'orce upon reality whims or desires which do not correspond to what is-inevitably leads to chaos and violates the
law of' contradiction.

Noting that oners wish or emotional

whim contradicts reality.

Rand argues that the ultimate end

of' subjectivism is illogic:

"It [subjectivism] is the doc-

trine which holds that man • • • can, somehow, .live, act and
achieve his goals apart f'rom and/or in contradiction to the
f'acts of' reality, i.e., apart f'rom and/or in contradiction
to his own nature and the nature of' the universe. 11 32

The

f'a.cts of' reality are what a man must examine (using the Laws
of' Thought as his means) in order tq determine the proper
action (s) in any given situation.

To assert that such and

such is so when it really is not, and then to act as if' it
lvere so is to assert and deny the same thing at the same
time in the same con text.

Man examines (or ought to) the

31Ayn Rand, "Intellectual Ammunition Department, 11 The
Objectivist Newsletter, IV, No. 2 (February, 1965), 7.
Itailcs in orlginal.
32Ibid.

My brackets.
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facts of reality, using his reason if he desires to live as
a man.
We may conclude that the following reflects Objectivism's metaphysical position:

Reality is that which exists

independent of man's mind, the mind being capable of comprehending it.

Two important corollaries follow:

(1) the key

to man's understanding reality is his reason, and (.2) man
survives by conscious goal directed actions and choices using
the Laws of Thought to determine what is.
Because Objectivism is a highly coherent philosophy,
a definite relationship exists between its metaphysical and
epistemological orientation.
we now turn.

It is to the epistemology that

Realist philosopher K. F. Reinhardt, although

not speaking of Objectivism, identifies a relationship
between metaphysics and epistemology with which Rand would
agree.

He wr·ites:

The intellect, confronted with a multitude of sensible
objects, distinguishes between substances and accidents,
causes and effects, means and ends. Applying the immanent first principles . • • [i.e. La1-1s o.f Thought] the
intellect proceeds, by means of abstraction, analysis,
synthesis, and analogy to the formation of concepts,
judgments and conclusions . • • • 33
For Rand, the first principles or Laws of Thought are used
in precisely the way Reinhardt suggests.

One o.f the .func-

tions of the intellect which makes it distinctly human is
its capacity to fornmla te concepts.

Her book, Introduction

33K. F. Reinhardt, A Healistic Philosophy (I'1lhmukee:
'J.,be Bruco Publishing co., l'1Iil1.), pp. 95-96 .. By first principles, Reinhardt means the principles of identity, contradiction and causality. Hy brackets.
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to Objectivist Epistemology, deals exclusively with the
nature

or

concepts, how they are rormed, and to what use

they are put by man.
The epistemology

or

is capable
reality.

or

Objectivism states that the mind

or

achieving objectively validated knowledge

By rormal derinition epistemology " • • • is a

science devoted to the discovery

or

or

the proper methods

acquiring and validating knowledge."34

Turning to its spe-

cirics, Rand believes that man's consciousness matures in
three states:
ceptual.35

the sensory, the perceptual, and the con-

or

the three, the level proper to man is the

conceptual and as such, has a special relationship to "something that exists" (i.e. existent), "the building-block
man r s lmowledge. "36

As vd th consciousness, the concept

"existent" develops in three states:
child's awareness

or

or

entity (" • • • a

objects,") identity ("awareness

or

spe-

ciric, particular things which he can recognize and distinguish rrom the rest or his perceptual rield • • • ") and
unit

( II

•

• • grasping relationships among these entities

by grasping the similarities and dif'f'erences or their identities.11)37

11

M~ distinctive method of cognition is the

abili t;y: to ree;_ard entities ~ units. n38

A concept, Rand

defines as " • • • a mental integration of
possess:~-_l:!:E.

_!:he_

~

distinguishing_

-~~ EE_ ~

charactc:_~~istic

(_~),

units
with

34Ayn Rand, Jntroquction to ObjectJv}:E~ Epistemolog:y:
York: 'l1 ho Objoctlv:tst Inc., 1959), p., Jc.
35]bi9:., p. 11.

36Ibid.

37rbidq_. p .. 12.

38rbid.
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their Earticular measurements omitted. n39

To be conscious

.;:.::;----

requires choice, and now the significance of that may be
observed.

If' one fails to be conscious, his entit•e episte-

mological f'ramework collapses because he can only remain
conscious by being conceptually aware.

In so doing, he

{first as a child) senses and then perceives that nexistents"
exist in reality.

The perception of' entities (the first

level), which at first appear in be-tvildering confusion,
gradually becomes more sophisticated, leading to awareness
of specifics or particulars (i.e. identities), and finally
culminating in the ability to grasp relationships between
entities.

This ability, to regard entities as units,

basis of concept formation.

is the

Essentially, through a process

of' classif'ication, ma."Yl begins to organize and integra. te
nni ts into wider and wider concepts, and is thus able to
learn.
Conceptual development involves a process of' abstraction and utilization of' language.

For exam9le in his home

environment, a child gradually comes to recognize that different entities have unlike and/or similar characteristics
such as sitting, cooking, supporting etc. (identities).

As

time passes, he forms a concept general enoi.t.gh to include
all or most of these and gives them a name:
Importantly, though, is

that

11

the process of

f'urniture.

:r orming a

I

concept is not complete until its consti tuc•1t units have
39Ibid., p. 17.

Italics in o1•iginaJ..

I
I
I
'
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been integrated into a single mental unit by means of a specific word.• n40

Thus, in Objectivist epistemology a necessary

condition for the existence of a concept is that it be

named~

Two significant corollaries of concept formation, implicit in the above, may now be discussed.

Beginning with

conceptual development, the process of cognition " • • •
moves toward more extensive knowledge, toward wider integration and more precise dif.ferentiations.n41

For example

when an entity with four legs and a top is identified as a
table, and then regarded, along with other entities as integrated into a single unit, we may observe that vast amounts
of material have been condensed to one or two essential
characteristics which " • • • stands or falls with the truth
or falsehood of' these observations."42
Secondly, concepts are

11

open-ended,n43 meaning that

they allow man to advance, correct, modify and improve existing knowledge and to retain and properly integrate vast
amounts of material.
role.

This is essentially their cognitive

If concepts were closed (i.e., that no new lm01vledge

could be added when discovered), then human knowledge would
remain static.

We mentioned in chapter twoL~ that Rand's metaphysical posit:Lon reflects Aristotle's.

Hoi·.rever, an important

diff'erence exists, related to epistemology-Objectivism
4°rbid., p. 23.

41 rbid.

h3J·b.
d
p. 61.
:._:_.2:_ • '

44Page

42rtid., p.

25.

46.
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regards the concept essence as epistemological; not metaphysical.

As Rand explains:

Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that
fundamental characteristic (s) of its units on which the
greatest number of other characteristics depend, and
which distinguishes these units from all other existents
within the field of man's knowledge. Thus the essence
of a concept is dete~1ined contextua~ly and may be altered
with the growth of man's knowledge.4
Rand appears to use essence in two ways:
and metaphysically.

epistemologically

Epistemologica:'.ly, man comes to know the

meaning of a concept by defining its essential characteristic
which separates it from all others.

Knowledge, therefore,

is operative and may be valid only in a particular moment or
history and is thus contextual.
is discovered

(~.:

If more knowledge of reality

the world is round; not flat), then

the new knowledge modifies or replaces the old.
however, does not change.

The world was always

when men believed it to be flat.

Reality,
rom~d,

even

Thus, if the essential

characteristic of' the concept "world" were flatness, that
characteristic changed when added knowledge revealed to man
the VTorld was round.

Essence is also used metaphysically,

meaning that the essence of an entity is what makes it what
it is.
When Objectivism states that the concept essence also
has an epistemological function, what follows is that an
essential characteristic could change (i.e., become nonessential or accidental).

45Ibi~., pp. 49-50.

For Rand, therefore, the use of
Italics in original.
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essence epistemologically could create metaphysical chaos.
If in the future, for example, man's essential defining
characteristic were found not to be reason--and if concepts
are open-ended, we must allow for the possibility--much of
Objectivism could be jeopardized, since it rests on the
foundation of man as a rational creature.46
Lastly, we must consider Objectivist ethics, for our
purpose thE most important part, since Rand's educational
position reflects a code of values man ought to accept if he
be really educated.

Writes one critic:

n

•••

what Miss

Rand is really playing is axiology • • • isn't she really
trying to give us a justification for a new standard of
values? 11 47

The answer, of course, is yes.

In defining a

new ethics based on reason, she contemplates several value
changes man ought to make if he is to act as a man.
Rand defines ethics as, n • • • a science devoted to
4 6Before leaving Objectivist epistemology, the reader
should be aware of a special class of concepts termed by Rand
"axiomatic.u Their purpose is 11 • • • the identification of
a primary fact of reality, which is implicit in all facts and
in all kno1vledge." They are: existence, identi t_;y_, and consciousness. She notes: 11 • • • although ·they designate--afundamental metaphysical f'act, axiomatic concepts are the
products of an eplstemo1ogical need-the need of a volitional
conceptual consciousness which is capable of' error and doubt.
• • • Axiomatic concepts ar'e epistemologicaJ. guidelines.
They sum up the c s sence of' all human cognition: something
exists of which I am conscious; I must discover its identi ty.rr CoGnition would not be possible without them-;-i'or in
order to think} we must be conscious of X existing, and willing to discover' vJhat it is. 11 Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemolop.;y, pp. 52-56.
4-7E. Cain, They t d Rather Be Right
millan Co., 1963), p. ~-S.

(:r[EHT

York:

:f\1a.c-

82
the discovery of the proper methods of living one's life.n48
Immediately a question must be disposed of concerning the
relationship between ethics and metaphysics.

Critics have

attempted to destroy the validity of Objectivist ethics by
invoking a distinction between metaphysics and ethics.

Donald

EJnmons, in an article entitled "Ref'uting the Egoist," charges
that egoism can only be refuted in moral, not intellectual
terms.

He writes:

11

•••

pure reason is impotent to under-

mine (or establish) any normative

e1~hical

code. • • • The

heart has its reasons that pure reason does not know • • • n49
Such a position certainly undermines the ethics of
Objectivism, since Rand regards metaphysics and ethics as
definitely related:
Does an arbitrary human convention, a mere custom, decree
that man must guide his actions by a set of principlesor is there a f'act of reality that demands it? Is ethics
the pro~bnce of whims • • • or is it the province of
reason?.?
We may recall that Objectivism rejects Social Darwinism for
basing ethics on custom and social convention.51

Nathaniel

4 8Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemologr, p. 36.
49nonald Einrnons,
(Summer, 1969), 309-19.
.5°Rand,
original.

11

11

Ref'uting the Egoist," Personalist, L

The Objectivist Ethics,

-

11

14.

Italics in

51 For

additional evidence regarding the relationship
between ethics and metaphysics, see: Keith Hard, "Moral
Seriousness," Philosophy,XLV (April, 1970), 125-26. Ward
suggests that bei'ore one can determine Hhat he ought to do,
he must f'irst discover the nature of reali ty 1 11 • • • which
is to say that morality and metaphysics cannot be divorced
by any clear set of' distinctions . . • • Nox•al seriousness
does involve, in a sonse, commitment to Hhat the facts are,
'Y.rha t human li f'e is. • • • 11

II

I" I
~,.,,.,., ····~---~ -~,-«··~..--:~-~-·

.•

----~-~":··~-··----- ..-~-~ •..-~~

··,~j)II'

83
Branden expresses the meta-ethical concept somewhat more
directly:
It is ~he nature o~ living entities--the ~act that they
must sustain their li~e by sel~-generated action--that
makes the existence o~ values possible and necessary.
For each living species, the course o~ action required
is spe~~~ic; what an entity is determines what i t ought
to do • .?
It is not intended here to present a

de~ense

o~

whether or

not an is can imply an ought beyond what Objectivist ethics
state:

namely, the ethics regards the relationship between
I~

is and ought as crucial.

man's essential characteristic

is rationality, then Rand maintains he ought to behave aco~

cording to a rational code

ethics.

It is

le~t

now to

determine what Objectivism says a man ought to do given his
nature as a rational being.
Objectivist ethics begins not with what values man
ought to accept, but more
values at all-and why? u53

~undamentally:

"Does man need

\-Ie have already discussed value

in terms of its relationship to logic, noting that Rand
defines value as " • • • that which one acts to gain and/or
keep. 11 54

Crucial to the concept o~ value is choice.

.52 :f\Ta thaniel

Values

Branden, 11 Ra tional Egoism: A Reply to
Professor Emmons,
Personalist, LI (Spring, 1970), 2.01.
Italics in original. It should be recalled that Rand's
break 't·Ji th Branden occurred in Hay of 1968. As this article
was published in 1970, Rand does not strictly endorse its
contents.. HoHever, he opens the article by notinr;, 11 I am an
advocate oi' the Objectivist ethics. . • • 11 and further
aclmouledges his intellectual debt to Rand as the founder o~
Objectivisln. For these reasons, the article is used.
11

53Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," p. 13.
54rhid., p.

15.

See above page 7ll-•
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values are meaningless if the entity valuing cannot

choose; if one finds himself in such a situation, then morality ceases.

Something has value when it sustains life (gives

pleasure) and the conditions necessary for the maintenance
of life, and ceases to have value if it negates life (gives
death):

" • • • the ultimate value which, to be kept, must

be gained through its every moment, is the organism's

-life.u55It should be recalled
for survival.

that man has no automatic code

His consciousness is volitional, i.e., he as

an individual must choose for himself those values which will
best sustain life.

Therefore, the fundamental choice which

a man must make is to think or not to think.

Implications

of this are metaphysical as vlell as ethical.

Notes Rand:

"Metaphysically, the choice 'to be conscious' is then the
choice of life or death.u56

If, in other words, man is

rational, then he ought to engage a value system which sustains rationality.

This is the context in which she sees a

55It is important to note precisely what Rand means
by life. Critics have argued that she speaks of life only
in a physical sense. Rand 1 s reply should be sufficient refutation: "It [man's survival on earth] does not mean a
momentary or a merely phJ:sical survival. It does not mean
the momentary physical survival of a mindless bi'U te. • • •
It does not mean the momentary physical survival of a cl,mlling aggregate of muscles who is vlilling to accept any tel"'!lS,
obey any thug and surr'ender any values. • • • 11 Han' s survival qua man 11 means the terms, methods, conditions and
goals required for the survival of a ra tiona.l being through
the whole of his lii'espan-in all those aspects of existence
Hhich are open to his choice." See: Rand, "Tho Objectivist
Ethics, 11 pp. 17 -2L~. Italics in original.
56rbid., p. 21.
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relationship between is and ought statements.

In ract,

another way in which Objectivist ethics may be derined is
"Ethics is an objective, metaphys.Lcal necessity or man's
survival. • • • n57 Given the nature or Objectivist metaphysics, an important relationship emerges between it, lire,
values and survival.
code

or

Man qua man cannot survive without a

ethics, one consisting or values proper to his lire

as a rational being.
The question to be presented now is:

"What values

ought man to choose in order to best insure his survival,
given the kind

or

being he is?"

Rand answers:

· • • • the three values which, together, are the means to
and the realization or one's ultimate value, one's own
lire-are: Reason, Purpose, Selr-Esteem, lvith their
th:ee ~grresponding virtues: Rationality, Productiveness,
Pr~de.--'

Objectivist ethics is above all a rational system.

Def'ining

reason as " • • • the raculty that identiries and integrates
the material provided by man's senses,n59 she notes that
man's happiness and selr-esteem is proportionate to his
fidelity to rational thought.6°

Irrationality, in ract,

explains, .for Rand, the problem o.f evil.

Rejecting the

Christian concept o.f Original Sin, Objectivism regards evil
as tho refusal to think, to be rational:
• • • some men do not choose to think, but survive by
imitating and repeating, like trained animals, the routine
57Ibid., p. 23.

59 Ibid., p. 20.

60For another vieN of the role of reason in human
affairs, see: Errol Harris, 11 The Povler of Reason, 11 Review o.f
~aphysics, XXII (June, 1969), 630.
----
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of sounds and emotions they learned from others, never
making an effort to understand their own work. • • •
such looters are parasites incapable of survival, who
exist by destroying thos~ who ~~ capable, those who are
pursuing a course of act~on proper to man. 6 1
Rand is very critical of American schoolmen for allowing the
foregoing type of learning to exist in schools, because it is
the antithesis of rational productivity.62 Formal education
fails to stress rational development of the young.

By gradu-

ating students who behave irrationally and emotionally,
schools help to weaken the moral fabric of society.
Reason, purpose and self-esteem are the three values
proper to a rational man, for they,
• • • imply and require all of man's virtues and all his
virtues pertain to the relation of existence and consciousness: rationality, independencg~ integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride. ~
These characterize the ideal man Rand creates in her novels;
her educated man Hould live up to and practice'these in his
daily life.
Before discussing each virtue specifically, we shall
classify Objectivism's ethics.
gest some type of egoism.

Enough has been said to sug-

Of the generally recognized types:

universal ethical, individual ethical, personal ethical,
6lRand, 11 The Objectivist Ethics, 11 p. 23. Italics in
originalc
6 2 Nathaniel Branden explains the nature of evil somewhat moro succinctly: 11 Evasion, the refusal to think, the
willful rejection of reason, the w-illful suspension of consciousness, the Hillful defiance o:f reality is man's basic
vice ...... tho source of all his evils. n See: 11 Hational Egoism:
A Reply to P1 0.fes s or .Enmons, 11 p. 200.
7

63Rand,

11

This Is John Galt Speaking, tt p. 128.

megalomania, group, and analytic egoism, none seems to best
characterize Objectivism. 64
constrained egoism, that is:

Her position has been called
"egoism subject to the con-

straint of not violating certain conditions (which are other
persons' rights).n65

While constrained egoism describes an

important characteristic of Objectivist ethics, it remains
incomplete.

Probably the best classification i-rould be

cognitive egoism, or to use Nathaniel Branden's phrase,
rational egoism.

Objectivist ethic5 presents a rational

morality; one based on the specific nature of man,66 which,
as we have seen, is his rationality.
Objectivist ethics holds reason, purpose and selfesteem as the three supreme values for a rational man.

Com-

ments John Galt:
To live, man must hold three things as the supreme and
ruling values of his life: Reason--Purpose--Self-esteem.
Reason, as his only tool of knowledge--Purpose, as his
64For a discussion explaining why Objectivism is not
consistent with the recognized types of ethical egoism, see:
Nathaniel Branden, "Rational Egoism: A Reply to Professor
Emm.ons, 11 and Donald Emmons, "Refuting the Egoist, 11 pp. 31317. See also: Paul 11. Taylor, (ed.), Problems of Horal
Philosophy (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson PubllShlng co:-;Inc., 1967), pp. 88-89. The latter explains some of the
types of ethical egoism.
65Robert lifozick, 11 0n the Randian Argument,
LII (Spring, 1971), 295.

11

Personalist,

66nand co1nn1ents: nMan cannot survive as anything but
man. He can abandon his means of survival, his mind • • •
but he cannot succeed • • • in achieving a.'lything but the
subhuman. . . . I·1an has to be man by choice --and it is the
task of ethics to teach him how to live like man. The Objectivist ethics holds man's life as the standard of valueand h~~ ~ lil~£ as the ethical ~rpose_ of every individual
ma11.. -rr See: Irrf'be Ob jec ti vist Ethics, 11 pp. 24-25.

,'
!:

1
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choice or the happiness which that tool must proceed to
achieve-Sel£-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his
mind is competent to think and his person is ~orthy or
happiness, which means: is worthy or living.67
These values imply seven virtues which a man needs to live as
a rational being:

rationality, independence, integrity,

honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride.

Each

or

these

seven virtues will now be examined:
Rationality " • • • is man's basic virtue, the source

or

all his other virtues . • • • It means a commitment to

reason, not in sporadic £its or on selected issues or in
special emergencies, but as a permanent way

or

lire. n68

Rand states:
It means one's total commitment to a state or rull, conscious awareness in all choices, in all or one's waking
hours. It means a co~itment to the rullest perception
or reality within one's power and to the constant, activg
expansion or one's perception, i.e., or one's knowledge. 9
I£ one commits himselr to a rational lire according to the
£oregoing he must, o£ necessity, reject any £orm o£ mysticism or raith, described as an

11

•••

alleged short-cut to

knowledge • • • which is only a short-circuit destroying the
mind."7°

The issue

or

£aith versus reason will be considered

in the next chapter when problems in Objectivism are considered.
67Rand, "This Is John Galt Speaking.t 11 p. 128.
see pp. 81-82, above.
68 Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," pp. 25-26.
69Ibid., p.

25.

7°Hand, "This Is John Galt Speaking,

11

p. 128.
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Independence " • • • is the recognition of: the !:act
that yours is the responsibility of: judgment and nothing can
help you escape. it-that no substitute can do your thinking
• • •

rr71

Objectivism regards anyone as evil who allows

another to assume his responsibility !:or thinking.

Independ-

ence requires the courage to express one's views (rationally
derived) regardless of: tvhether they violate a norm held by
the group.

Rand's critique of: Progressive education suggests

it violates this virtue.
Integrity

11

• • • is the recognition of: the !:act that

you cannot f:ake your consciousness • • • that man • • • may
not sacrif:ice his convictions to the wishes of: others.

. . . rr72
honesty.

Integrity is closely related to independence and
One must never abandon his

convictions~

regardless

of: the pressure.
Honesty

11

..•

is the recognition of: the !:act that

the unreal is unreal and can have no value, that neither
love nor f:ame nor cash is a value if: obtained by f:raud
• • •

tr73

Honesty is man's most solf:ish virtue in that an

honest man refuses to " • • • sacrif:ice the reality of his

mm existence to the deluded consciousness
Fraud means two things:

of:

others. 11 74

(1) metaphysical subjectivism

which destroys the real by imposing on it one's lfhims or
desires as if: they were real, and (2) social metaphysics,

71 Ibid.

73rbid.,

72 Ibid., PP~ 128-29.
Pe 129.

74rbid.

I
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a belief which makes truth what a given group or society
deem it to be at the moment.

Objectivism regards Progres-

sive educators as social metaphysicians, destroying young
minds by imposing group norms on individual learners.
Justice

11

•••

is the recognition of: the fact that

you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the
character of nature, that you must judge all men as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects, with the same
respect for truth, with the same incorruptible vision, by
as pure and as rational a process of identification--that
every man must be judged for what he is and treated accordingly. • • • u75

The Objectivist concept of' justice counter•s

accepted Christian beliefs.

Whereas the Bible warns,

not, lest you be judged," Objectivism argues,
be prepared to be judged.u76

11

11

Judge

Judge, and

One must stand r~ady to accept

the consequences of his own actions.

Importantly though,

one must never take the responsibility lightly; judging must
not be confused with the random accusing of people with whom
we may disagree.

One must "Never fail to pronounce moral

judgment, n77 for one

'lrlho

sees evil and fails to proclaim it

as evil is himself guilty.
Productiveness is
• • • your acceptance of morality, your 1•ecognition of

75 I b.d
l .•
76Ayn Rand, "Intellectual Ammunition Department,"
11
I, No. 4 (April, 1962), 15.

.T..b_~ Ob,jectivi~t._l~c_!ter,

77rbid.
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the fact that you choose to live--that productive work
is the process by which man's consciousness controls his
existence, a constant process of acquiring knowledge and
shaping matter to fit one's purpose, of translating an
idea into physical form, of remaking the earth in the
image of one's values--that all wo~k is creative work
if done by a thinking mind .--.-. 7~
The highest activity to which a man can aspire is to use his
reason by engaging in productive work.

Rand notes, "Produc-

tive work is the road o:f man's unlimited achievement and
calls upon the highest attributes o:f his character:

his

creative ability, his ambitiousness, his self-assertiveness •
• • • n79 \{e may consider this as a re-interpretation of
Aristotle.

Intellectually excellent activity consists, then,

in actualizing not only what potentially exists in the universe, but also in actualizing the mind's potential through
productive work.
Pride is
• • • the recognition of the fact you are your own
highest value, and, like all of man's values, it has
to be earned--that of any achievement open to you, the
one that makes all others possible is the creation of
your own character--that your character, your actions,
desires, your emotions are the products o.f the premises
held by your mind--that as a man must produce the physical values he needs to sustain his life, so he must
acquire the values of character that make his life worth
sustaining •
that to live requires a sense of selfvalue. • • • 0

e.

Terming pride a virtue clashes with Christian morality.
Webster's Third Nevr International Dictionary defines pride
78Rand,

11

This Is Joh.t"l. Galt Speaking," p. 130.

79nand, "The Objectivist Ethics,

11

p. 26.

80nand, n'.L'his Is John Galt Speaking," pp. 130-31.
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as, "inordinate sel.f-esteem:

. •t Y• rr
superl.Orl.

an unreasonable conceit o.f

This de.finition, used in the Christian sense,

is not what Objectivism means; rather pride is equated with
"moral ambitiousness."

In other words,

• • • one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's
own highest value by achieving one t. s own moral perfection
-which one achieves by never accepting any code of irrational values impossible to practice and by never f'ailing to practice the virtues one knoHs to be rational-by
never accepting an unearned guilt and never earning any,
or, if' one has earned it, never leaving it uncorrected
-by never resigning oneself' passively to any f'la\vS in
one's character---by never placing any concern • • • above
the reality of one's own self-esteem. And, above all, it
means one's rejection of' any doctrine that preaches self'Dillaolation as a moral virtue or duty.Bl
In this sense, pride becomes an important virtue, one a
rational man must have .for living on earth.

However, its

legitimacy is contingent on one's engaging in productive
work, and thus should not be confused with arrogance as this
constitutes the wise (in def'iance of reality) to be given
credit f'or the unearned.
Objectivism brands American education f'or its f'ailure
to teach these virtues.

In essence they are needed if' one

is to live up to Rand's concept of' the educated man.
Given a man who practices Objectivist ethics, what
then ought to be the result?

There can be but one-happiness:

• . . the achievement of' his ~ ~pin:.::ss is mah' s hie.!];est moral purpose • • • • Happiness is that state of con·scio;t:tsii.OS s-"lihlch pr>occeds f'rom the achievement of' one t s
values. If a man values productive Hork, his happiness
is the measure of' his success in the service of' his
life • • • • Happiness is possible only to a rational man,
81Rand,
original.

11

'J.lhe Objectivist Ethics, 11 P~· 27.

Italics in
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the man who desires nothing but rational goals, seeks
nothing but rational yalues and ~inds his joy in nothing
but rational actions.H2
This is the heart o~ Objectivist ethics--the (rationally
derived) happiness o~ man achieved by ~idelity to (rational)
values.
We must now consider the role
al man r s

li~e.

o~

emotions in a ration-

They have alrea·dy been discussed when examin-

ing the concept sense

o~

li~e,

but now their philosophical

role needs ·treatment.
In addition to being the agent man needs to engage
in productive work, reason perrorms another valuable runc-

tion, that or evaluating entities which afrect the selr.
Nathaniel Branden derines emotion as,
somatic form in which

~ experience~

u

•••

the psycho-

the benericial

~

harT.Irul relationshiE or~ aspect or reality,to himselr.n83
The sequence is from perception to evaluation to emotional
response to some action.84

So orten, emotional responses

occur with such rapidity that the subject rails to realize
that an evaluation takes place, but because it does, reason
is involved.

Emotions are the result or a value judgment

made by a man and are " • • • not tools of cogni tio_!! • • •
what one feels in regard to any fact or issue is irrelevant
to the question or whether one's judgment is true or ralse.
82Ibid., pp. 27-29.

Italics in original.

83Nathaniel Branden, "Emotions and Values," Tho
V, No. 5 (Hay, 1966), 5. Italics in original.

Qbjectivis~,

84Ibid.
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It is not by means of one's emotions that one perceives
reality." 8 5

Emotions and reason, then, are not incompatible

except functionally.

One cannot

~erform

the task of another.

Evaluations occur prior to emotional reactions, and it is
reason that controls evaluations.

Emotions occur because

man has a rational nature; not in spite of it.86
healthy, rational

~nan,

For a

an emotion is the conscious product

of his values as formed by reason; emotions reflect rational
value judgments. 8 7
One issue needs consideration before closing this
chapter.

When someone advocates selfishness as a virtue,

replies often take the form of questions such as:

"You mean

you wouldn't help the victims of a :flood?" or "Wouldn't you

86R. s. Peters in The Logic of Education also argues
that a de:fini te relationship exists bet-vreen emotions and cognition. He notes that emotions themselves have a cognitive
core, 1:-1hich he calls an appraisal. In other words, a man who
experiences the emotion of anger cognitively "appraises" the
situation which gives rise to the emotion. For example, a
man cognitively appraising that a convicted murderer escaped
jail may experience anger. Consequently, "the separation of
intellectual from affective development is as untenable as
the study of emotional development without stress on the role
ot: cognition. 11 See: R. s. Peters and P. H. Hurst, The Logic
of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970),
PP •

Ii-9-50.

87KnOL-Tledge of the proper role ot: em.otions refutes the
charge that Objectivism is a i'orm ot: hedon:i2m. Objectivi::nn
denies tho premise that whateveP emot~ons, ~,jishes or -v;hims one
ha8 at the moment constitute tho fSOod. Notes Rand: 11 • • •
'Happiness' can properly bo the purpose of ethics, but not the
sta.'l.dfu•d. • • • \'ihen a des:i.re • :· • ~s taken as an ethical
pr1.mti"10~· and the gratif'ication o.f any and n.ll desires is taken
as an othics.l goal • • • men have no choice but to hate, .fem..
and i'ight one another, because their desires and their interests t..r:i.ll nocossarily clnsh.u See: HThe Objectivist Ethics, 11
PP. 29-30. Italics in original.
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helP a little child hurt in a car accident?"

For Objectivism,

however, selrishness does not imply any moral consideration
or "does not tell us whether concern with one's own interests
is good or evil • • • it means only concern with one's own
interests.n88

Rand argues that while her derinition or selr-

ishness is not the Christian one, it does conrorm to what the
dictionary states.

or the rour examined however, including

Webster's unabridged three-volume dictionary (Webster's
International), only one (The Random House Dictionarr) derines
selrishness the way Rand does. 8 9 Although Rand•s belier that
her derinition or selrishness conrorms to the

dictionat~y

is

thus vTeakened, this does not absolutely rule out the concept
of selfishness without violating the rights or others.

Rand

88Rand, "Introduction" to The Virtue or Selfishness,
p. vii.
89These dictionaries derine selfishness as follows:
(In all cases, the rirst or primary meaning is cited).
Webster's New World Dictionary (School and Office Edition):
Overly concerned Wlth one's own interest and advantage so
that the welfare of others is neglected."
Webster • s New Horld Dictiona!:.r (College Edition): 11 Having
such regard .for one's own 1nterests and adva..."ltage that the
happiness and welfare of others becomes of less concern th&~
is considered right or just."
The Random House Die tionarz (College Edition) : "Devoted to
·or ca.r1ng only f'or one serf; concerned only with one's own
inte:r•ests. 11
~~bster'

s 'I?hir·d New International Dictionary (Unabl~idged):
Concerned excess1voly or exclus1vely Wlth oneself; seeking
Ol' concentrating on one r s own advantage, pleasure, OI' wellbeing Hi thout x•egard ror others. 11

Webster's College Edition especially does violence to Rand's
def'ini tion oi'seli'islmess.
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clarifies the meaning of selfishness:
If it is true that what I mean by "selfishness" is not
what is meant conventionally, then this is one of the
worst indictments of altruism: it iiie"ans that altruism
permits no concept of a self-respecting, self-supporting
man-a man who supports his life by his own effort . • • •
The Objectivist ethics holds that the actor must always
be the beneficiary or his actions and that man must act
for his mm rational sel.f-interest • • • • It is not a
license "to do as he pleases" and it is not applicable
to the altruists' image o.f a "sel.fishu brute nor to any
man motivated by irr•ational emotions, feelings, urges,
wishes or whims.90
we have alr7ady examined under what terms and conditions a
man may act in his own (rational) self-interest and what
values and virtues make this possible.

Selfishness, in an

Objectivist context, then does not mean the violation of the
rights o.f others.

Further, the concept in no way forbids

one .from providing help in emergency situations:
It is only in emergency situations that one should volunteer to help strangers, if it is in one's power. For
instance, a man who values ht~an life and is caught in
a shipvrreck, should help to save his fellow passengers
(though not at the expense of his own life). But this
does not mean that a.fter they all reach shore, he should
devote his e.f.forts to saving his fellow passengers from
poverty, ignorance . • • • 91
More is expected when those needing help are .friends or loved
ones:

II

. . . i.f

one's .friend is starving, it is not a sac-

rifice, but an act of integrity to give hlia money for .food
• • • because his '\vel.fare is important in the scale of one's
personal values.u92
9°Rand., 11 Introduc tion, 11 to The Vil~tue of Sel.fishness,
pp. ix-x. Italics in original.
9l.Ayn Rand, "The Ethics o.f Emergencies," in The
48. Parentheses in original.

~ue o.f Selfif;lmoss, p.

------------

92 rbid., p. ~.6.
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The only qualification attached stipulates that nonsacrificial means should be used.
·---;f·

.·~

Acting against one's oWn.

rational self-interest, for example helping an accident victim at the expense of one 1 s own child, would be rejected as
irrational.

Further, Rand believes it immoral to help save

the life of a horribly immoral person--a dying Hitler, for instance--since such a being ought to be allowed to die for his
crimes.
Thus, one who gives money to help a flood victim or
saves a child hurt in a car accident is not, according to
the Objectivist ethics, sacrificing anything and may therefore help.

A rational man does not live for the purpose of

only serving others.

He helps in emergencies if they occur,

but this is hardly the same situation as being morally obliged
to provide help whenever asked, and to the detriment of himself ru1d his family.
The only exception to the above would be the men who
serve as police officers and firemen.

To them falls the

task of saving life at the risk of their own, but these are
risks they agree to accept as necessary conditions of their
duties.
SU1'1MARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide the
reader vrith an understanding of Objectivist metaphysics,
epistemology and axiology and some related issues as a necessar•y pPelude to a proper appreciation of Rand's educational

I
I

I

'
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·position.
As an introduction to Objectivism, the concept sense

-of life

WclS

exa~ined.

This pre-conceptual equivalent or

metaphysics helps shape man's relationship to reality, and
later develops into a philosophy of life.

Education's task

is to help the learner make the transition from a sense of

-

life to a philosophy of life.
Metaphysically, Rand's orientation is Aristotelian.

Based on the Laws or Thought, it posits the belier that
reality exists independent or the mind.

One cannot properly

dismiss these Lai.YS as having no relationship to what a<?tually

!!'

for they constitute the tools needed by man to probe

reality.

Of course, Objectivist metaphysics rejects most

forms of subjectivism, especially the attempt to shape reality to one 1 s personal whims or wishes.
Epistemologically, Objectivism considers the nature
of concepts and how they help man to understand reality.
Without concepts which alloH one to classify and integrate
vast amounts of knowledge, intellectual growth could never
occur.
respect.

But, Rand differs from Aristotle in one important
Hhile the latter regards

11

essence 11 as metaphysi-

cal, the former regards it as epistemological in nature,
implyine; that concepts are open-ended thereby allol-Ting ror
the addition of' new·J.y discovered lmowledge.
Ethically, Objectivism postulates the 'ideal man,
in effoct the Ra.ndian concept of the educated man.

1

Objec-

ti\rist axiology postulates objective moral truths, validated
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by reference to reality.

The criteria used ror determining

what values a man ought to accept is manrs life as a rational
being.

Objectivist ethics argue that reason, purpose and

self-esteem together with the virtues

or

rationality, inde-

pendence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and
pride constitute the values one ought to accept if he wishes
to live a rational lire.

Objectivist ethics can best be

classiried as cognitive or rational egoism.
Advocating selrishness as a virtue does not imply
violation

or

the rights

or

others, but allows one to help

another only in an emergency situation, the aid terminating
when the emergency does.

Problems relating to this will be

discussed in the next chapter.
Thus rar, this study has largely been uncritical in
presenting Objectivism in order that the reader may study it
as it actually is.

The next chapter, however, will deal with

"problems" Objectivism presents.

These coul.d possibly stand

in the way or Rand's educational views being implemented, and
thus require consideration.

CHAPTER FOUR
PROBLEMS WITH OBJECTIVIS11
As a philosophy of education, Objectivism presents
parents, teachers and learners with several difficulties
which might, if left unexamined, hinder acceptance.
following shortcomings will be discussed:

The

(1) definitional

thinking, (2) atheism, (3) religion and reason versus faith,

(4) religion and capitalism, (5) the ethics of emergencies,
(6) internal contradictions (The Fountainhead), theory of
compromise, and (7) intolerance.
Definitional Thinking
Objectivism stands or falls on its use of definitions,
objections to which have been raised by Albert Ellis:
Objectivist philosophy bases most of its basic premises
on highly tautological thinldng • • • it is • • • ultimately i~ai th in the pm-ter of analytic def'ini tional propositions that nullifies practically all the good things
that are included in Objectivism.l
He argues that Objectivism uses analytic statements which
although logically true, may not necessarily be true in
reality.

The distinction made concerns the so-called

analytic/synthetic dichotomy.

According to Robert Ennis in

1A1ber·t Ellis, Is Objectivism a Religion?
Lyle Stuart, 1968), pp-:--2"17 :ff.

(New York:
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_&ogic in Teaching, analytic statements " • • • are those which
are in a given context correctly taken as true simply as a
result of the meanings of the words appearing in the state1nent •
• • • no conceivable test could exist for them. • • • " 2 Synthetic statements, on the other hand, constitute any nonanalytic ones, ones for which a counter-example could be conceived.

The distinction is made since synthetic statements

must be validated.

For example to say "A bachelor is an un-

married man" is to speak analytically; to deny it would be a
contradiction, but to say "Bachelors are happier than married
men" may of course be contradicted.

Thus it must be vali-

dated in the context in which it appears.
Ellis accuses Rand of making statements which appear
to be

~~alytic

but fail to meet the criteria for such and

therefore are invalidly used.

For example, he cites the

following from Atlas Shrugged,
There is a morality of reason, a morality proper to man,
and Nan's li.fe is its standard o.f value. All that which
is proper to the life of a rational man is good; all that
which destroys it is the evil,j
and comments:
• • • life is defined as being good; and it is assum.ed
that reason necessarTly sustains lii'e and that therefore
a mor•s.lity based on r•oason must be absolutely va.lift:·
Actually, human life csn bedefined as bad. • • • ~
2 Hobert Ennis, !Jogic in Te~ch:i.ne (Englmvood Cli:fi's,
N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., l<;i69J, pp. 300-01.
3Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged (Nov;r York:
The Nm...- American
Library, Signet PI•oss,-19.j(), p. 940. Italics in original.

4Ellis, Is Ob jec ti vism a Reljeion_:?_, P. 219 e
in original.

I taJ.ics
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Ellis suggests that merely because Objectivism defines reason
as life sustaining (morally good), does not necessarily make
it so.
There are several ways to respond.

Quoting a statement

out of context and then charging insufficient data to justify
conclusions reached does Objectivism an injustice.

Ellis of

course is free to critique Objectivist ethics, but must himself consider supporting data offered by Rand.

The purpose

of chapter three was to provide such data for the reader.
Secondly, one may (as does Rand) deny the distinction
between analytic and synthetic statements.

In order to

understand why she denies other distinctions we must briefly
return to the Objectivist theory of concept formation as it
relates to the present question.

Rand defines a concept as

• • • a mental integration of two or more units possessing
the ~ dlstlnguishing ~-acteristic (s), ~ their
partlcular· measurements omltted,5
·
and argues that concepts intrinsically relate to language,
specifically definition.

Definition is defined as " • • • a

statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed
under a concept.

The purpose of a definition is to distin-

guish a concept from all other concepts . • • • n6

Imp or-

tantly, "the nature of the units subsumed" means all units,
and not just the essential or distinguishing characteristic
(s) which usually constitute reported de£initions.

She writes:

5Ayn Rand, Intl~oduction to Obiectiv:bEt Epis__:!::~molog¥
The Objectivist Ine q 19 9}, p. 17. Italics ln

(NoH York:
original~

6Jbid., p. llo.
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• • • the error lies in assuming that a concept consists
of nothing but its distinguishing characteristic. But
the fact is that in the process of abstracting from
abstractions, one cannot lmm-r what is a distinguishing
characteristic unless one has observed other characteristics of the units involved.7
In forming definitions one naturally selects a distinguishing
characteristic

(~.,

rationality), but this should not imply

that other non-essential characteristics be ignored.

One

must be aware of all the characteristics in order to determine the essential ones.
Rand argues that man needs logic as a tool for comprehending reality, so to weaken logic by means of a dichotomy denies man his means of survival.

Rand suggests that

the proposing of a counter-example in no way sanctions an
artificial split.
examples:

By way of proof, she offers the following

All swans are white--synthetic since one may

imagine a black swan, and a being from Mars with rationality,
but a spider's body--synthetic, since one may imagine a
creature other than man which has reason, ru1d comments:
What these • • • do demonstrate is the failure to grasp
the cognitive role of' concepts-i.e., the fact that the
requirements of cognition determine the objective criteria of concept-formation. The conceptual classif'ication of' newly discovered existents depends on the nature
and extent of' their dirf'erences f'rom and similarities to
the previously kno\m existents. In the case of' black
m.;~ms, it is objectively mandatory to classify them as
11
swans, 11 because virtually all their characteristics are
similar to the characteristics of' 1vhite swans, and the
dif'f'ercnce in color is of no cognitive signif'icance.
(Concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity).
In the case of the rational spldei' from Hars (if' such a
creature Here possible), the dif'.ferences betHeen him and
man would be so great that the study of one would scarcely

7 Ibi~., p. 29.

Italics in or•iginal.
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apply to the other and, therefore, the formation of a new
concept to designate the Hartians would be objectively
mandatory. (ConcepSs are not to be integrated in disregard of necessity.)
She reasons, therefore, that the discovery of additional
knowledge does not sanction the analytic-synthetic dichotomy.
If possible the new knowledge must either be integrated into
an already existing concept, or a new concept must be formed.
Man, in other words, holds

~he

synthetic statements (thereby

power to logically validate
rendel~ing

the distinction use-

less) by reference to objective reality, but

tt

•••

it is

man who has to identify the facts; objectivity requires discovery by man • • • • Man cannot know more than he has discovered.119

Thus Rand argues that merely because the proposi-

tion "All m1ans are white" admits to counter-examples -that
such does not justify its being given a special category.
Therefore, what man ought to do to determine if black swans
exist, or if bachelors are happier than married men, is to
examine the facts of reality to discover the truth.

The

propositions are (or are not) logically true according to
what evidence is uncovered.
In Objectivist epistemology, the facts of experience
are involved in all propositions, and are governed by the
(logical) laws of thought.

Thus,

11

• • • a word has no

meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and
the meaning of a concept consists of its units.

It is not

BRand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemolog][,
pp. 65-66. Parenfhosos in original.
9rbid., PPo L!-4-45.

Italics in original.
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words, but concepts that man derines--by specirying their
rererents.nlO

The rererents, however, are what exist in

reality and what man seeks to understand through the knowledge
provided by his senses.

To remove the "rererents 11 would make

words themselves meaningless.
We may conclude this section by noting that when Rand
deals with the accuracy
sive

or

or

propositions, she does so exclu-

any dichotomy, the truth or ralsity

be determined by rererence to reality.

or

which can only

It has not been the

purpose of the foregoing to refute the analytic-synthetic
dichotomy, but to discuss Rand's objections to it.
Regarding Objectivism and definitional thinking, then,
He must be careful to note the context in which words are
used.

As mentioned in the last chapter, Objectivism regards

all definitions as contextual; thus selfishness or Romanticism cannot be understood unless studied in the context
Objectivism.

Strictly speaking, many

or

or

Rand's definitions

are stipulative and readers may properly demand she remain
internally consistent Hhen using them.

Importantly for the

chapters on education which follow this one, all definitions
should be understood in the context of Objectivist metaphysi.cs, epistemology and axiology.
Atheism
Rand's classification of religion is not flattering.
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Regarding it as a primitive form or philosophy, she responds
in the Playboy Interview to whether religion has ever "offered
anything or constructive value to :. .uma.n life":
Qua religion, no--in the sense or blind belief, belief
unsupported by, or contrary to, the facts or reality and
the conclusions or reason. Faith, as such, is extremely
detrimental to human lire: it is the negation or reason.
But you must remember that religion is an early form or
philosophy, that the rirst attempts to explain the universe, to give a coherent frame or rererence to man's life
and a code or moral values, 't-Tere made by religion, before
men graduated or developed enough to have philosophy.
And, as philosophies, some religions have very valuable
moral poi~ts • • • but in a very contradictory context,
and on a very--how should I say it?--dangerous or malevolent base: on the ground or raith.ll
Hhether or not .faith is the negation of' reason will be discussed shortly.

Presently, however, we should note that in

the Randian scheme of' things, religion serves as a crutch to
be discarded when an individual becomes sophisticated enough
to embrace a philosophy of' lif'e.

Her dislike of' Christianity

is oven more blatantly expressed:
• • • according to the Christian mythology he [Christ]
died on the cross not f'or his own sins but f'or the sins
of' nonideal people. In other words, a man of' perf'ect
vil,tue Has sacri.ficod f'or men who are vicious and who
are expected or supposed to accept that sacrif'ice. If'
I were a Christian, nothing could make me more indignant
than that: the notion of' sacriricing the ideal to the
nonidea1, or virtue to vice. And it is in the name of'
that symbol that men are asked to sacri.fice themselves
f'or theil• inf'eriors. That :l.s precisely ho1.; the symbolism is used. That is torture.12
Ho:r>e,

it l-Tould appear that she not only rejects Christian

morality, but also the concept of' God, linking it to sacri-

AJ.v~n Tof.flcr, (Interviewer), "Playbo~ Interview
with Ayn Rana, 11 Playbo;l[ XI (1-farch, 1964)~0.
1 2 Ibid. My brackets.
11
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fice and (as we saw earlier) the forcing of man to live up to
an unattainable moral ideal.
Rand's militant stand against God and all forms of
faith is apparently not shared quite so strongly by all of
her followers.

When still associated with Objectivism,

Nathaniel Branden, in The Objectivist Newsletter (December,
1965) warns that a frank and open admission of atheism certainly might not serve the advancement of Objectivism in a
Christian democratic society.

In "A Report to Our Readers-

1965," in which he lauds the spread of Objectivism in America,
Branden notes:
As uncompromising advocates of reason, Objectivists are,
of course, atheists. He are intransigent atheists, not
militant ones. \..Je are for reason; therefore, as a cOil="
sequence, He are opposed to any form of mysticism; therefore, we do not grant any validity to the notion of a
supernatural being. But atheism is scarcely the center
of our philosophical position. To be known as crusaders
for atheism would be acutely embarrassing to us; the
adversary is too tmworthy. 5
Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to offer a
defense for God's existence (for this writer it needs none),
it would be worthwhile to examine the error in Objectivist
thinking.
13Nathaniel Branden, "A Report to Our Readers-1965 11
The Objectivist Newsletter, IV, No. 12 (December, 1965), 5~.
Ita11cs in origlnal:--T3randen 's remarks surmest a serious
viola.tion of Objectivist ethics, as defined by Hand. If one
must never be afraid to proclaim rationally derived principles,
(and if Objectivism holds atheism as such), then by virtue of
f'idolity to integrity, Branden ought not to be afraid to
11
crusaden for atheism, regardless of' tho consequences. His
reason (the adversary is too unworthy) appears as a thinryveiled attempt to hide one of two truths: rejection by the
American people, or lack of conviction regarding tho merit
of atheism itself.
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First

or

all, the relationship between religion and

philosophy is somewhat confusing.

Philosophy, for example,

may serve as a testing ground for the religious experience
by clarifying and/or refining its commandments, adding so to
speak intellectual ballast.

Perhaps one reason why the

Christian raith has endured centuries of persecution is because its foundations were strengthened by the philosophical
systems

or

both Plato and Aristotle.

J. Donald Butler com-

ments on tha philosophical-religious experience in this context:
Many times • • • there are serious inconsistencies in
religious thought. This is because the rational implications of beliers are not rollowed through logically.
Accordingly, the culling or truth .from the religious
heritage, and the resolving or inconsistencies in religious doctrine, are tvm o.f the important re.finements o.f
religion to Hhich philosophy can contribute much. • • •
Also religion may readily become the appropriate f'ield
of practical endep.vor in which a given philosophy may
find expression.l4
·
Thus both philosophy and religion, far rrom being antagonis tic, tend to define the co:mmi tment a man n1akes to lead a
good lire.

Butler's final sentence suggests still another

relationship between religion and philosophy.

It will be

recalled that Rand considers a philosopher 1-:ho refuses to
practically augment his convictions as leading less than a
full life.

Might not religion be the ideal means through

l-Ihich this might be accomplished?

Although Rand would dis-

agree, religion ca..'1 serve as the vehicle tl-:rx•ough ivhich a man

lq.J. Donald Butler, Four Philosophies and their Practice in

Edu~a ti _on

.196uL PP· 9-lo.

and Relit;IO'Ti\'11eH York:

f~lrpei'

and Rmv,
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actualizes his philosophical potential.
Religion and Faith VPrsus Reason
When Rand speaks or religion, she generally rerers to
it as mystical jargon beyond rational comprehension and thus
absolutely non-contingent on rational thought.
in an essay entitled Faith and Force:

For example,

The Destroyers or the

Modern \vorld, she writes:
Mysticism is the acceptance or allegations without evidence or proor, either apart from or against the evidence
of one's senses and one's reason. Hyst~cJ.sm is the claim
to some non-sensory, non-rational, non-derinable means or
knowledge such as 11 instinct,n "intuition," "revelation,"
or any form of njust knowing. 11 • • • in the light of what
followed [i.e., the Renaissance) • • • nobody can now
take faith, or religion, or revelation or any form of
mysticism as his basic and exclusive guide to existence,
not the way it was taken in the 1-'Tiddle Ages .15
Here, Rand seems to be accepting the philosophical position
that man's senses provide the data necessary to allow reason
to for•m proper judgments.

But since the time of Plato,

philosophers have argued that sense data can be extremely
inaccurate, often therefore misleading reason.

So from the

standpoint of accurate reporting, sense data has its share
of risks too, just as rai th.

Ironically, Rt=md places so

much ufaith 11 in reason that she regards it as man's exclusive
guide to kno"trledge and refuses to recognize that it, too, may
deceive man, especially if data fed to it by the senses are
15Ayn Rand, Faith and_Force: The Dc~~rozers of the
l·'fodel'n Horld, reprint of a lectura deliverod at Yale University (February 17, 1960), Brooklyn College (April!~, 1960),
and ColunJbia University (i'.Iay 5, 1960). (Nmr York: The
Objectivist Inc., 1960), 11. Hy brackets.
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not accurate.
Further, the use of' the word "exclusive" (basic and·
exclusive guide to existence) is at best misleading.

Today,

f'ew Christians would advocate a return to the Middle Ages.
Not many religions base the conduct of' their af'f'airs totally
on revelation, suspending all rational operations in the
process.

As the author of' lif'e, God gave man a mind which

He expects him to use in order to

s1~vive.

Love of' and

dependence on God does not in any way imply the abandoning
of rational thought to mystical whim.

Indeed the New Testa-

ment tells us that Jesus Has quite severe with the man who
had failed to use his "talent" productively (Matt. 15:14-30).
The dichotomy made bet1·men reason and faith is not
accurate.

1-lhen postulating such a dis tinction, Rand seems

to be saying that those who have faith must, as a necessary
condition, either abandon reason entirely, or regard it as
inferior to f'aith.

But, to have faith is not to do either.

Faith may be vieHed on tHo levels:

hrunan and divine.

Faith

in our felloH man is a matter of necessity, since human
knowledge Hould stagnate without it.

No one person could

ever hope to personally verify the data he must use to live,
even if he possessed the necessary skills to do so, which
is unlikely.

\vhen an executive of a large corporation

issues an order, all he can logically expect is that his
subordinates 't·Iill execute it.

LikeN·ise, a man wishing to

pu:r>chase a television set or visit a doctor must place his
faith in the reputation of the manu.facturer 1 s or doctor's
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ability, especially if he lacks the education necessary to
unders·tand and evaluate the complex electronic systems built
into a television or the medical knowledge of the doctor.
Of course, reason plays a crucial role in helping one to do
this, but the fact remains that
[the] largest percentage of our knowledge comes to each
of us through our habitual trust in the reports, research,
and opinions of others whom we take (perhaps by an additional application of faith) to be in a position to know.
And we do not require that in order to be in a position
to knm..r one must in every case be able to find out for
himself. It would be a rare person who could claim to
have found out or to have checked (or even have partially
verified) any significant proportion of the things he
counts among his knmvledge .16
Without "faith," then, there could be little human knowledge.
Direct and personal validation occupies but a mnall place in
man's means of acquiring knowledge.
Religious faith or "faith in God" does not render a
man irrational.

What gives rise to religious faith is often

contingent upon the experiential environment:
Hhat you can see depends upon the kinds of experience
you can have; that depends upon the significance you
assign to the elements of your experience and that
depends upon your perceptual sets; and that in turn
depends very often upon whether you are lucky enough
to have met the right disclosure ~ituations. This
holds for life generally . • • • l{
Put in these terms, then, what Rand chooses to do is assign
little signii':i.ca.Dce to the type of human experience which
16James Ross, Introduction to the Philosophy of
(London: Thel1acmillan · Company, 1969), p. 79.
brackets. Parentheses in original.
Rol~on

17Ibid., p. 109.

Italics in original.

Ny

112

gives rise to raith in God.l8

But, reason and raith may be

looked upon as two related types

or

human lmowledge.

To deny

the rormer would destroy human knowledge by negating the
role

or

the mind in acquiring and validating lmowledge.

To

deny the latter would, in errect, accomplish the same thing
by rerusing to man an inrinite variety
as essential to his survival.

or

experiences just

Faith in God can be a beauti-

ful and personally fulrilling experience ror man.
ism's rejection

or

Objectiv-

a creator leads to many dirriculties,

not the least of which is the philosophy's rejection by
American schoolmen.
Religion and Capitalism
Objectivists argue that it is irrational to speak

or

capitalism and religion in the same context; the case against
religion as an inrluence on the growth

or

capitalism in

18Perhaps Rand's background explains why. Barbara
Branden, her biographer, tells us that her parents, u • • •
who were J-evdsh, were not particularly religious, e-nd had
given her no formal religious training." Additionally He
must not forget that as a child, she experienced the horror
o.f the Russian revolution experiencing many horrible incidents including con£iscation of her father's store, lack of
food, little money, and unemployment. Under such circtunstunces, Rand's lack of belief in God's existence may appear
understandable. Living in a world which ignored religious
training ar!d fostered brutality as a way of: life, she obviously lacked the experiential elements necessary to a development of' strong religious faith. Further, her almost
f'aith-·like allegiance to the power of re!lson as man t s only
reliable guide to knmvledge could possibly stem f'rom the
irrationalism of' the revolution which perpetrated so many
degradations. For details see: Barbara Branden, nwho Is
Ayn Rand?, 11 in Nathaniel Branden, v!ho _I~ A?J! Rand?
(New
York: Paperback Library, 1968), pp. u.S~ , and Ayn Rand,
\ve the L1.vi)r~ (New York:
':Phe Nm-v American Library, Signet
Press, 1959 , passim.

113
America is stated by Barbara Branden:
To rest one's advocacy of capitalism on .faith, is·to concede that reason is on the side of one's enemies. Such
implies that a free society cannot be rationally justified • • • • To claim that capitalism rests on religious
faith is to contradict the fundamental principles of the
United States; in America religion is a private matter
which must not be brought into political issues.l9
unfortunately, for her argument, the "fundamental principles
of the United States" as they relate to economic issues are
indeed inclusive of religious issues.

Objectivists, when

advocating the opposite, ignore the tremendous impetus given
capitalism by the Puritan ethic.

The latter, by stressing

hard work, productiveness, and self-help as signs of the
elect and by condemning non-productiveness and laziness as
vices, provided an atmosphere conducive to economic competition.

Writing in this connection, R. H. Tawney observes of

the Puritan:
• • • he sees in the poverty of those who fall by the
way, not a misfortune to be pitied and relieved, but a
moral railing to be condemned, and in riches, not an
object of suspicion-though like other gifts they may be
abused-but the blessing which rewards the triumph of
energy and vlill. Tempered by self-examination, selfdiscipline, self-control, he is the practical ascetic,
whose Victories are won not in the cloister, but on the
battle.f'ield, in the counting-house, and in the market.20
The

fail~e

of Objectivists to note the relationship between

capitalism and the Puritan ethic leads them to distort history.

In attempting to select only the non-religious

.facto1~s

1 9Barbara Bran.den, 11 Intellec tual Ammunition Department,
_!h~..s>.PJ_~vi1:t NeHs1etter, I, No. 3 (March, 1962), 11.
Ital1cs 1n or1ginal.
20 R. H. Ta~mey, Religion and tho Rise of Capitalism
(Nevl York:
Hontor Books, 1954), pp. "191-92 ..
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which gave rise to free enterprise in America, they arbitrarily censor an important element in political and economic development of this country.

Although it is quite

true that religion in the United States is a private matter,
all the privacy implies is that according to the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights, the Federal government may not
institute a state religion, or lend support to any individual
religion.

It says nothing about the influence of religion

in shaping .tmerican values and institutions.

Objectivists

fail to realize that the economic and political freedoms
enjoyed by Americans today might not have occurred were it
not for the religious influence.21
Further, the concept of individual rights as opposed
to man in service to the state has its roots not just in
the Renaissance (as Objectivism suggests), but also in the
"theocratic" !,riddle Ages, the era Rand deplores.

Writes

one critic of her historiography:
• • • the idea of representative government we owe to
the cru~istian notion of personality and the medieval
conception of mutually binding covenants • • • the cornerstone of English and by extension American constitutionalism is the ~ost medieval and feudal of documents,
the Hagna Carta.2
Although it may be argued whether the Hagna Carta exercised
as much influence as suggested, it remains defensible to
suggest that Christianity helped to displace the notion,
21 samuol Eliot r.Torison, The O.xf'ord History of' the
American Poople (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),
pp.·

"69-7~--

22

11. Stanton Evans, "The Gospel Accm:•ding to Ayn Rand,"
Na tiona]. Roviel.·l, XIX ( Oc tobor, 1967), 1063.

115

common to Plato and Aristotle, that man must exist for the
state.

Paramount to the Christian ethic is respect for the

individual dignity of' all men.

.Just as an undue emphasis

~n

f'aith can warp one's judgment, the converse is likewise true.
one who f'ails to grasp the role religion has played in the
f'or.mation and growth of' America cormnits the cardinal sin
against which Objectivists constantly warn:

that of evading

reality and substituting whims or desires f'or what actually
is (or was).
The Ethics of' Emergencies
As we have noted above, Rand rejects the source of
human rights as coming f'rom the Christian ethic.

Rather,

she suggests that " • • • the source of' man's rights is not
divine law or congressional law, but the law of' identity.n23
Such a belief' tends to depreciate the value of' an individual's dignity.

In the last chapter, we discussed the Objec-

tivist belief' that it would be morally justif'iable to allow
an Adolf' Hitler to die.

If' one judged his actions as

morally abominable but then saved his lif'e, he would in
ef'f'ect be perpetuating a moral evil.

Whether such a moral

norm becomes operative depends on who authors human
If' rights originate

~rom

li~e.

anyone or anything other than God,

then one would indeed be justified in allowing Adolf' Hitler
23Ayn Rand, "Han's Rights," in The Virtue of' Selfishness (New York: The Ne1v American Library, "signet Press,

Y9b1+),

p.

94.
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to die since his
his

li~e

li~e

per se is

does not prevent us

evil, even to the point

o~

o~

~rom

no importance.

Saving

judging his actions as

prescribing death had he
There~ore,

the war, but only through due process.
position that we must know the

~acts be~ore

surviv~d

Rand's

condemning is

not consistent with her position on the Hitler issue.
Nathaniel Branden identi~ies the issue involved when
discussing why capital punishment constitutes a danger to
human freedom.

Noting that the

mor~l

issue involved does

authorize the state to execute a convicted

~elon

through

due process, he goes on to attach the rollowing legal stipulation:
• • • men are not inrallible; juries make mistakes; that
is the problem. There have been instances recorded where
all the available evidence pointed overwhelmingly to a
man's guilt, and the man was convicted, and then subsequently discovered to be innocent. It is the possibility
or executing an innocent man that raises ~pubts about the
legal advisability of capital punishment. 4
The issue, however, is precisely a moral one ror the very
reason Branden suggests--inrallibility.

Suppose we argue,

as it has been, that Hitler was insane at the time he issued
orders leading to the extermination o£ rive million Jews.
If so, can he be held completely morally responsible for his
actions and thererore be allowed to die at the discretion
a single individual?

or

The point is that when God is divorced

rrom human affairs, the moral commitment to preserve lire
fades~

Probably the rirst restraint to disappear would be
2 ~·Na thaniel

Branden, 11 Intellectual Arn.muni tion Department, The Objectivist Ne't·Tsletter, II, No. 1 (January, 1963),
3. Italics id~riginal.
11
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due process, resulting in death sentences being pronounced
on the whims or mistaken judgments of accusers.
Rand is quite correct when demanding that men not
evade the responsibility to denounce evil, but to do so in
a context which also denies the source of all good allm-Ts
for too many errors.

If a jury which has listened to over-

whelming evidence of guilt for months can err, then the risk
of one person doing the same is that much greater.

Plato

suggests that belief is not the same as knowing; if it were,
Branden's argurnen t against capital punish.'1l.en t would not
exist, but men are fallible.
We

C~L

thus condemn the actions of a Hitler and urge

that he be held accountable for his perversions of the moral
law, but to judge, condemn, and then execute is not the
prerogative of any one individual in a free society.
Internal Contradictions
Ob jec ti vism is not 1-1i thout internal contradictions.
Inconsistencies, for example, are found in her novel,
Folmtainhead.

~

In an earlier chapter, we referred to Rand's

heroes and their intensive struggle against evil, noting
that the war usually consists of intellectual refutations,
coupled when nec:essary 1-1i th appropriate action. 2 5
of "appropriate" concerns us now.

The nature

The F ountainhead's hero
1

Hov1a.rd Roark, an arc hi teet, undertakes to design a low-rent
housing project, free of charge, for an inefficient colleague

--------·-2')
·See p.

51 above.

, I

'Ji
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provided he, Roark, .retains sole autonomy regarding design.
However, when completed, implemented structural changesmade without Roark's authorization-results in a hybrid
design. He responds by dynamiting the project, 26 and orrers
the

~ollowing

derense at his trial:

"I designed Cortlandt. I gave it to you. I destroyed
it. I destroyed it because I did not choose to let it
exist. It Has a double monster. In form and in implication. I had to blast both. The form was mutilated by
two second-handers who assumed the right to improve upon
that which they had not made and could not equal. They
were permit ted to do it by the ge ..'leral implication that
the altruistic purpose of the building supers·eded all
rights that I had no claim to stand against it.
.
"I agreed to design Cortlandt ror the purpose of
seeing it erected as I designed it and ror no other
reason. That lvas the price I set :for my work. I was
not paid. • • •
"It is said that I have destroyed the home o:f' the
destitute. It is forgotten that but for me the destitute
could not have had this particular home. Those vrho were
concerned with the poor had to come to me, who has never
been concerned, in order to h~lp the poor. It is believed
that the poverty of the future tenants gave them a right
to my work. That their need constituted a claim on my
life. That it was my duty to contribute anything demanded
of me. This is the second-hander 's credo now Slvallolving
the world. n'c!.7
It is difficult to reconcile Roark's actions with
ist ethics on several counts.

Objectiv-

First it would appear that

although Roark considers his rights violated, the response
26Interestingly enough, The New York Times reported
that when 'I'he Fountainhead was be~ng made ~nto a movie (1949)
the producer, Henry Blanke, recalled: "She [Rand] told me
she Hould bloH up the Harner Brothers lot if vle changed one
word of her beautiful dialogue . • • • And we believed her.
Even Jack Harner believed her. He gave her a cigar. 11 See:
E. Ephron, "A Strange Kind o:f' Simplicity, 11 The NeVI York Times
Book Revielv, (Hay 1, 1968), p. 43.
27Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead (New York:
American Library, S~gnet Press, 1958), p. 685.
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constitutes the aggressive use of' force-that 1'11'hich Objectivist ethics supposedly rejects.

Further, Roark's actions

certainly set a dangerous social precedent.

Society would

obviously collapse if' individuals were allo1'11'ed to express
personal dissatisfaction by using bombs.

Ironically, Rand

speaks quite harshly of those who resort to such tactics in
the colleges to foster social change.

If Roark's defense

speech suggests a possible justification, then we must ask
Rand to provide specific moral criteria which permit one to
toss a bomb into a building.

In any event, his actions

certainly are not consistent with Objectivist ethics.
Secondly, Roark's acceptance of the contract itself
to design the housing project for low-income families ought-for an Objectivist--to constitute a moral evil, for such a
project is certainly socialism in action.

If Roark honestly

believes in the moral evil of the welfare state, then he
certainly has no business associating himself' with actions
designed to perpetuate its very existence.

The project is

ostensibly paid for by looting the productive workers to
provide homes for those who, on the basis of' their need,
require them.
Another significant contradiction found in Objectivism concerns Rand r s view- of morality and
compromise.

he1~

theory of

We have already touched on the issue when dis-

cussing Aristotle's doctrine of the golden moan.

ism operates in a black/white context, refusing to allow
for any moral compromise.

i

Objectiv-

Permitting compromise regarding

l

I
I[
i

!f'

i

'!

fj!J
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"concretes or particulars,"" 28 but not where moral principles
are concerned, she notes:
The next time you are tempted "!...:> ask: "Doesn't life
require compromise?" translate that question into its
actual meaning: "Doesn't life require the surrender of
that which is true and good to that which is false and
evil?" The answer is that that precisely is what life
forbids-if' one wishes to ach~eve anything but a stretch
of' tortured years spent in progressive self-destruction. 2 9
In another publication, The Ayn Rand Letter, we .find endorsed
the fairness doctrine for education, i.e., allowing students
exposure to ideas and concepts beyond those advocated by a
particular (and by implication, as we shall see, non-rational)
university department.

For example, she notes that

[if] student minorities have succeeded in demanding that
they be given courses on such subjects as Zen Buddhism,
guerrilla warfare . • • then an intellectual student
minority can succeed in demanding courses on, .for
instance, Aristotle in philosophy, von }lises in economics, 11ontessori in education, Hugo in literature. At
the very least, such courses would save the students3
mind; [sic] potentially they would save the culture. 0
The educational significance or such a policy will be discussed later, but importantly for the present purpose is
what Rand actually thinks of its application by government:
The "Fairness Doct1•ine 11 is a messy little makeshift of'
the mixed economy, and a poor substitute .for .freedom of'
speech. It has, hoHever, served as a minimal retarder
of the collectivist trend: it has prevented the Establish.t'nent t s total takeover of the airways. • . • The
doctrine is a typical product of the socialist senti28Ayn Rand, "Doesn't Life Require Compromise?" in
The Virtue o:f SeJ.fislmess, p. 68.
29Ibid., p. 70.

Italics in original.

30Ayn Rand, "Fairnes n Doctr:i.ne for Education, 11 The
Ayn Rand Lettei•, II, No. 19 (June 19, 1972),

I~.

I1y bracl{ets.
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mentality that dreams of combining government o'W!lership ·
with intellectual freedom . • • • The trouble with the
fairness doctrine is that it cannot be applied fairly.
Like any ideological product of the mixed economy, it is
a vague, indefinable approxima~ion and! therefore, an
instrument of pressure-group warfare.J
The fact that Rand can endorse the fairness doctrine, even
as a temporary stop-gap measure, suggests she is willing to
compromise a very significant moral issue:

the refusal to

deal with, or accept any doctrine which advances the welfare/
socialist state at the expense of moral integrity.

We are

not quarreling with the ends-as will be argued later, students do indeed require exposure to Aristotle-but with the
means to achieve it which, according to Objectivist ethics,
should also be moral.
Additionally, by Rand's own admission, the fairness
doctrine cannot be applied fairly as presently used, so
what guarantee is there that it will work for education?
Other means need to be found to achieve the same (legitimate)
goal--freedom of thought on the campus.

Rand is quite correct

when arguing that the principle must remain inviolate.
Intolerance
Finally, Ellis charges that Objectivism provides
little tolerance for opposing philosophies.

Parenthetically,

one Honders if Rand vrould allow the fairness doctrine to be
31Ayn Rand, "Fairness Doctrine i'or Education,
~Rand Letter, I, No. I8 ·rJune 5, I972),-1.
•
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applied to Objectivism itsel£?32

Ellis notes:

• • • objectivists £requently resort to accusing them
[their intellectual opponents] of many views to which
they c~early do not subscribe. Then the objectivist
writers enthusiastically proceed to knock down the strawmen which they have constructed--while deluding themselves
t~at tb~y have actually demolished their opponents'
vJ.ews.33
Unfortunately, this is true.

Perhaps the most glaring in-

stance would be Rand's treatment of philosophical history.
Excepting Aristotle, her catalog o£ philosophers and their
mis-contributions to man's intellectual development reads
like a tour through Dante's Inferno.

Everyone since

Aristotle, according to Objectivist historiography, has
consistently and deliberately set out to destroy what
Aristotle had accomplished.

For philosophical crimes,

post-Aristotelian philosophers are placed in two categories:
Attilas and Witch Doctors, imagery suggested by Branden.
She comments:
The essential characteristics of these two remain the
same in all ages: Attila, the man who rules by brute
force, acts on the range of the moment, is concerned
vlith nothing but the physical reality immediately before
him, respects nothing but man's muscles, and regards a
fist, a club, or a gun as the only answer to any problem
-and the 1Vitch Doctor, the man who dreads physical
reality;-dreaas the necessity of practical action, and
escapes into his emotions, into visions of some mystic

32Apparently not, for Ellis reports:

nThe objectivists themselves consistently attack writers, painters • • •
and I have never noticed that they give the persons they
attack equal space in their publications.rr See: Ellis, Is
Objectivism a Religion?, p. 290. This is correct; onl'J"" those
i·Tho acree with Objectivism may publish in any of Rand's
journals. As mmel"' and publisher, she may, of course, refuse
to grunt anyone space, but that does not change the fact that
intolel'ance exists.
1• 1•
33Ib··
- ---2:2:.' • , p • 2 '+'+
•

1-iy brackets.
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realm where his wishes enjoy a s~pernatural power unlimited by the absolute or nature.34
An examination or the introductor; essay in For the New
Intellectual reveals the rollowing classirication or ages
and individuals:

\vi tch Doctors_-Plato, the Middles Ages,

Augustine, Descartes and Hegel; Attilas--Greco-Roman
(political) civilization, Hume, and Harx, and both--Kant,
Logical Positivists, Twentieth Century Philosophers.35
One ,)xample will illustrate ho1-v the classirication
operates.

Writing that the Renaissance freed philosophy

from theology, Rand continues to say that the ruture seemed
bright until Descartes who
• • • began with the basic epistemological premise or
every Witch Doctor • • • 11 the prior certainty of consciousness,11 the belief that the existence of an external
world is not self-evident but must be proved by deduction from the contents of one's consciousness--which
means: the concept of consciousness as some faculty
other than the faculty of perception--which means: the
indiscriminate contents of onets consciousness as the
irreducible primary and absolute, to which reality has
to con.form. ltlha t followed was the grotesquely tragiC""
spectacle of philosophers struggling to prove the existence of an external reality by staring, 1iith the Witch
Doctor's blind, inHard stare, at the random twists or
their c9nceptions--then of perceptions--then of sensations.36
This is what Ellis means by setting up a stra\vrnan for the
purpose of destroying it.

Rand ignores the f'act that

Descartes does not attempt to destroy the certainty of

34Ayn Rand, "Introduction" to For the NeH Intellectual (NeH York: The New American Library, SJ..gnet Press,
19'bT), p. 11~. Italics in original.
35I?i~., pp.

1o-57.

36Ibid., p. 28.

Italics in original.
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external reality, but temporarily doubted its existence in
order to ~ind criteria ~or determining and establishing
reliable guidelines ~or human knowledge.37

Descartes real-

ized what was concluded earlier, that sense data can be inaccurate, providing

there~ore

incorrect lmowledge.

Further, she ignores the reasons which prompted philosophers and scientists such as Descartes and Bacon to demand
new methods o~ investigation.

Scholasticism had become so

corrupted and decadent that human lm;:nv-ledge ~aced the prospect o~ extinction i~ attention were not paid to the environmental stimuli or the day.

Ironically, a contributing ~ac-

tor to the decline o~ scholasticism was Aristotle's logic.
The use o~ deductive science, it was reasoned, provided
convenient means ~or classi~ying lmowledge, but not expanding it.

The insisting on new methods which supplemented

Aristotle resulted in the Renaissance which Rand so highly
values.
Thus, Rand's iconoclastic classi~ications are at
best most misleading and hardly re~lect a mature approach
to the study o~ philosophy.

or course, she is ~oe to dis-

agree with conclusions reached by philosophers and scientists, but one 1muld expect that as a philosopher (lover o~
v.Tisdom), she -vmuld at least respect the cont;ributions made
by Plato, Kant and others to Western thought.
37Rene Descartes, "Neditation I," !>1editations on

~-t Philosophy, trans. by Norman Smith 1n f:lonroe

c. -

Beardslt-;,y, ed., European Philosouhors f'rom Descartes to
Nietzsche
- - - - (Ne~v York:- Hodern Llb~ary, 1960), pp. 28-J-:!:-
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Critic James Collins suggests that Rand's tactics
stem

~rom

~rom

nove:ist to philosopher:

the

di~~iculties

she encounters when switching

Metaphors are use~ul in philosophy, but only as directives o~ the mind toward the particular evidences by
which to test and quali~y the hypotheses using the
metaphors. ~fuat makes it di~ricult ~or Ayn Rand to
make the transition ~rom novelist to philosopher is
that her personifications tend to take possession o~
the discussion and to lead a li~e Q~ their mn1, beyond
our possibility o~ checking them.3b
collins goes on to suggest that using imagery has a certain
shock value, which jars the reader's complacency, but

~ails

to contribute anything of substance to philosophical thought.
Nrune-calling belongs to propaganda; not philosophy.
Rand's over-use

o~

metaphor in philosophy

o~ten

results in a reader dismissing Objectivism as being
little worth.

o~

Her neglect by the academic community con-

stitutes an example.

Objectivism can make a significant

contribution to educational thought, as the following
chapters will

hope~ully

make clear, but readers are cautioned

to read beyond the shock tactics used.
j

I

'

SUMMARY

I

This chapter has attempted to balance the previous

l

ones by providing the reader with evidence suggesting irregularities in Objectivism.

These include misleading or

inaccurate assumptions regarding religion, faith, laissezfaire Capitalism, and non-Objectivist philosophies.

3 8 James Collins,

11

0~

Ayn Rand's 'l1 alents f'or Getting

Headlines," America, CV (July, 1961), 569.

I
i

f
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~portance

special

to education is the conduct or her char-

acter Howard Roark, whose actions seem to

~itate

the very

student radicals she repudiates.
The rollowing chapters will consider Objectivism as
it evaluates American education.

In so doing, however, we

must keep in mind that the above characteristics will have
to be either dismissed outright or modiried ir the philosophy is to make any contribution to American educational
thought.
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CHAPTER FIVE ·
THE OBJECTIVIST

CRITI~UE

OF

AMERICAN FOill4AL EDUCATION
Rand's educational position rerlects a code or
values a man ought to accept ir he be really educated.
Thus, her critique or contemporary American rormal education isolates practices which deviate rrom Objectivist
ethics.

The rollowing summary indicates rive areas or·edu-

cational practice Rand rinds most objectionable.

When

practiced by schoolmen, these procedures prevent the child
rrom acquiring the virtues listed in the·second column.
Rationality is common to the rive categories, since Rand
regards it as man's basic virtue--the roundation ror the
remaining virtues.
Educational procedure:
1.

Virtues:

Inadequate development or
sense or lire.

l.

Rationality, integrity.

2.

Inadequate development or
self-esteem and cognitive
selr-reliance.

2.

Rationality, selfesteem, pride, productiveness.

3.

Confusion or tho roles or
reason a.nd emotion in
childhood growth.

3.

Rationality, honesty,
justice.

4.

Student activism, especially
violence.

L~.

Rationality, justice.

5.

The "welfare state 11 mentality or formal education.

5.

----

127

Rationality, honesty,
integrity, justice,
produetivenoss.
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Rand condemns American educators for failing to practice virtues which are essential to the realization of her
concept of the educated man.

In essence they are the

which she wishes the educated man to possess.

virt~es

Any system

of education which negates one or all of them falls under
her critical scan.

Each of the five issues will in turn be

considered.
Inadequate Development of

~iense

of Life

In chapter three, the concept sense of life was
examined in reference to its importance for education.

Rand

relates it to education when discussing the learning situation in the context of Objectivist epistemology:
The integrated sum of a man's basic values is his sense
of life. A sense of life represents a man's early
value-integrations, which remain in a fluid, plastic,
easily amendable state, while he gathers knowledge to
reach full conceptual control and thus to drive his
inner mechan1sm . . • • The transition from guidance by
a sense of life to guidance by a conscious philosophy
takes many forms. For the rare exception, the fully
rational child, it is a natural, absorbin8, if difficult
process--the process of validating and, if necessary,
correcting in conceptual terms what he had merely sensed
about the nature of man's existence . • . • • The result is
a fully integrated personality, a man whose mind and
emotions are in harmonl, whose sense of life matches his
conscious convictions.
The educative process, then, begins with values regarded by
an individual as significant-significan-t in terms of a
personal evaluation of his universe, be it the home, the
1Any Rand,."Philosophy and Sense of Life,

11

in _The
Romantic r1anifosto (New York: The Ne\-1 American Library I
·~hgnet Press, 19{.[), p. 29.
Italics in original.
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school or the community in which he resides.

The adult

community, by the way it structures the child's enviromnent,
can advance or retard a healthy and viable sense of life,
for a sense of life " • • • is formed by every individual
child's early impression of the world around him:

of the

ideas he is taught • • • and of the way of acting he observes
and evaluates.

. . . n2

Education plays a significant role

in helping the child convert his sense of life to a rational
philosophy of life.

It is at this juncture in the child's

life that Objectivism begins its critique of American education.
Rand advises that sense of

~

becomes operative

when the child confronts his earliest and most fundamental
choice:
Does a child conclude that the world is intelligible,
and proceed to expand his understanding by the effort
2Ayn Rand, "Don't Let It Go," The Ayn Rand Letter,
I, No. 4 (November 22, 197IT,~. In Atlas Shrugeed, Rand
describes what a proper sense of life ought to be, when
spea1dng of two children: "They seem to face life as she
[Dagny Taggart, Rand's heroine in the novel] had faced it.
They did not have the look • • • of fear, half-secretive,
half-sneering, the look of a child's defense against an
adult, the look of a being in the process of discovering
thEi.t he is hearing lies and of learning to .feel hatred.
The two boys had the open, joyous, friendly confidence of
kittens who do not expect to get hurt, they had an innocently natural, non-boastful sense of their mvn value snd
as innocent a trust in any stranger's ability to recognize
it, they had the eaeer curiosity that would. venture any-1.1here
with the cer·(;ainty that life had nothing 1.l1'1.>vorthy of or
closed to discovery, and they looked as if, should they encounter malevolence, they would reject it c-:mtemptuously,
not as dangerous, but as stupid, they would not accept it
in bruised renignation as the la11 of existence." See:
Atlas Shrugged (New York: The New American Libra1•y, Signet
Press, "T9:;7T;--p. 730. My brackets.
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of conceptualizing on an ever-wider scale, with growing
success and enjoyment? Or does he conclude that the
world is a bewildering chaos, where the fact he grasped
today is reversed tomorrow, where the more he sees the
more t_,:dpless he becomes-and, consequently, does he
retre~t into the cellar of his own mind, locking its
door.
Unfortunately for the child, todayrs schooling usually leads
to the latter--chaos.

Objectivism offers several examples

of educational decay, but perhaps the most important one
concerns the destruction of a child's sense of the heroic.
Young children tend to project their own activities in
terms of heroes:

Superman, The Lone Ranger, Batman--all of

whom emerge victorious over evil.

Why?

In pre-conceptual

sense of life terms, the child does not recognize that such
heroes represent concepts he values as vital to healthy
self-esteem:

courage, integrity, honor, etc.

What parents

ought to do, suggests Rand, is to cultivate this hero worship by aiding the child in his attempts to transform his
sense of

~

estimate of them to proper conceptual (philo-

sophical) terms.

However, she warns:

It is easy to convince a child, and particularly an
adolescent, that his desire to emulate Buck Rogers is
ridiculous: he knows that it isn't exactly Buck Rogers
he has in mind and yet, simultaneously, it is-he feels
caught in an inner contradiction--and this confirms his
dosolrtoly embarrassing feeling that he is being ridiculous.+
Of course the Lone Ranger and Buck Rogers do not exist, but

3Ayn Rand, "The Comprachicos," in Tho New Left: Tho
Anti-Industrial Revolution (NeW" York: The Nelv AmerJ.can
L1brary, Signet Press, 1971), p. 159.
4Ayn Rand, "Art and Moral Treason," in The Romantic
Manifesto, p. 114.
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that is not the point.

When parents and teachers ridicule

the child for admiring them or casting himself in their
roles,

h~

will eventually not only reject them, but also the

values they represent.

The hero himself may soon fade in

the older child's memory, but the values ought not to fade.
The hero and his values are so closely linked in the child's
mind that a rejection of the former usually implies rejection of the latter with tragic results .for his moral/intellectual development.

The inner contradiction, in other

words, impedes the proper integration of data later needed
for concept formation, and for the formation of morally
proper principles.

The damage inflicted upon self-esteem

is enormous and often irrevocable as the next section of
this chapter will indicate.
The child's sense of life and its potential for
transition to an integrated conceptual framework become
further frustrated, suggests Rand, when formal education
begins, especially if the child is subjected to the Progressive educational influence.

Her critique of John

Dewey's philosophy of education5 charges that it lacks
proper cognitive and moral foundations.

Rand critiques

Dewey's evaluation of the learning process.

Writing in

5Rand erroneously equates Dewey with Progressive
education; for her, criticism of one implies criticism of
the other. In reality, Dewey himself was quite critical of
the excesses in the Progressive educational movement. See:
Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books, 1971),
pass:Ui1. Por a scholarly treatment of the Progressive educatl.on movement and Dewey's role in it, see: IJm-Trence Cremin,
Tho rrransformation of the Schools (New York: Vintaee Press,
I96Id, o~c3peciaiTy pages 237-:-.39".-
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Democracy and Education regarding alleged de.ficiencies in the
Montessori method, Dewey observes:
Even the kindergarten and I1ont . . ssori techniques are so
anxious to get at intellectual distinctions, without
"waste of' time," that they tend to ignore-or reducethe ~uediate crude handling of' the f'amiliar material
of' experience, and to introduce pupils at once to material
which expr~sses the intellectual distinctions which adults
.
have made. 0
Rand of' course takes exception to any philosophy of' education
which suggests. that cognitive operations be f'orestalled f'or
whatever

re~son.

This is especially true regarding intel-

lectual distinctions since the ability to recognize distinctions cognitively constitutes an essential part of' the
process of' concept !'ormation.

The child, she warns, can

never become conceptually aware if' intellectual operations
are not involved at the earliest possible moment.

Objec-

tivism not only f'aults Dewey's attempt to postpone intellectual development, but f'urther objects to the context in
vThich this occurs:

namely, the group.

Dewey believes that the " • • • reconstruction or
reorganization of' experience, • • • n7 his def'inition of'
the learning process, may best occur if' the learner interacts with the

in an active sense as part of' a
group engaged in problem solving. 8 The group, 1vhen solving
enviro1~ent

problems, is guided by its own interests and should, therefore, be self'-motivating.

Education f'or Dewey stresses the

6 ~fohn Dewey, Democracft and Education (New Yorl:::

Fl'ee Pl'e s s, 1968), pp .-

7Ibid., p. 76.

15.3-5 ~.

.

8Ibid., pp. 10-22.

The

.

I

I,

I I
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need for social cooperation as a means for survival in a
democracy.

He writes:

• • • the social environment forms the mental and emotional disposition of behavior in individuals by engaging them in activities that arouse and strengthen certain
impulses, that have certain purposes and entail certain
consequences.9
Rand counters the learning by doing method in a group context, noting its effect on young children:
He (the child] has acquired no incentive, no motive to
develop his intellect. Of what importance can reality
be to hi1:.1 if his fate depends on the pack? • • • Reality,
to him, is no longer an exciting challenge, but a dark
unknowable threat, ~1hich evokes a feeling he did not
have when he started: a feeling not of ignorance, but
of failure, not of helplessness, but of impotence--a
sense of' his own mal~unctioning mind. The pack is the
only realm he knows where he feels at hame; he needs its
protection and reassurance; the art of human manipulation
is the only skill he had acquired.10
Without incentive or motivation, then, the transition spoken
of earlier can not occur.
ing to Rand, since Dewey

This is especially true, accordtt

•

•

•

opposed the teaching of

theoretical (i.e. conceptual) knowledge, and demanded that
it be replaced by concrete, "practical" action, in the form
of "class projects" which would develop the students' social
spirit. 11 As we shall have occasion to note later, Objec9rbid., p. 16.
10Rand, "The Comprachicos," p. 167.

Hy brackets.

llibid., p. 172. Parentheses in original. An advocate of Dewey 1 s philosophy might here argue that Rand sets
up a 11 straw man. 11 Specifically, according to Dewey, motivation emanates from the learning situation itself (i.e.,
the problem), and that his opposition to 11 theoreticarr-:knowledge means opposing 11 verbalism 11 introduced too early in the
child t s education. Dewey himself', fol' exa.111ple, 11 lectured 11
l..Jhon teaching at Chicago.
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tivism accepts the Montessori method because it regards the
child as individual as the primary unit (not the group) in
the educative process.
The moral effects of Progressive education are worse,
according to Rand.

Progressive techniques (it is not clear

whether Rand means De-vrey or Progressive education, but in
the context of her article, "The Comprachicos," probably
both) systematically destroy the virtues of rationality and
integrity.

As man's basic virtue, rationality demands a

full and continuous

conh~itment

to reason, for only in this

way will man's life on earth be happy.

Specifically, Objec-

tivism charges that the virtue of rationality is turned
against the child by forcing him to conform to the will of
the group.
The child who regards Buck Rogers as a hero senses
a moral vrorth in his hero 1 s behavior, the same moral worth
Rand's characters exhibit--they exist as morally responsible
individuals concerned Hith the continuous and sustained
development of the mind through engaging in productive work.
Likewise several chaPacters, Jim Taggart, Lillian
Rearden, and especially Ellsworth Toohey represent the antihero, the individuals wishing to destroy the moral code
practiced by the John Galts and Dagny Taggarts.

As such,

they repr0sent the Randian concept of' mis-educated people.
Characteristically, they practice a code of' values consistent with graduates of PPogressive schools.

For example,

prizing like-mindedness and group directeru1ess, Toohey
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comments (in a selection Rand entitles "The Soul o:f a Collectivist"):
Everything I said is contained in a single word-collectivism. And isn't that the god o:f our century?
To act together. To think--together. To :feel-together. To ~ite, to agree, to obey • • • • Kill the
individual. Kill man's soul. The rest will :follow
automatically.l2
such is the philosophy or the man educated to serve the
group.

Existing only insorar as the group will permit, he

rears indep.)ndent cognitive action, which begins, according
to the Objectivists, when the child is simply told by a
teacher that his personal a.Yilbi tions or. thoughts mean little
if the group wishes to pursue a conrlicting problem.

Notes

Rand:
~1e of the most evil aspects of modern schools is the
spectacle of a thinking child trying to "adjust" to the
pack, trying to hide his intelligence (and his scholastic
grades) and to act like "one of the boys. 11 He never
succeeds, and is left wondering helplessly: "What is
wrong with me? What do I lack? \vhat do they want?"l3

Related to the groping for a sense of self-worth and selfidentity is the virtue of integrity, defined as

11

•••

the

recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your consciousness • • • that man , , • may not sacririce his convictions
to the wishes of' others. • • • nlL~

But tho Objectivists

warn that Progressive education demands such sacrifice (by
12Ayn Rand, 11 '11 he Soul of a Collectivist," in For The
Ne1;v Intellectual ( NeH York: The New .American Library, SJ.gnet Press:-1961), p. 76.
13Rand, t• rrhe Comprachicos, 11 p. 179.
parentheses in original.

Italics and

11.1-Ra.nd, "This Is John Galt Speaking, n in For 'rho
Ne\.<T Intellectual, pp. 128-29.
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creating the anti-hero) and lauds it as proper classroom
practice.
Another l-tay of examining the so-called amorality of
Progressive educational methodology is to think in terms of
the means-ends relationship in the educative process.

Rand

defines man in terms of the end he ought to seek if he
desires to live as a man.

Her ethical system adheres to

the principle that man ought to exist as a heroic being,
responsible and happy--in Aristotelian terms.
Dewey, hmvever, does not recognize ends in the Randian
sense, but focuses attention on means, or methodological
procedures (i.e. the scientific method}.

In Experience and

Education, he writes:
The educational system must move one way or another,
either baclnvard to the intellectual and moral standards
of a pre-scientific age or forward to ever greater utilization of scientific method in the development of the
possibilities of gro1-dng, expanding experience .1.5
In this context, ends achieved immediately become means
utilized again to achieve other ends, and so on.

Thus Dm-1ey

rejects the means/ends dichotomy, really seeing the two as
one.

Such a process fulfills an important criteria for an

educative experience, that it be continuous.

Objectivism

charGes, hm·JE:ver, that the concept growth implies directiongrowth to1-1ard what?

Dewey rejects all objective absolutes

as too confining and restrictive, thereby preventing man
from seekinG (gro-vling to} the truth.

It \<Jould appear, then,

~------------------

15John DeHey, Experience and Education (New York:
Collier Bookn, 1971), p. 89.
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that a given problem becomes only a temporary end, providing experience needed for fUrther growth.

By ignoring a

final end toward which the educative process must lead,
Rand argues that Dewey divorces morality from education.
If values are determined by the use and the satisfaction
gained from employment, then ethics simply becomes a matter
of plugging in proper methods to solve problems uithout
regard to their moral worth.
Rand's charge is serious, and deserves examination
in light of Dewey's mm thinking.

In Democracy and Edu-

cation, he speaks of' moral worth as arising from an activity
oriented social context:
The something f'or which a man must be good is capacity
to live as a social member so that 1-1hat he gets f'rom
living Hi th others balances ui th what he con tributes .
• • • All education which develops power to share
eff'ectively in social lif'e is moral. It forms a character vlhich not only does the particular deed socially
necessary bu·c one which is interested in that continuous readjustment which is essential to gro"t-lth. Interest
in learning f'rom all ghe contacts of' life is the essential moral interest.l
Objectivism "t·wuld ask, continuous readjustment tm·mrd what?
The group?

The society?

The nation?

While it is essential

to Dewey's philosophy that grovTth consists of' solving problems (thereby building the experiential fund) in the group
context, such is not essential f'or Objectivism.

When Dewey

denies objective moral principles, Rand charges that he
delivers ethics to the whims of' "t-lhat the gi von group determinos as good.
16Dmo1ey, .:Q•.emocracil and Education, pp. 359-60.
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Growth for Objectivism constitutes growth tm-rard a
specific moral end-the concept of the educated man.

Once

achieved, conscious and continuous action by the individua:
is required to insure proper ethical conduct.

The concept

serves the moral purpose of reminding man of the values he
must constantly practice if he desires to remain a man.
While Dew·ey is correct when suggesting that mere verbal
information alone and divorced from action \-Till not result
in proper moral conduct, he errs (according to Rand) when
rei'using to assign to gro1vth a specific direction leading
to a specific (moral) end.l7

For these reasons, Objectivism

maintains the position that the scientific method of inquiry
alone (i.e., without a final moral end) is not sufficient
to bind ethics to educational pursuits.
Objectivism's critique of Dewey's philosophy of education is to a large degree contingent upon Rand's interpretation of it.

Dewey himself', as we have noted, criti-

cized Progressive educational excesses, including its failure to come to grips vTi th sub j oct matter.

Indeed, he

warned that method can never be divorced i'rom substantive
content.

Ii' Rand wishes to critique the excesses oi' Pro-

gressive education, she oi' course may do so, keeping in
mind, hotvever, that Dewey himself is not synonymous with
the movement, especially in its later stages.
17This position, oi' course, rei'lects Objectivism's
Aristotelian base. The latter argues that it is illogical
to speak in terms oi' an ini'inity of means/ends. There must,
he maintains, be a i'inal end or cause.
t
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Objectivism warns, however, that Dewey's philosophy
frustrates the child's sense of life, resulting in fear, a
blinding fear that the universe is malevolent, unintelligible, and without direction.

One reason Rand endorses

Montessori is because that method presents reality as
ordered fuid structured, therefore capable of being understood by the child.
Fear does constitute a clear and present danger.
John Holt, who studies the concept in How Children Fail,
outlines his belief that fear is the principal cause for
academic failure:
It is not just a matter of not knowing this fact or that
fact; it is a matter of living in a universe like the
one lived in by very young children, a universe which is
utterly whimsical and unpredictable, wher~ nothing has
anything to do vti. th anything else. • . • 8
The demand for "the right answern and "memorization versus
understanding" (which De1.-1ey deplores also) as learning
techniques contribute to the child's sense of fear and
ultimately darr1age self-estee1n.

Objectivism posits that if

education is to succeed then it must seek to dissipate fear
and present a view of the 1tniverse as a place the child can,
to the limits of his ability, understand.

Holt in fact

calls attention to the reality that intelligent children
seldom regard the universe as hostile:
They chock their nnswor·s and their thow:;:hts against
common sense. • • • It seems as if Hha t 1-1e call intelligent children feel that the universe can be trusted

18 John Holt, How Children Fail (New York:
Books, 1964), p. 93.
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even when it does not seem to make any sense, that even
when you don't understand it you can be fairly sure that
it is not going to play dirty tricks on you.l9
But how can a child come to recognize his own intelligence
o~ten

when the school so
con~idence?

sel~-esteem

shatters

and self-

Objectivisn 1 s critique of Progressive educa-

tion essentially denounces its placing children in group
situations, arguing that such practices cripple selfconfidence.
concept

o~

The next section

sel~-esteem

this chapter considers the

in more detail.

Inadequate Development of
and Cognitive

Sel~-Esteem

Sel~-Reliance

Very few adults seem capable
children are terrified of school.

o~

realizing that many

The fear mentioned above

grows and grows until the adolescent begs to be set free.
Anyone who has observed the speed and joy of most children
leaving school at the day's end knows, or should knovr, that
what goes on inside cannot but damage young minds.

In this

section we are concerned with Rand's position that such
damage results from the school's destruction of cognitive
sel~-reliance

and self-esteem.

Educators including John Holt and Charles Silberman
have recognized the

~act

success~ul

necessary for

that a healthy selr-esteem is
learning.

It is significant that

Silberman, for example, in a chapter entitled "Education
f'or Docility,

11

argues that

19Ibid., p.

46.

~ar ~rom

helping students to develop into mature, sel~
reliant, self-motivated individuals, schools seem to do
everything they can to keep youngsters in a state of
chronic, almost infantile, dependency. The pervasive
atmosphere of distrust, togethrr with rules covering
the most minute aspects of existence, teach students
every day that they are not people of worth, and certainly not individuals capable of regulating their own
behavior.20
Objectivist educational philosophy stresses that the
destruction of the self-esteem concept utterly thwarts the
learning process.
self-esteem.

To determine why, we must first define

Arguing that i t is a basic need of man,

Nathaniel Branden comments:
From the time that a child acquires the capacity for
conceptual functioning, he becomes increasingly aware-implicitly and sub-verbally--of his responsibility for
regulating his mind's activity. To maintain the conceptual level of avrareness, he must generate directed
mental effort.21
i<vhen the mind empl-oys proper mental efforts to sustain
awareness, it is said to be

11

self-confident.n22

Self-

confidence implies the fact that a man knows he is capable
of dealing rationally with the facts of reality.

Related

to self-confidence is "self-respect"-the knowledge " • • •
that he is right as a person, right in his characteristic
manner of acting-that he is good. n23

These two conditions

constitute a healthy self-esteem, which " • • • entails and
requires cognitive self-assertiveness, which is expressed
20 charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New
York: Random House, 1970), p. 134.
21 Nathaniel Branden, "Self-Esteem,n Part I, The Objectivist, VI, No. 3 (March, 1967), 2. Italics in original.
22 Ibid.
2 3Ibid., p. ~-· Italics in original.
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through the policy of thinking, of judging, and of governing
action accordingly.n24
tive,

the~l

If the above conditions are opera-

the young child will experience a healthy and

viable self-esteem.

It must be emphasized, however, that a

child's self-esteem remains, while he is young, delicate and
fragile; therefore capable of either grm-lth or suffocation
contingent upon what the child estimates the state of reality to be.

At a young age, this estimate is largely deter-

mined by what the child observes in his limited environment:
the home and the school.

If a child, for example, discovers

the world to be hostile, contradictory and oppressive,
Branden warns that, n • • • after a number of unsuccess.ful
attempts to understand their [irrational adults] policies
and behavior, the child gives up-and takes the blame. n25
The result is .fear, a fear often reinforced by both home
and school.

Branden continues,

In the life of a young child, a certain amount o.f .fear
is to be expected, since the child knows so little and
the world around him is unfamiliar and strange. Normally and healthily, with the growth of his knowledge
and abilities, these fears are overcome and left behind,
so that, with the transition to adulthood, fewer and
fewer things have the power to invoke fear in him. The
extent to which a child follows this course to .full
maturity, depen~g on the policy he adopts for dealing
with his fears.
In this connection, Objectivism argues that modern schooling,
2 4Nathaniel Branden, "Self-Esteem," Part II, The
Objectivist, IV, No. 4 (April, 1967), 6. Italics in-original.
2 5Ibid., Part I, p.
original.--

5.

26~., Part II, p. 8.

11y brackets.

Italics in

instead or showing the child how to deal with his rears,
reinrorces them through irrational behavior.
when

youn~

For example,

children (individual children) are £creed to

conrorm to group standards, live in constant rear or supplying the wrong answer, and are never quite sure v.rha t the
teacher "wants," then selr-esteem becomes impaired and
learning ceases.

Children so victimized o.f'ten become sullen

or hostile, attempting to strike out at a world they never
made and cannot control.

As we shall have occasion to note

later, they grow into the "hippies" who drop out in a bewildering stupor or drug addiction.

Their pathetic state

represents to a large degree the railure or education to
help them develop selr-esteem.

Signiricantly, they-j.n

both dress and action--seem to derive perverse pleasure in
self-degradation.
Sadly, in the school establishment today, the teacher
orten acts as the agent for destruction of sel.f'-esteem, and
cognitive assertiveness.

For example both Holt and Silber-

man27 report instances in which teacher action generated a
lack of self-esteem in students.

The follm.ring, .f'rom Crisis

in the Classroom, is typical:
ITEM: A fourth-grade math teacher vlri tes a hali'-dozen
problems on the board for the class to do. "I think I
can pick at least rour children Hho cantt do them," she
tells the class, and proceeds to call .f'our youngsters
to tho board to demonstrate, .f'or all to see, how correct
the teacher's judgment is. Needless to say, the children
2 7For adc1i tional examples, see: Silberman, Crisis in
_the Classroom, Chapter IV, and Holt, HovT Children Pail,
Part II.
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fulfill the prophecy.28
such activity negates the virtues needed for a healthy selfesteem:

rationality,

independenc~,

pride, and productive-

ness.
Independence means that one is solely responsible for
his own thinking, and cannot allow anyone to assume that
task.

But, when one is forced to abrogate this responsi-

bility, self-esteem suffers.

Teachers such as the one

Silberman d·7Scribes above seem to take a strange pride in
destroying self-esteem.

Holt notes how they destroy self-

esteem and independence by using the learner's self'-image
destructively:
Note the danger of using a child's concept of himself'
to get him to do good work. We say "You are the kind
of sensible, smart, good, etc., etc. boy or girl who
can easily do this problem if you try." But if the
work fails, so does the concept. If he can't do the
problem, no matter how hard he tries, then, clearly,
he is not sensible, smart or good.29
The learner soon equates the fear of failure with his own
self-concept, and tragically grows to hate learning itself.
Forming the mental equation, learning = failure = lack of
self-esteem, the learner, to preserve self-esteem as best
he can and wishing not to be called "stupid" rejects learning.

Branden identifies the nature of the error when he

notes:
If, in spite of his best efforts, a man f'ails in a particular undertaking, he does not experience the same

--

28silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, p. 139.
29nol t, How Children Fail, pp. 4-3-ltlt•

145
emotion oE pride that he would Eeel iE he had succeeded;
but, if he is rational, his self-esteem is unaffected
and unimpaired. His selr-6steem J.S not..::Or should not
be--dependent on particular successes or failures, since
these are not necessarJ.ly J.n a man's direct, olitional
control and/or not in his exclusive control. 30
The concept of control is essential.

At a young age, when

the learner is struggling to master a given problem and
fails to do so, his lack of intellectual maturity causes
him to equate failure in one specific area {i.e. not knowing that 8 + 2 = 10) with lack of self-esteem.

At such

times, the teacher must assume the responsibility of convincing him that failure in one area ought not to diminish
his self-worth.

But, as Holt observes, teachers not only

fail to provide such assurances, but rather reinforce the
child's sense of his own self-degradation.
Such is the result of a scho-ol system which rewards
the ability to memorize often unrelated data.
~nny

In The

of Testing Banesh Hofrman observes that the common

multiple choice {guess) test reinforces the need to memorize answers, 1-rhile penalizing brighter students:
It is obvious from the nature of the tests [multiple
choice] that they do not give the candidate a significant opportlmity to express himself. I£ he is subtle
in his choice of answers it will go against him; and
yet there is no other '\-vay for him to shovr any individuality. If he is strong-minded, non-conformist, unusual, original, or creative • • • he must stifle his
impulses and conform. • • • The more profoundly gifted
the candidate is, the more his resentment v-rill rise
against the mental st:rrit jacket into which the testers
would force his mind.J
3°Nathaniel Branden, 11 Self-Esteem, 11 Part III, The
Objectivist, VI, No. 5 (May, 1967), 10. Italics in original.
. 31Banesh Hoffman, The Tyranny o_f_ _rpes.!_;ing (Nou York:
CollJ.or Books, 1962), pp. 91-92. Hy br·acl~ets.
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Again we may observe the common theme-s-lack of respect for
the individual's ability, conformity--which Rand decries in
contemporary education.

Such

tes~in8

practices do little

to allow brighter, more sophisticated students to function
at maximum efficiency.

Rather, they cater to those who

equate memorization with understanding and guessing with
sustained understanding of concepts.

Self-esteem and its

corollaries pride and productiveness suffer.
The ·1irtue of pride bears an important relationship
to self-esteem as Nathaniel Branden observes:
Self-esteem pertains to a man's convictions of his
fundamental efficacy and worth. Pride pertains to the
pleasure a man takes in himself on the basis of and in
response to specific achievements or actions • • • •
Self-esteem ls 0 I can, 11 .Pride is 11 I have. 11 3~
Productiveness is likewise essential:
The scope of a person's productive ambition reflects,
not only the range of his intelligence, but, most
crucially, the degree of his self-esteem. The higher
the level of a man's self-esteem, the higher the goals
he sets for himself and the more demanding the challenge
he tends to seek.33
Educators have noted the profound sense of pleasure experienced by a student 1.vho, on his own, has accomplished a difficult task or solved a significant (to him) problem.

But

pride and productiveness are destroyed lvhen the child is
denied the atmosphere conducive to the development of selfesteem upon which pride and productiveness are contingent.
3 2 Branden,
in original.

11

Self-Esteem, 11 Part III, p. 9.

Italics

33Nathaniel Branden, "Self-Esteem," Part IV, The
.Qbjectivist. VI, No.6 (,June, 1967), 3.
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As mentioned above, many children dislike school, and perhaps
one reason why they do rests with the inability of adults
to recognize that all children crave an ordered

environmen~

in which they, as individuals, can develop their own cognitive powers.

As we shall see, Rand admires Hontessori for

the latter's scaling the environment to children's capabilities, and for allowing them to pursue problem-solving on
their m-1n.
Educators have long argued that the school ought not
to exist apart from life, but integral to it.

College stu-

dents or adults who drop out of society have never learned
to cope vrith life's challenges as individuals.
recent years, communes have become popular.

Thus, in

The schools

must assume the responsibility for failing to prepare children to function in life as independent agents.

More will

be said concerning Randts position regarding what the school
can do to foster self-esteem in the next chapter.
The Roles of Reason and Emotion
in Childhood Growth
To insure healthy self-esteem, educators must not
only break free :from the inimical effects of' ine.ffective
teaching but (on the positive side) must cultivate rational
development of the child so that he will be competent to
survive as a man.

Rand sees schooling engul.fed in a quag-

mire of emotionalism which retards rational development.
The decline o.f the intellect as a signii'icant factor
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in education may be traced to the inrluence or Rousseau.
Decrying the corruptive influence or man-made society,
Rousseau suggests that the child be raised apart from it,
according to the dictates of nature.

Bluntly advocating

that education ignore cognitive growth, Rousseau--through
the persona or the tutor to Emile--never really teaches
Emile to read, suggesting he will learn when interested.
Rousseau argues ror the primacy of instincts and emotions
as the only significant vehicles capable of producing an
educated (natural) man.

Condemning this influence as hav-

ing infectious consequences ror education, William J.
McGucken, S.J. argues:
Back of every change will be found a man and a theory.
Many of the significant innovations in American schools
are derived from Jean Jacques Rousseau • • • • The cult
of sentimentalism and utilitarianism in American education is due in large part to Rousseau's Emile • • •
which has become the Koran of the American school with
its cry of "back to nature. 11 The child is to be allowed
to develop according to nature. Common sense indicates
that the logical following of this maxim would lead to
savagery • • • John Dewey, with his theory of freedom
and his abhorrence of discipline, is a direct inheritor
of the Rousseau tradition.3~
Rand too terms such educational philosophy "savage."

As

we have noted, she believes that reason is man's only means
for survival; so to attempt to deliver the concept to
instinct and emotions courts disaster.

Harning that emotions

are not cognitive operators, Branden comments:
Hhat one feels in regard to any fact or issue is irrelevant to the question of whether one's judgment of it is
34Hilliam HcGucken, S.J., The Catholic Hay in Education (Chicago: Loyola University"'P'ress, 1962), pp. 6-7.
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true or ralse, right or wrong. It is not b~ means of
one's reelings that one perceives reality.3~
Rand notes that the educat5ve process raises a false
dichotomy between reason and emotion very early in the
child's lire.

She observes

or

the young learner:

His rationality is turned against him by means or a
. • • dichotomy: reason versus emotion. His Romantic
sense or lire is only a sense, an incoherent emotion •
• • • It is an intense, yet fragile emotion, painfully
vulnerable to any sarcastic allegation . • • • vlhile the
child is thus driven to rear, mistrust and repress his
own emotions, he cannot avoid observing the hysterical
violence of the adults' emotions unleashed against him •
• • • He concludes, subconsciously, that all emotions as
such are dangerous, that they are the irrat~onal, unpredictably destructive element in peopGe' which can
descend upon him at any moment • • • • j
The moral damage is great.

At a young age a child does not

yet understand that value judgments are contingent upon
rational processes.

Rather he s.ees hi.s likes and dislikes

solely in terms of emotional stimuli.

When, thererore, a

child represses emotions, he soon concludes that making
value judgments is likewise inimical to survival and consequently, he never implements an important principle of
Objectivist ethics:

pronouncing moral judgments.

As we

have noted earlier, such pronouncements serve as the foundation of the virtue of justice.
When tho proper relationship between emotions and
35nathaniel Branden, "Intellectual Ammunition
Department," 'rho ObJectivist Newsletter, I, No. 1 (January,
1962), 3. Italics
original.
3 6 nand, "Art and Horal 'Ereason, 11 pp. 113-15. Italics
in original. Por additional comments regarding the need
for a remolding of formal education along rational lines
see: Robert Hutchins, The Higher Learninc in America (NeH
Haven: Yale University"Press, r)68), p. 65.
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reason is not taught, educational standards decline since
educators are either a.fraid or incapable o.f judging.37

I.f

quality education cannot exist without standards, then
standards themselves cannot exist unless someone capable o.f
judging judges.

Yet, warns Rand, by either ignoring the

distinction between reason and emotion or construing reason
inferior to emotion, educators destroy the child's potential
to develop as a moral being and sacri.fice standards .for
whims.
The standards Objectivism seeks, of course, are
those intellectual virtues outlined in chapter three.
Another way of describing the importance o.f reason as the
means o.f .fostering and maintaining educational standards
is to speak in terms of the need .for objective .first principles which, as we have noted, Rand requires in any moral
operation.
We shall conclude this section with additional comments regarding the e.f.fects o.f .fear on young learners.

The

psychological and philosophical consequences are enormous,
in producing what Objectivists call social metaph¥sical
~'

meaning that what a given group, society or mob demas

37\,Jri ting in this connection Harry s. Broudy observes:
"Quality education ·Hithout standards is a meaningless and
mischievous notion. SomeHhere the standards o.f truth, goodness, and beauty must be made explicit . • • • Such norms
are available in the living tradition or each or the great
domains or 1mowledge and the arts, and the school can be
judged in terms or quality i.f these standards are accepted
and used." Soe: The Real Horld o.f the Public Schools (NeH
York: Harcourt Brace, and Jovanovich, -Inc., 197"Z),Pp. BL~-8;>.
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true be true, regardless of' the i'acts of' reality.
Termed by Branden as "a parasitism of' consciousness,"
social metaphysical i'ear " • • • consists of' rebelling
against the responsibility of' rational judgment, of' resenting the 'burden' of' cognitive seli'-reliance of' seeking to
exist as a parasite on the consciousness of' others.n38
Refusing to think and always living in :rear of' what someone
will say or how they will react to independent thought
i'irst develops in an educational

con~ext.

Rand describes

the epistemological consequences:
They tgraduates of' Progressive schools] are expected to
acquire some sort of' i'ormal knowledge, to pass exams, to
achieve acceptable grades, i.e., to comply with some
minimal i'actual norms--but, to them, it is a metaphysical betrayal. Facts are what they have been trained to
ignore; i'acts cannot be learned by the kind of' mental
processes they have automatized: by an animal-like
method of' catching the emotional cues emitted by the
pack. The pack is still there, but it cannot help them
at examination time--which they have to i'ace in a state
they have been taught to regard as evil: alone.39
Thus the epistemological contradiction in Progressive education is that although it demands i'idelity to group norms
(and thus presents a metaphysically i'alse reality), the
child--as an individual--will eventually have to i'unction
on his oHn:

alone.

iihen that time arrives, however, he

Hill be incapable of' any independent cognitive operations.
Rather, the student will begin a desperate search i'or someone to tell him what to do; how to think.

This is the real

38Na thaniel Branden, 11 Social Jv1ctaphysical Fear, 11 The
Objectivist Newsletter, III, No. 7 (July, 1964), 27.
39nand, "The Comprachicos, 11 p. 177.

My brackets.
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evil of Progressive education as Rand sees it.

If the child

is prevented from thinking, then the man is left incapable
of independent rational judgment not only of his own worth,
but also of the world about

hL~.

One cannot function

rationally while chronically fearful.
Fear of course has many manifestations, not the least
of which is hate and a desire to destroy.

Rand argues

therefore that the graduate of' a Progressive elementary
school is the college student anarchist of tomorrow.

It is

to the problem of student violence that we now turn.
Student Violence
Perhaps the most horrifying and dangerous spectacle
American education has had to endure in the last decade
concerns attempts by so-called "protestors" or "idealistic"
students to subvert the f'or.mal educative process by engaging in violence and brutality.

To Rand the causes of such

activity emerge f'rom philosophical nihilism.
why, we shall discuss the student

11

To determine

protestn movement as

viewed by Objectivism.
Prior to 1964, Alllerican university lif'e bad been
quiet, almost apathetic, but events were soon to change.
In that year, students at Berkeley formed what they called
the Free Speech l-1ovement and proceeded to present the university Hith a list of "demands" regarding academic freedom.

Specifically they objected to a university regulation

forbidding the use of school property for

of'f~can1pus

polit-
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ical activity.

Comments one observer:

The Free Speech movement showed how the campus itsel~
might become a front line. Students nm-1 saw that what
happens on campus could really matter politically, and
that a local campus uprisfrBg could have national and
international importance. ~
And that is the important lesson.
shown later, are not important.

The issues, as will be
What does matter, however,

is that students found a vehicle they could readily utilize
to forward any given "demands. n

Rand comments on the

Berkeley rebellion, deploring how quickly and easily the
administration surrendered to the students:
To the astonishment of the naive • • • the more demands
were granted, the more were made. As the administration
intensified its efforts to appease the F.S.M., the F.S.M.
intensified its provocations. The unrestricted freedom
of speech took the form of' a "Filthy Language Hovement"
which consisted of' students carrying placards with ~our
letter words, and broadcjlsting obscenities over the
University loudspeakers.41
And \<Tilliam Peterson, Professor of' sociology at Berkeley,
sunrmarizes what he considers the students' real purpose to
be.

He is quoted by Rand:
The first fact one must know about the Free Speech
Movement is that it has little or nothing to do vii th
free speech. • • • If' not free speech, what then is
the issue? In fact, preposterous as this JllAY seem, the
real issue is the seizure of power. . • • ~

But perhaps the issue of' p01-1er may not be so preposterous
if' the facts are examined.

York:

Tracing the evolution of the

40.rerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New
Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 93.

!~lAyn Rand, lt'I'he cashing-In: The Student I Rebellion I
in The NeH Le.ft: The Anti -Industrial Revoluti_££, p. 1.5.

Student

~2willirun Peterson as quoted in "The Cashing-In:
1 RcbeJ.lion 1 , 11 Ibid., p. 17.

The

'"

154
student activist movement reveals several phases.

Follow-

ing the Berkeley incident and to about 1964, Civil Rights
occupied student attention.

As the war in Asia gathered

impetus, anti-war protests grew, as well as "police/
university" brutality charges.

Anti-war protests and

demonstrations lasted until the 1970's, l-Then the ecology
issue attracted attention.
Such cause-jumping (from Civil Rights, to the war,
to university affairs, to ecology) might be interpreted in
terms of a means-ends continuum.

It becomes very difficult

to speak of these phases in terms of ends ror if the phases
were ends, then the rapidity with which students switched
allegiances should not have occurred.

For example, many

argue that the black man in America has yet to fully win
the civil rights struggle, but today student involvement
on a scale comparable to the 1960's is lacking.

Why?

Might the ans1-rer not rest with the fact that Negro leaders
began taking their case to the courts rather than to the
streets?

It seems apparent that the various causes are

only means, only devices which can be used to further the
central aim which remains unchanged:

the pursuit of power.

The current lull in the student "protest" movement is
really no lull at all.

Since ecology is accepted by most

citizens as a worthwhile goal, and since most states have
taken legal measures via legislation to prevent corruption
of the environment, students 1-1ere f'orced to look for another
cause lvhich of' late escapes them.

\·Then and if' it is f'otmd,

r
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'

however, we may well expect violence to reoccur.
By way or example which will serve as a transition to
an analysis or tactics, let us co11sider the case or a small
university in the East attended by this writer in the mid1960's.

In the month or November, 1968 the rollowing stu-

ent activity was witnessed:
Nov. 5: Eight university students (including the student
body president) were rom1d drinking in the offices of
the school newspaper in direct violation of a school ban,
ror which they were found guilty by the student court.
Nov. 22: A "massive student demonstration" opposed the
convictions. During the demonstration, various spokesmen warned of "various methods of confrontation. 11 43
Nov. 25: The President of the university reversed the
student court, dismissing the charges in order " • • •
to set an example of charity, hoping that others will
imitate it."44
Although the incident received little publicity except in
the local press and police intervention on a massive scale
was not needed, the events reveal the tactics of those
seeking power.

The following five steps may be discerned,

characterizing this and most student protests:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

An incident (real or conjured) is student sparked;
the university is accused or violating student
rights.
The University responds with appropriate action or
does nothing.
-Regardless, outraged students scream "repression 11
and "police bl~utalitytt (i.f the latter are involved);
they demand that their rights be respected, or
aggrAssivo means might be utilized.
'1.1 he university surrenders.
Students thon press for greater freedom and rev-Ter

43"u of S Violators Receive 'Break'," The Scranton
Times, November 25, 1968, 3.
411-Ibid.
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university controls.45
The toll such activities take on American formal education
is tragic •. Between 1969 and 1970 alone, about 1000 demonstrations involving over 200 colleges, with property damage

'
!
l.
r

in the millions of dollars, were witnessed by the American
people.46

The time lost to serious students, those devoted

'

to acquiring an education, can never be redeemed.
Ironically, many seem to be deceived or unable to
recognize the true intent of violent students.

Witness,

for example, the testimony of an undercover agent who joined
the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) and won the
confidence of the Black Panthers:
I stayed in a mountain cabin with Hark Rudd and other
SDS leaders. The emphasis was on fiery revolution, on
the necessity of ambushing "pigs," \_policemen] of bombing government building·s, of violence for its own sake.
45students of Hitler's rise to power will recognize
how successfully the Fuhrer used these same tactics to get
pm·Jer. In the definitive biography of' Hitler, autho1.. Alan
Bullock comments: "One of Hitler's most habitual devices
was to place himself' on the def'ensive, to accuse those who
opposed or obstructed him of' aggression and malice, and to
pass rapidly f'rom a tone of outraged innocence to the f'ull
thunders of' moral indignation. It was always the other sido
who v-rere to blame. • • • " See: Hitler, A ~~tud~- in Tyranny
(New York: Har>per Torchbooks, 1964), p. 376, A olf Hitler>,
Me in Kampf (Boston: Houghton-1'-Iiff'lin Co., 19It.3), passim.,
and Norman Hill, (ed.), The Black Panther 1-1enace: America's
Neo-l'raz.is (NeH York: Popular Library, 19{T), pa~~aim. 'l'he essence of' the comparison is also stated by Jerry Dolln
Femina: "There's very little dif'f'erence botHcen tho SDS
punks Hho foment revolution in college and the Hitler Youth.
Both Here f'ighting f'or poHer f'rom the establishment . • • •
You have the power they Hant. You are the establinhmont
they want to overthrow." See: "The Lost Generation,"
Hal~koting/Corrrrnunications, CCXCVII (June, 1969), 32.
46 11 \-,'ha t' s Going On Inside America, 11 U.s.
\vorld Repor·t, LXVIII (Nay, 1970), 18.
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Hard drugs and wild sexual orgies were stressed as impor~
tant because they .serve to break down any links with the
"straight" world. 4 7
Apparently, the radical lert does not hesitate to employ
whatever means they deem appropriate to achieve power.

Since

any government in its right mind has a legal and moral mandate to curb violence threatening the prevailing social
order and usually does so via the police, the latter have
become the targets or unbelievable vilirication and hate.
Between 1962 and 1972 the number of police orricers killed
in the line

or

duty rose from 48 to 126.

In December, 1962

alone, thirteen policemen were murdered while attempting to
perform their duty.48
Attacks on policemen rorm a significant part or the
tactics used by student revolutionaries ror they know that
one way to destroy a rree society is to render lavT enrorcement ineffective.

Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, one of the few

university Presidents courageous enough to confront student violence, defines the tactic.

After describing how

students first find a cause and then use it to provoke a
crisis, he continues:
Once this has occurred--justified or not, orderly or
not-yell, 11 Police brutality! 11 If' it does not happen,
provoke it by foul language, physical abuse, whatever,
and then count on a larger measure of' synpathy .from the
up-to-noH apathetic or passive members oi"' the community •
• • • Hust universities be subjected, willy-nilly, to
47T. Ed1-1ard Hosher, "Inside the Revolutionary Le.ft, 11
~~~.!''s Digest, IC (September, 1971), 53-5'7.
My brackets.
4 8 nA Ne1·J Drive Against Killers o.f Police," u.s. NeHs
and 'tofor1d Repo1~t, LXXIV (January, 1973), 26-27.
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such intimidation and victimization? • • •

49

Often the naive are fooled and indeed extend sympathy, the
classic case perhaps being those who accused the Chicago
Police of rrbrutality" at the 1968 Democratic Convention.
Neglecting the fact that officers 1.vere assaulted with rocks,
bricks, bottles, chunks of asphalt, lye, balls studded with
spikes and even human excrement, members of the community
and the press played into the hands of the "demonstratorsu
by blaming the police.5°
The students who demand no police intervention in
university affairs fail to comprehend a serious flaw
their reasoning.

~

Usually the radicals attempt to justify

violence by pointing out that the university must be jolted
out of its apathy and assume responsibility for correcting
social and political abuses in the community.

This of

course implies a bond between the two, but when they reject
community intervention on campus (even to abort a serious
threat to life and property), they sever the bond, implying
that the university ought to exist as an isolated unit,
apart from the community.

Either the university is an

integral part of the community or not.

When students sup-

port the former position, then logically they ought to

h9

Dealing with Campus Chaos,u U.S. N'ews and Horld
Report, LXVI (Harch, 1969), 34.
11

50F01"' accounts of' Chicago, 1968 which report injuries
sui'fered by police and identify radical ta'C:tics see: Alan
Stang, 11 Democrats, 11 American Opinion, XI {October, 1968),
1-0, and P. J. Emerson, (ed.), Crisis in ~licago: 1968
(New York: Bee Line Books, 1968), passha.
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recognize that su.ch a bond implies community involvement.
Rand maintains,

o~

course, that civil authority be

allowed to intervene regardless
tionship to the cornnunity as

o~

the university's rela-

de~ined

by students,

existence poses a threat to public order.

i~

its

The ethical issue

involved is that no organization be allowed to employ the
aggressive use

o~ ~orce

to solve any social problem-espe-

cially in a rree society.
A

~ew

educators have recognized that moral principle

and enrorced it.

Among them,

s. I.

Hayakawa and Father

Herburgh have exhibited exceptional courage.
President

o~

The latter,

Notre Dame University, had taken one

strongest stands against campus violence.
to raculty and students is

there~ore

or

the

His directive

worthy

or

extended

citation:
Anyone or any group that substitutes rorce ~or rational
persuasion--be it violent or nonviolent--will be given
15 minutes of meditation to cease and desist.
They will be told that they are, by their actions,
going cotmter to the overHhelming conviction of this
community as to what is proper here. If they do not
within that time period cease and desist, they will be
asked for their identity cards.
Those who produce these will be suspended rrom this
CO!lh'nuni ty as not nnderstanding what this comrrnmi ty is.
Those who db not have or will not produce identity cards
Hill be assumed not to be members or this community and
will be charged v-Jith trespassing and disturbing the
peace on private property and treated according to the
lalv. • • •
A~tor notification of suspension or trespass in the
case o.f noncommunity members, if there is not then within
five minutes a movement to cease and desist, students
will be notified of expulsion from this community, and
the lal-v will deal with them as nonstudents. • • •
Thoro seems to be a current myth that tmiversity
members a1~e not responsible to the lau, and that somehow the law is the enem.y-pai>ticularly those l-vhom society
has constituted to uphold and enforce tho law. I would
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like to insist here that all o:r us are responsible to
the duly constituted laws of' this university community
and to all the laws o:r the land. There is no other
guarantee of' civilization versus the jungle or mob rule,
here or elsewhere.
r:r someone invades your home, do you dialogue with
him or call the law?
Without the law, the university is a sitting duck
:Cor any small group f'rom outside or inside that wishes
to de§troy it, to incapacitate it, to terrorize it at
whim.;,l
Several important themes emerge :rrom this statement, with
which Rand would agree:

(1) the aggressive use of' :Coree is

morally wrong, (2) man is man because he has law, without
which he becomes an animal, (3) one cannot appease brute
:Coree, and (4) the imposing by :Coree of' a minority's viewpoint on the majority constitutes tyranny.

The signif'icant

point of' agreement, however is that both recognize that a
rational man does not need f'orce to live as a man.

Thus

the issue is ultimately philosophical, speci:Cically epistemological in that the mind is man's only tool f'or survival; ethical in that the aggressive use o£ f'orce is wrong,
and metaphysical in that whims and desires f'or p01.vor cannot
reshape reality.

Rand connnents on Father Hosburgh 1 s deci-

sion:
This, of' course, is the stand-and tho !?nly morally permissible stand-that a civilized person ::.-mst take in the
present college crisis. (And more: this is tho stand
to take in any issue and against sny group that initiates
the use of' force. One does not "negotiate" with brutality, nor give it the benefit o:r the doubt • • • • )
Father' Hesburgh's was the f'il"st voice ot: reason, dignity,
and moral courage. • • • Observe that contompol'El.I'Y
events are slowly bringing men·' s minds to tho nccoptance
of an abstract principle which Objectivism haa beon

.
DoalJ.ng
with Campus Chaos,"
Beport, p. 3L+·•
~1
:.J 11

u.s.

Hows nnd Horld

161

advocating ror many ~~ars:
over physical force.~

the moral supremacy

or

reason

cries of alleged repression and violation of rights do not
justify the aggressive use of force by any member of the
university community.

Only in a rationally moral atmosphere

can the university function as an institution dedicated to
the pursuit of truth and knowledge.
A justification often cited by students ror their
conduct centers on the charge that they are rarely given
the opportunity to articulate their own views.

If we pay

tuition, then we have the right to be heard, they argue.
Several errors, however, exist in their thinking.

First

of all, students tend to conruse articulation with compliance.

There can be little doubt but that students are

heard.

'trJhat they really seek, however, is instant imple-

mentation

or

stated demands.

To equate the articulation

of a position with its implementation is absurd and illogical.

Indeed, such rerlects serious doubts as to the admin-

istrative ability of those students claiming the right to
rormulate policy.

Secondly, when demanding the right to

formulate policy, students rest their case on the erroneous
assumption that the university is a political institution.53
5 2 Ayn Rand, 11 Brief Cormnents," The Objectivist, VIII,
No. 3 (11arch, 1969), 1-2. Italics in orJ.gJ.nal.
53In this connection Robert Hutchins connnents:
one shudders to note that every citizen entertains
the conviction that he is an educational export of the most
nigni.ficant variety." See: The Higher Lear;ninc in America
(Ne\<-1 Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p:;--2o.
11
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students who seek a four year college education at least
tacitly admit that they lack the necessary intellectual
sophistication for survival in society.

If this be the

case, then by what rule of reason or logic can they possibly
equate their competence with that of experienced faculty or
administrators?
As long as students act as civilized human beings
who are willing to learn and abide by university regulations,
then they have the right to pursue the degree, but that
right can and should be revoked if reasoned debate gives
place to unreasonable demands and violent activity.

Free-

dom to govern one's life and especially the lives or others
cannot be granted by any administration unless the individuals involved first prove they are mature and responsible
enough to do so.

One way to do this might be to devote

serious attention to their course work.
Ayn Rand observes that the SDS radicals of today

were the graduates or Progressive schools when children.
lVhile there, they learned that values are subjective and
contingent only on immediate circlrrastances surrounding a
given problem, that one should never judge, and that all
one need do to solve a problem is implement whatever meru1s
deemed appropriate.

She notes:

• • • they went obediently along every step or the way,
never challenging the basic premises inculcated in the
Progl~ossive nursery schools.
Thoy act in paclw, -vrl. th
tho will or the pack as their only guide. The scramble
for power amone the pack leaders and among difforont
packs doos not make them question their premises: they
are incapable or questioning anything. So they cling to
tho belief that mankind can be united into one happily,
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harmoniously unanimous pack--by rorce. Brute, physical
rorce is, to them, a natural rorm or action. Philosophically, it is clear that when men abandon reason, physical
rorce becomes their only means or dealing with one
another and or settling disagreements. The activists
are the living demonstration or this principle.
The activists' claim that they have no way or "attracting attention 11 to their demands and or getting what they
want except by rorce--violent demonstrations, obstruction
and destruction-is a pure throwback to the Progressive
nursery school, where a tantrum was the only thing
required to achieve their wishes. Their hysterical
screaming stilJ,. cai•ries a touch or pouting astonishment
at a world that does not respond to an absolute such as:
"I want it!" The three-y~flr-old whim-worshiper becomes
the""Twenty-year old thug.:::>L+
This is 1-rhy Rand entitles her article on student violence
"The Cashing-In.
the whirlwind

or

. . . " Educators,

she reels, are reaping

their own doctrines, with students merely

"cashing-in" what they were taught as children.
very second an objective code

or

From the

ethics is denied, then

literally anything goes.
Violent student conduct and crime in America in
general proves Rand's

mfu~date

that a rational code or moral-

ity is urgently needed ir America wishes to survive.
Rand:

"Ir the universities-the supposed citadels

or

Writes
rea-

son, knowledge, scholarship, civilization-can be made to

surrender to the rule

or

brute rorce, the rest

or

the coun-

try is cooked."55
According to Objectivist ethics, one must "never rail
54Rand, "The Comprachicos," pp. 199-200.
original.
55Rand, "The Cashing-In:

Italics in

The Student Rebellion, 11

p. 39.
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.:!!.£ pronounce moral judgments."56 University administrators
who fail to punish students who violently disrupt academic
life are themselves guilty of moral cowardice.
In concluding this section, it might be wise to ponder the words of realist philosopher, Harry

s.

Broudy:

All are against cruelty, pain and domination by others,
but some of them [students] do not mind, on occasion,
lacerating the hearts of their parents, the scalps of
the cops, and t9e feelings of those not yet on the road
to liberation • .?
The students, and fortunately they are a minority, who consider violent tactics as moral means to achieve their goals
should remember that they must afford the same respect .for
the rights and opinions of others that they wish for themselves.
The final section of this chapter will consider the
eff'ects of' the "welf'are state" influence on American schooling.
The 1velf'are State Hentali ty of' Formal Education
Earlier chapters have suggested that as an advocate
of' laissez-f'aire Capitalism, Rand rejects the concept of
positive government, specif'ically socialism.

Morally, she

argues that the welf'are state negates the Objectivist principle that the aggressive use of force is always Hrong,
f'or once postulated a producer must provide money and/or
services for the unearned benefit of

p.

7L~.

others~

Rand relates

57 Broudy" The Real vJorld of the Public Schools,
r~ry

bracke s.
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the issue to Objectivist ethics in Atlas Shrugged:
There it was: the punishment that required the victim's
own vi~tue as the ruel to make it work • • • • Such was
the code that the world had accepted and such was the
key to the code: that it hooked man's love or existence
to a circuit of torture • • • so that the virtues which
made life possible and the values which gave it meaning
became the agents or its destruction, so that one's best
became the tool of one's agony . • • • The need of some
men is the knife or a guillotine hanging over others-that all of us must live 1-Ji th our work • • • at the
mercy of the moment Hhen that lmi.fe will descend upon
us • • • that need, not achievement, is the source or
rights, that we don't have to produce, only to want,
that ~he earned does not belong to us, but the unearned
does./tl
Hence, the more one values the virtue or productivity, the
more he will incur punishment insorar as those in needwill
have more to claim.

Rand does not regard need as the basis

for rights, but insists rather that achievement be the
standard; that one be allowed to keep what he rationally
and honestly earns.
The concept "right" is important here, and must be
defined.

According to Objectivist ethics a right is

• • • a moral principle derining and sanctioning a mants
freedom o:f action in a social context. There is only
one fundM1ental right • • • a man's right to his own
life • • • for every individual, a right is the moral
sanction of a positive--of his rreedom to act on his own
judgment, for his ovm goals, by his own voluntar~,
uncoerced choice. As to his neighbors, his rignts
l.!llpose no obligation on them except of a negative kind:
to abstain from violating his rights ..::8
For Objectivists, the concept or a welfare state directly
58Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pp. 526,

540.

59Ayn Rand, "Nan's Rights, 11 in The Virtue o:f Selrishness (Nm·T York: The Ne't-I American Library, S~gnet Presc,
~), pp. 93-9!~.
Italics in original.
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violates the rights of producers since choice becomes involuntary and coerced.

The implications ror education are

significant and will now be discussed.
In its economic manirestation, the welfare state is
familiar to most Americans, but its errects on other areas
(including education) have not been rully recognized.
Jacques Barzun comments:
• • • the university is the last outpost or help, like
the government or a wel.fare statE:.·. Hhatever the individual and the society cannot do .for themselves is
intrusted to the likeliest existing agency. Faith in
education and faith in the integrity and good vlill o.f
those called educators have accordingly wished upon the
mid-century univer•si ty a varig5Y or tasks .formerly done
by others or not done at all.
Recent developments suggest that the university in its role
o.f "welfare state" may be sur.fering under the weight o:f
increasing demands such as having to provide hotel, restaurant, employment services, and psychological rehabilitation
etc.

There are two vJays in which this influence has af:fected

American education:

governmental intervention and student

attitudes.
Three .forms of governmental intervention which Objectivists dislike as violating someone's rights are:

the

maintenance of tax supported schools, busing, and the
alleged quota system regarding faculty hiring and admission
policies.
In American educational history, the belief that all
citizens have a right to a :formal education supported by

60Jacque s Barzun, Th e Amerlcan
.
1
Unl. versl. t Y. ( New y orr:
Harper and RoH, 1968), p. 10.

the state may be traced to the proponents
school:

Horace Mann and Henry Barnard. 6l

essentia:ity

or

or

the common

Arguing ror the

informed moral citizens as necessary condi-

tiona £or the survival

or

democracy, Mann called £or the

establishing or common {elementary) schools.
he appealed to various vested interests:

In so doing

organized religion,

business and industry, workers etc., promising each their
own utopia ir they would only support public education.
Mann's errorts created a panacea-like atmosphere in
i'ormal education l-Thich has prevailed to the present.

Be it

problems of' race, drugs, crime or health, Americans look to
their schools as the agencies responsible for and capable
oi' correcting them.

In the present century, as noted above,

the university has inherited this tradition and is therei'ore
expected to solve the problems of' community and government.
Rand believes that the trend toward weli'are statism
in education poses a serious threat to quality.

Arguing

that the state has no legal right (or moral commandment)
to set up and maintain, through public i'unds, a school
system, her (then) associate Nathaniel Branden asks:
Should the government be permitted to remove children
i'orcibly i'rom their homes, with or without the parents'
consent, a~d subject the children to educational training and procedures of' which the parents may or may not
a.pprove? Should citizens have their wealth expropriated
to support an educational system which they may or may
not sanction, and to pay f'or the education of' children
61Gorald Gutek, An Historical Introduction to
American Education (Nelv York: Thomas Y. Crmvell Co.,

1970),

pp.

49-53.

168
who are not their m·m?62
such a policy he maintains is consistent only with Nazi or
communist states in which education was and is regulated by
the authorities .for the purpose o.f promulgating political
doctrine.

Why state control invites danger is explained in

three reasons:
(a) most parents are e.f.fectively compelled to send their
children to State schools and cannot a.f.ford to pay the
additional .fees required to send their children to private schools; (b) the standard.s oi' education, controlling
all schools are prescribed by the state; (c) the growing
trend in /unerican education is .for the government to
exert w~der and wider control over every aspect o.f education. 3
As will be argued in the next chapter, one reason Objectivists i'avor tax credits is that they allow parents to send
children to schools oi' their own choosing.

Regarding con-

trol, the danger seen by Rand is that in the past, when a
government assumed control o.f the educational establishment, it sooner or ·later began to prescribe curricula.
For example, the law denying the teaching o.f evolution in
Tennessee was not declared unconstitutional until 1968.
-

The i'amous Scopes ·trial, however, had occurred in 1925.
Point (c) .above has come true today, believes Rand,
in the form o.f compulsory busing to achieve racial integration.

Objectivists reject Duch o.fficial encroachment

as being unethical and inimical to educational quality.
62 Nathaniel Branden, "Intellectual Ammunition Department," .The Objectivist HeviSlettor, II, No. 6 (June, 1963),

22.

-

63Ibid.

Italicis in original.
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To determine why, we must

brie~ly

examine the government's

role in American education in recent years, with regard to
equal opportunity.
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court, in "Brovm
v. the Board of' Education

o~

Topeka," struck down the doc-

trine of' 'separate but equal.'

Ten years later the Civil

Rights Act authorized the Commissioner

o~

Education

• • • upon the application o~ any school board, State,
municipality, school district, or other governmental
unit legally responsible for operating a public school
or schools, to render technical assistance to such
applicant in the preparation, adoption, and implementa .
tion of plans f'or the desegregation of' public schools. 64
Initiative here obviously rests with the schools; Title VII
of' the Act, banning discrimination on the basis

o~

race,

color, creed, and national origin, did not apply to educational institutions.

In 1972, the Equal Employment Oppor-

tunities Enrorcement Act amended Title VII to include
schools (1dth the exception or religious corporations,
i.e., seminaries etc.) and directed that
[ir] the court finds that the respondent has engaged in
or is engaging in an unlawf'ul employment practice char•ged
in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent
f'rom engaging in such unlawrul employment practice, ~~d
order g~ch af'f'irmative action as may be appropriate.

...

As ue shall see, the phrase "order such

~f'irmative

action"

6 4civil Rights Act or 196L1:, (2000 C-2), United States
Code, Title 1.1.2-'I'he Pub lie Ileal th and 1velrare, 1X (Hashington, D.C.: The United States Government Printing orf'ice,
1971), p. 10289.
6 5r-rouse Resolution 17lL6. E ual ~nplo~ent Opportunities l!.nf'orcement Act of 1972 (2)
\vashington: 'rhe United
States Government Pr1nt1ng Office, 1972), p. 19, Hy brackets.
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:::..s l;he key to subsequent legislation.

Meanwhile, the Su-

-~

:-~''lito Court speeded the process of' school integration.

On

~-~t·t I. 20, 1971 in a nine to nothing decision, in "Swann v.
1111
:-:.:
''-otte-Mecklenburg

-

:""1\ 11

-

-

--- ""-

'

l;

Board of' Education, N.C.," the high

directed that "Local school authorities may properly

''nquired by a Federal District Court to employ bus trans-

•
--= <'1\• t•1\t~on
as a tool of' school desegregation.u66

Other

::"-'~''''nunended means of' enf'orcing desegregation included
::"·:2'\l\\
!:: -

t

0

lring school districts to prove their own innocence and
\'ing school attendance zones.
Since 1971, busing has become the principal means

-=~:l -, lzed by the courts to enf'orce school desegregation.

r . .___

t

- - ''-',~tivists argue that the busing problem results in a
::::.=__ -:"1.. ~ '

-

--,

-···tre of' politics and government with serious eff'ects

.:. . -:- ~- ,~ducational quality.
C =
-_ ..~, ·~.. .

Ethically, Rand rejects the con-

of' busing on the grounds that it leads to quota sys(which will be discussed below) and promotes governenf'orced racism:

'
_,·~'Z:

is true that the Federal government has used the
·':-.:\cial issue to enlarge its own power and to set a prec'',~ent of encroachment upon the legitimate rights of'
~:~ates,67 in an urillecessary and unconstitutional manner.

---..,.,.-:..........

----------------66

uni ted States Suureme Court Reports, 11 Swann v.
-:-.:~-- :'" ':otte'-Hocklenburt; Board of Educatron, 11 Lmry-er 's edition,
;-::_-- ~~I (New York: The Lmry-ers Co-operative Publishing Co.,
- - ' ' , p. 560 •

c- --

z-:: :::-_ ~67The Tenth Amendment to the F'ederal Constitution
t.:--~ s that, 11 The po-vwrs not delegated to the United States
""""'" -.,._
-:.e Constitution nor prohibited to it by the states, are
~ :- -~- -' '::-oved to the states respectively, or to the people. 11
~;.:;-~- ,' > the Constitution does not mention education, this
e;:;~ - - : : --:":::>ved po-vrers" clause has been interpreted to mean that
_ ._ . ~tion is essentially a local matter.
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• • • Instead or righting ror equal rights, they (Negro
leaders] are demanding special race privileges. 0 8
·
As mentioned above, the concept of' "rights" pertains to the
individual citizen, and not to the race.

Consequently, Ob-

jectivists charge that such practices as busing cannot be
morally sanctioned.

The black man in America, Rand argues,

must base his case on his right as an individual citizen to
equal protection under the law, ror any other solution
implies the violation or someone else's rights.69
Pedagogically, busing conrronts educators with a
serious problem.

We have noted that a child needs a secure

environment ir his view
and coherent.
~riendships

or

the universe is to be ordered

But, stability may be jeopardized when

are broken, roots dislodged, and students rorced

to travel several miles per day to school.7°
especially a young one,

~inds

it

di~i'icult

emotional stability is threatened.

A student,

to learn if' his

Under such conditions,

he may mature thinking that existence is, of' necessity,
unpredictable and intrinsically harmi'ul.

Although presUin-

ably well-intentioned, lmvmakers and judges may lack the
educational competence to realize that their decisions produce unwelcome consequences in terms of child growth and
68Ayn Rand, "Racism," The Objectivis~ Newsletter, II,
No. 9 (September, 1963), 35.
69rbid., pp. 35-36.

My brackets.

7°rn "Swann v. Chai•lotte -r,recklenburg Board or Education," the Supreme Court stipulated that the distance travelled should not exceed seven miles or take longe1. . than
thirty-five minutes.
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development. 71
The "quota" issue must now be considered.

Between

1964 and 1972, the President's office issued a series of
Executive Orders to be enforced by the Department of Labor
and HEW.

Designed to further prevent racial segregation,

Order 11246 required "all government contracting agencies"
to include in every government contract the following:
"The contractor will take affirmati,.re action to ensure that
applicants are employed • • • without regard to their race,
creed, color or national origin. 11 7 2

Because affirmative

action remained vague, the Labor Department, in Revised
Order No.

4,

specified that "non-construction contractors"

must develop a "1-1ri tten affirmative action," defined as,
II

• • • a set of sp.ecifi.c and result-oriented procedures to

which a contractor
ef.fort.n73

co~~its

himself to apply every good faith

Throughout the Order, ngood .faith11 is the estab-

lished norm for compliance.
stitutes good faith?

But it may be asked what con-

Hm·T can the concept be def'ined in

relation to plans proposed by schools?
71For evidence suggesting that busing produces harmful educational consequences, see: 11 i'lhat Happened to One
'Hodel School', 11 u.s. Nevrs and vlorld Heport, LXVIII (April,
1970), 37.
72Executive Order 112!1;6, Equal Employment Opportunity
(Washington, D.C.: 'l'he United States Government Printing
Office, Office of Federal Contract Compliance, 1965), p. 2.
73Public Contracts and Property Hanagement-Title 41,
Department of Labor (\"Iashin-gton, D.C.: The United
States Government Printing Office, Office of Federal Contract Compliance, 1971), p. 2.

u . s.
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When discussing the nature or law, Rand specifies
an important and necessary condition ror a valid one:
The retaliatory use or force requires objective rules or
evidence that a crime has been co~~itted and to ~rove
who committed it, as well as objective rules to ei"ine
punishment and enforcement procedures • • • men need an
institution charged with the task or prQ~ecting their
rights under an objective code or laws.f~
How then may we objectively derine good raith?

Ir a school's

derinition conrlicts with HEW's, whose judgment prevails?
J. Stanley Pottinger, director of the Ofrice or Civil Rights
in HEW comments:

"We have a whale or a lot or power, and

we're prepared to use it if necessary.n75

It would appear,

then, that !1r. Pottinger's definition of good raith will
prevail.

vlhen objective law gives place to subjective eval-

uation, then law becomes a matter or the enforcer's personal
desire.

The point is that non-objective law places citizens

at the mercy of "a whale of a lot or power" against which
they have no recourse.
The implications of these laws for education are
serious.

Dr. George C. Roche III, Pre·sident or Hillsdale

College in Hichigan, when delive:r•ing an address before the
American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges
and Universities on December

4,

1972, spoke of the effects

7hAyn Rand, "The Nature of Govel""mnent, 11 in Capitalism: The Unlmown Ideal (New York: The UEH·l American
Library, Slgnet Press, 1967), p. 331. Italics in original.
75J. Stanley Pottinger quoted in George Roche III,
"Government Intervention in Private Education, 11 in "on
Campus: 'An Iceburg of Government Inte:t.'vontion 1 ?, 11 u.s.
News and 1-!orld Report, LUIV (January, 1973), 50.

174
of "good faith" on educational quality:
Today, admission procedures in many schools are governed
by a quota system which sets its own special double
standard, unwritten but exercising great f'orce in the
lives of' individual students. Such admissions policies
also have their ef'rect on campus standards, compelling
steadily lower requirements as the original applicants,
of'ten unqualif'ied f'or admissions, are retained on campus
despite their poor perf'or.mance.7o
Although Revised Order No.

4

specif'ically denies that

quotas be established, the result o:f "good faith" seems to
suggest they are the logical result.

If' quali.fied minority

group students are lacking and the university must demonstrate "good faith," then quotas would have to be established.
One might inquire o:f Errmi as to the criteria which
constitute a minority, discrimination, or lack o:f good
:faith.

For example, i:f a student receives a D grade in a

course, may he claim discrimination on the grounds that the
instructor lacked good :faith?

Should an administrator

reserve the right to change the grade to demonstrate good
:faith?
'\llhen the basis of' human rights becomes "need" or

"color" or any .form of' the unearned, then the virtues of'
integrity and especially productiveness as de:fined by Objectivist ethics are compromised.

Laws must be based on objec-

tive criteria if' those obeying them are to know when and
how to obey.
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The wel£are state concept also e££ects the per£ormance o£ students, who observe that "need" and not
achievem€.. . .lt is rewarded.

In a special section o£ The

Objectivist called "The Horror File," Rand has compiled
in£ormation re£lecting speci£ic violations o£ Objectivist
ethics.

The following represent incidents related to the

present context:
A recent survey taken to ascertain "lvhat• s In Among
College Students" has divulged a surprising £act: the
most popular new activity among the hope of the £uture
is • • • academic goldbricking . • • • According to the
poll, on hundreds of campuses arotmd the country, there
is actually hot competition to see who can get away
with doing the least by using the most credible excuses.77
and,
Student power demands appear to have reached the ridiculous extreme in India. The London Observer reports
that students there have demanded that they be allmved
to cheat on tests. It says some Indian students have
refused to £inish a ~est unless they are permitted to
use 'unfair means.' 7
The second example, regarding the right to cheat, is

espe~

cially revealing in terms of what Rand argues in Atlas
Shrugged regarding the amorality of those advocating the
welfare state:

nAs they feed on stolen wealth in body, so

they feed on stolen concepts in mind, and proclaim that
honesty consists of refusing to knoH that one is stealing."79
Cheating of course counters the Objectivist virtues
77uFrom the Horror File," The Objectivist, VI, No. 1
(January, 1967), 15.
78"From the Horror File,n The Objectivis~, VIII,
No. 7 (July, 1969), 16.
79nand, Atlas Shrugged, p. 964.
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of honesty, rationality, justice, and productiveness.

In a

study published in 1960, Jerome Ellison isolates the moral
issue in"olved:

"The principle involved is that someone

• • • possesses valid inrormation and transmits it--because

of fraternal bonds or just to be obliging-to the needy.n80
Again, we are confronted l-Ti th "need" as moral justification
for immoral acts.
The study includes several "justifications" offered
by students for cheating, including pressure rrom family to
do well, the willingness to help someone less academically
fortunate, and the fact that everyone cheats.8l
If the justifications are considered, however, the
following moral errors (in terms
become apparent:

or

Objectivist ethics)

The end does not justify the means.

Rationality requires integrity--namely, ridelity to moral
means, regardless of' social or family pressure.

Likewise,

independence requires that there be no substitute for
one's own thinking.
on numbers involved.

Finally, morality is not contingent
Justice demands that ir it is immoral

for a single individual to cheat, then even an infinite
number of' cheaters cannot abort the principle involved.
Rights are conditions which must be earned; they
cannot be predicated on any other condition.

An individual

in society has a moral right to follow his own designs, but
80Jerome Ellison, "A..'tJlerican Disgrace: College Cheating," .The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXII {J·anunry, 1960), 58.
Blrbid.
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not at the expense of others.

No one citizen is under

moral sanction to make another happy if he does not choose
to do so, and most certainly not if his rights are violated
in the process.

An educational institution which sanctions

quota systems or cheating violates the rights of I'ational
men and women dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge and
truth.
SUMMARY

The intent of this chapter has been to examine five
important flaws Objectivism sees in American formal education and to specify how they negate the Randian concept of
the educated man.

The five issues discussed all represent

interdictions of Objectivist ethics.
By depriving the learner of a proper sense of life,
of self-esteem, by tolerating student violence, by misconstruing the roles of emotions and reason, and by permitting
the

"welfm~e

state" concept to dominate the educative

process, schoolmen have gravely damaged the learner's
chances to develop into a rational and well adjusted individual.

The negation of rationality, independence, hon-

esty, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride retards
the learning process, replacing healthy growth with fear
and hostility to moral worth.
The following chapter will consider what alternatives Rand postulates, and how they could roverne the
trends of current school practice.

Accordingly, the imple-
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mentation of her views on education ought to culminate in
the Objectivist concept of the educated man.

CHAPTER SIX
OBJECTIVISM:

AN ALTERNATIVE

Rand regards modern educators as "Gomprachicos 111 of'
the mind.

'ihen summing up the ef'f'ects of' contemporary edu-

cation on a child's intellectual development, she notes:
The Progressive nurseries pleaded f'or a delay of' the
process of education, asserting that cognitive training is premature for a young child--and conditioned his
mind to an anti-cognitive method of' f'unctioning. The
grade and high schools reinf'orced the conditioning:
struggling helplessly with the random snatches of' knowledge, the student learned to associate a sense of' dread,
resentment, and self-doubt ~-rith the process of learning.
College completes the job, declaring explicitly--to a
receptive audience-that there is nothing to learn, that
reality is unknowable, certainty is unattainable, the
mind is an instrument of self'-deception, and the sole
function of' re~son is to f'ind conclusive proof of' its
own impotence.
Obviously, Objectivism warns that American rormal education
needs serious and sustained restructuring if' the "Comprachico" syndrome is to be negated.

The pm:>pose of' this

chapter will be to examine suggestions for improvement,
with special emphasis on elementary and higher education-1 Tho 11 Comprachicos" were Seventeenth Century nomads
who bought, sold, traded, and tortured children for• the
amusement of the population. Rand notes: 11 :l'hey uere educators. They took a man and turned him into a miscarriage.
• • • They stun ted gr•Nrth; they mangled features. • • • 11
Soc: "The Compx•achicos, 11 in The NeH Left: 1'he AntiIndustrial Revolution (New York: The NeH Amor~can Library,
Signet Press, 19)I~pp. 152 f'f.
2 Ibid., pp. 188-89.
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the two areas most rrequently subjected to criticism.
Generally speaking, any educational rerorm must begin
with a philosophical revolution.
criticism

or

The entire thrust

or

Rand's

American lire, including the educational estab-

lishment, points £undamentally to an abandonment by society
of philosophical principles.

Countering the anti-

philosophical trend, she comments:
In order to live, man must act; in order to act, he must
make choices; in order to make choices, he must de£ine
a code or values; in order to define a code of values,
he must lmoVT what he is and where he is-i.e., he must
know his oHn nature (including his means or lmovdedge)
and the nature o£ the universe in which he acts--i.e.,
he needs metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, which means:
philosophy.3

or

course, philosophy in this context means Objectivism.

Without philosophy, man cannot survive on earth, much less
achieve the happiness seen as his end.

To be a use£ul

instrtunent for human growth and development, education
must provide £or the child's philosophical maturation,
meaning (in terms of epistemology) the process of concept
formation.
The young child needs to grasp the means men employ
to acquire and extend knowledge.

As discussed

earlie~,

process of conc.ept formation is, for Objectivists, the
only means one can use to sustain consciousness.

As a

child matures, he notes differences in objects, actions
~·

at £irst in his limnediate environment, and later in

3Ayn Rand, "Philosophy and Sense o£ Li£e, 11 in The
~ntic Manifesto (Nmv York:
The New Arnerican Library,
S~gnet Press, T97I), p. 30.
Italics and parentheses in
original.

the
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the world at large.

The ability (which must be learp,ed) to

do such constitutes the first steps of classification which
eventually will lead to concept rormation.

Rand describes

the significance or this ability in an educational context:
Since concepts represent a system or cognitive clas~ifi
cation, a given concept serves (speaking metaphorically)
as a file rolder in which man's mind riles his knowledge
or the existents it subsumes. The content or such
folders varies rrom individual to individual, according
to the degree or his knoVTledge-it ranges from the primitive, generalized inrormation in the mind or a child or
an illiterate to the enormously detailed sum in the mind
or a scientist--but it pertains to the same referents,
to the same kind or existents, and is subsumed under the
same concept. This riling system makes possible s~ch
activities as learning, education, research • • • ~
Elementary education's task, then, ought to consist primarily in teaching the child how to form concepts.

Specifi-

cally, Objectivism holds that two " • • • interrelated but
dii'rerent chains or abstractions, two hierarchical structures or concepts must be considered:

the cognitive and

the normative.5
Cognitive means a philosophical awareness or the
nature or reality.

Importantly, the child must be taught

that he is capable or understanding (within the limits or
his ability) the nature or the universe.

On the elementary

level, Rand has reconnnended the I'1ontessoPi I-1ethod as being
conducive to proper cognitive development.

l.~Ayn Rand, ~~eduction to Ob~ectivis~ Epistemolo~y
(NeH York: The ObJectivist Inc., l'~h9), p. 60. Parentheses
in original.
5Rand, "Art and :Horal Treason," in The Romantic
Manirest£, p. 110. Italics in original.
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The Montessori Method first attracted attention in
the United States in 1911 when McClures Magazine published
an article by .Josephine Tozier entitled "An Educational
~vonder-tiorker,

The Net hods of Maria Montessori."

Dealing

with her method in general, the article lauds Montessori's
use of didactic materials, her psychological insights, her
use of sensory training materials, and her ability to spark
explosions into reading and writing.

Contrasting Montessori's

beliefs with those of earlier educators, Tozier reports that,
In Maria Montessori's view, all education worth having
is auto-education. One or the dirriculties experienced
in the training of teachers is that of preventing them
from rushing to the aid of a child who appears to be
• • • puzzled. • • • The policy of non-intervention
applies, as a matter of course, no less to the moral
than to the intellectual domain. Rewards and punishments are rigorouslK banished. • •• The idea of "discipline for liberty 1 i·s aimed at and attained. • • •
The child, in her conception, ought to be free, within
the limits imposed, not by scholastic convention, but
by social amenity; that is to say, h~ must not use his
freedom to hurt or incommode others.6
This brief passage contains several contributions of
Montessori, notably teacher non-intervention, intellectual
and moral self-discipline, and the moral/intellectual basis
for rights (i.e., in negative terms).

In contrast to the

Progressives who ,.;rongly believe (according to Rand) that
the child can best function in a group context, Montessorians stress the role of the learner as individual.
Indeed, the very foundation of her method is the liberty
6.rosephine Tozier, "An Educational \ifonder-Horker,
The Hethods of Maria l'fontessori, 11 HcClur·o's Mac;azine,
XXt'\VII (Hay, 1911), 8-9.
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of the individual child.

On the nature of liberty in its

pedagogical context, Montessori explains:
The fundamental principle of scientific pedagogy must
be, indeed~ the liberty of the.pupil;--such liberty as
shall perm1t a development or-~nd~v~dual, spontaneous
manifestations of the child's nature. If a new and
scientific pedagogy is to arise from the study of the
individual, such study must occupy itself with t h e observation of free children.?
She reasons that educational reform must begin with child
study.

Consequently, Montessori stresses that the first

duty of an educator must be to recognize the distinct personality of the young and to respect it.8

Education which

forces the child to conform to adult standards gravely
harms the young spirit.
The Montessorian concept of freedom also wins Rand's
sympathy.

The form.er defines i'reedom in terms of the active

child who disciplines himself, as opposed to being artificially restrained from without.

In other words, discipline

can only be viable when emanating i'rom child activity:
And this freedom is not only an external sign of liberty,
but a means of education. If by an awkward movement a
child upsets a chair • • • he will have an evident proof
of his own incapacity • • • • Thus the child has some
means by which he can correct himself • • • • It is
plainly seen that the child has learned to command his
movements.9
7Naria I'1ontessori, The Nontessori 11ethod Trans.
Anne E. Geol"'ge (New York: Schocken Books, 197-r), p. 28.
Italics in original.
· 8Haria Hontessori, The Child in the Fami11:, Trans.
Nancy Ch•illo (Chicago: Henry Regne17 Co., 1970), p. 35.

9Hontes sori, The 1'-fon tessori ~·fe thod, p. 8L~.
in original.
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Thus discipline arises not rrom the teacher (or group), but
.from the children themselves who, attempting to bring order
to their own environment, will learn the value o.f discipline
and order.

Montessori describes a well-disciplined individ-

ual as one who leads his own li.fe as a .free man, limited
only by the respect paid to the rights o.f others.

In this

way, individual di.f.ferences are allowed to emerge, and
" • • • the child, conscious and .free, reveals himsel.r.nlO
We may recall at this point how similar to the Montessorian
concept o.f rights is the Randian concept.

Both suggest

that the rights of' an individual child must be respected,
and are limited only inso.far as the rights o.f others are
not violated.
Montessori devised two sets o.f exercises to achieve
the above goals:

the exercises o.f practical li.fe and the

didactic materials~both to be used in a structured environment, i.e. one scaled to the child's physical abilities
(small chairs, coat hooks within reach etc.), thereby allowing him to do .for himsel.f as much as possible.
The practical li.fe exercises consist o.f various
activities (v.rashing the hands, hanging up a coat, serving
ltmch etc.), all designed to .foster independence and selfreliance, but·above all intelligent growth.

Rand comments:

Intelligence is the ability to deal with a broad range
o.f abstractions. \ifhatever a child's natural endo"Wlllent,
the use o.f intelligence is an acquired skill. It has to
lOibid., p.

95.

Italics in original.

185
be acquired by a child's own e~~ort and automatized by
his own mind, but adults can help or hinder him in this
crucial process. They can place him in an environment
that provides him,with evidence of a stable, consistent,
intell~gible world which challenges and rewards his
e~forts to understand • • • 11
To Rand, the Montessori school provides that kind
ment:

o~

environ-

one ordered, structured, and secure, thereby permit-

ting the young child to master the skills necessary
proper concept

~or

~ormation.

The didactic materials consist

~or

the most part

o~

and graded stimuli designed to facilitate

sel~-corrective

sensory avrareness of reality and concept formation.

The

cylinders,

vary-

~or

example, include sets

o~

cylinders

o~

ing diameters which must be placed in their proper corresponding containers.

These materials help the child make

comparisons betvreen objects, to :Corm judgments, to reason,
~~d to reach decisions. 12 Such abilities Rand regards as
essential to concept

~ormation.

Writing in The Objectivist,

Beatrice Hessen discusses the importance of the didactic
materials to concept formation:
The didactic materials aid the child in the process o~
concept-formation (of abstraction and integration) by
means of eliminating nonessentials. The mat;erials are
designed in such a way that all their characteristics
are tho same except the one a ttl~ibute on 1.vhich the child
is to concentrate. This allows him to focus on one dif~eronce at a time and to form a clear concept of a particular attribute, such as length, height, thickness,
weight, sound 01~ color • • • • The child is able to Hork
by hi:raself with tho didactic materials, vli thout constant
llnand,

rhe Comprachicos, 11 p. 160.

111

12r.1aria Uontessori, Dr. :f\1ontossori 1 s 0Hn Handbook
Trans. Nancy Rambusch (Nevr York: Schocken Boo'Ks, 1965),
p.

71.
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directions rrom an adult • • • ir he places a cylinder
in a hole too large ror it, he rinds at the end that he
has at least one cylinder left which does not f'it in the
remaining hole; he has to backtrack and discover his
error and, in the process, he sharpens his capacity to
observe and discriminate, which would not occur ir his
mistake were merely pointed out to him by the teacher.l3
The didactic materials become the basis ror the conceptual
thinking

or

an adult.

By aiding in the development

or

dis-

criminatoFJ judgment, they perform a significant philosophical function:

they lay the foundat:ton f'or proper episte-

mological development.

In other words, the child comes to

learn that the universe is not beyond his cognitive grasp.
Another reason Rand endorses Montessori concerns the
latter's philosophical base:

Aristotle.

Montessori's biog-

rapher, E. M. Standing, relates the use of the didactic
materials to Aristotelian philosophy when he observes:
I

What is most interesting, and most significant is that
Aristotle described the whole process (the use of
didactic materials in the process of abstraction and
concept £'ormation] in terms of a gradual discarding of
matter, until only the ab~tract ideal is left, which is
purely immaterial • • • 14
He continues, by Ttray of' example, noting that when a material
object such as a cup is removed from sight, we retain a
mental image of its physical properties.

Finally, after

observing a sufficient number of cups, ue arrive at the
essence cupness, an intellectual concept, which is removed
13Beatrice Hesson,· "The l\1ontessori Method," Part II,
The Objectivist, IX, No. 6 (J'u!'1e, 1970), 10. Parentheses
in origina1.-1L~r.·
c< t an d lng,
.
M.arla
. 1\Jr
.
H er L.J. f e and
.:.:.. M• u
1·1on t essorl:
1
Hork (NevJ York: 'l he New Amorlca.n Llbrary, Slgnet Press,
'!9b'2'), p. 163. Italics in original. I1y brackets.
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from matter.

Rand, of course, bases her epistemological

position on this process.
Unfortunately, Montessori's reception in America was
short-lived.

The primary agent of re.futation was a book by

\villirun Kilpatrick, published in 1914, anti tled The r1ontessori System Examined.

Comparing Dewey to Montessori, he

argues that 1-rhile both contributed to the nelv education,
Montessori's plan was too narrow, less comprehensive than
Dewey's, and based on inadequate assumptions.
11

•••

He argues:

she belongs essentially to the mid-nineteenth

century, some .fi.fty years behind the present development
o.f educational theory • • • • We owe no large point o.f view
to Hadron :r--rontessori.nl.5

Although the method remained, as

a result of Kilpatrick's charges, dormant f:or some forty
years, recent interest in Montessori has sparked a revival.
Of course, Rand sees the Montessori revival as vital to
American education.
In her defense of Montessori, Rand responds to the
Kilpatrick charge that the didactic materials are too rigid,
thereby frustrating creativity. 16 She notes:
Since the purpose o.f the Hontessori materials is to help
the child in his cognitive development, i.e., to help
him grasp the nature o.f reality and learn to deal with
it, the 'rigidity' of the problems he has to solve pro1 5william Kilpatrick, The Montessori System Examined
(Ne-tv York:

Arno Press Reprint and the New York T1..mes,

1971), pp. 63, 67.

16Ibid., pp.

42-52.
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vides him with the most important lesson he will ever
learn: it teaches him the Law o~ Identity. It teaches
him that reality is an absolute not to be altered by his
whims, and i~ he wants to deal with it success~ully, he
must ~ind the one right answer. He learns that a problem
does have a solution and that he does have the ability to
solve it, but he must look ~or the answer in the nature
o~ things he deals with, ~ in his ~eelings.l7
Rand's position is contingent upon tHo principles discussed
earlier:
ity

(1) the

~esters

a man
swer.

success~ul

a healthy

dealing w.ith an ordered real-

sel~-esteem,

and (2) that all issues

can be solved in te:':'Ills

con~ronts

o~

one correct an-

Although the latter was critiqued when discussing

Objectivist ethics and Aristotle's golden mean, the

'
•

does have

signi~icant

cally, the use

o~

educational implications.

~or.mer

Speci~i-

the didactic materials teaches the child

that his whims or emotions cannot erase the fact that reality will not magically alter

itsel~

to suit those whims or

desires.
Creativity and cognitive efficacy cannot arise out

t

or chaos and disorder.

If students would learn this lesson

while young, then Rand argues that college radicals-demanding that reality conrorm to their whims, or else-would not exist.

When storming university buildings, they

deny the epistemologica1 base needed
ation:

~or

any learning situ-

that emotions and whims are not tools

o~

cognition.

It should be mentioned that if Rand is to be consistent with her own philosophical position, she cannot
17Ayn Hand as cited in Beatrice Hessen, "The Montessori Hethod, 11 Part III, The Objectivist, IX, No. 7 (July,
1970), 7. Italics in original.

'~l
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accept all of Montessori.

The area of disagreement concerns

Montessori's emphasis on religious education.

Montessori

speaks of the "spiritual embryo,nl8 implying that the child
needs religious education to acquire Christian virtues.
As we have noted, Rand rejects the Christian religions, and
a Montessori school under her aegis would of necessity have
to delete religious training, but in so doing, the potential
exists that the method would sui'fer.

Rand, therefore, may

be vie-v1ed as accepting :Hontessori epistemologically, but
not spil•i tually.
Normatively, Objectivists note that current education fails to teach the child the importance of ethics-specifically, her sense of the heroic.

Rand's educated

man, as stressed bef'ore, is a moral being, cne practicing
Objectivist virtues, and thus potentially capable of' the
heroic.

She comments in this connection:

Apart from its many other evils, conventional morality
is not concerned \vi th the f'orrna tion of' a child t s character. It does not teach or show him what kind of' a
~ ~ ~uroht to be and Hhy; it is concerned onlrwith
J.mposlng a set of' rules upon him-concrete, arbJ_trary,
contradictol"y and, more often than not, incompreh~nsible
rules, which are mainly prohibitions and duties.l'7

"'Te have noted in the last chapter that such dictating causes
grave damage to self'-esteem.

Rand argues that education

must assume the responsibility of' proper moral development,
18Naria Mont(~ssori, The Absorbant 1·1ind Trans. Claude
A. Claremont (New York: Delta' Books, 1967), pp. 60-82.
19nand,.
original.

11

Art and Horal Treason," Po 110.

Italics in
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~hich

can best be accomplished through the teaching of

Romantic art.

Chapter two, when discussing the anteced-

ents of Objectivism, argues that a clear relationship exists
between art and ethics.

Believing that art's function is

to select the·essontials necessary for a given value change,
I

I

Rand proceeds to create, in her novels, the concept of the
educated man as one profoundly moral.

Regarding Romantic

art as the means necessary to instill proper values, she
J

I

I

comments:
The major source and demonstration of moral values available to a child is Romantic art (particularly Romantic
literature). What Romantic art offers him is not moral
rules, not an explicit didactic message, but tne-image
of a moral person--i.e., the concretized abstraction of
a moral ideal. It offers a concrete, d~rectly perceivable answer to the very abstract question which a child
senses, but cannot yet conceptualize: What kind of person is moral and what kind of life does he lead?20
In other words, a study of Romantic li teratu.re which por-

I

trays man as morally heroic, helps to develop in the child
a sense of moral ambition, a desire to engage in productive
work and to be proud of any rational achievement.
Rand believes Romantic literature recognizes the
principle that man has or possesses volitional consciousness which must operate if he is to be moral.

By studying

Romantic literature, Rand suggests that the child will
learn what is required for existence as a moral being
because

J

• • • Romantic art offers him a clear, luminous impersonal abstraction-and thus a cleal', obj;·:1ctive test of
20 Ibid., p. 111.

Italics and parentb.eses in original.
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his inner state, a clue available to his conscious mind.
• • • Romantic art is the i'uel and the spark plug of a
man's soul; its task is to set a soul on fire and never
let it go out. The task of providing that lii'e with a
motor and a direction belongs to philosophy.21
In the context of higher education, Objectivists regard
philosophical training as the logical extension oi' Romantic
art.

For Rand, who terms herself a Romantic realist,

Aristotle's philosophy provides the only meaningful philosophical experience the college student should seek.
A child's sense of life may tell him that Buck Rogers
or The Lone Ranger are heroes worthy of admiration but as
he matures, this Romantic sense must acquire philosophical

1

i'oundations.

A sense of life cannot provide the epistemo-

logical, metaphysical and axiological premises he needs to
survive.

Conscious goal-direct·ed action· requires philosophy.

Specif'ically, the Aristotelian goal of intellectually excellent activity (the use of reason) ought to be the studentts

t

'
t

goal for therein lies the only means to happiness.

Believ-

ing the source of moral evil to be irrational man, Objectivism suggests that if education were to postualte as its
goal the happiness of man (i.e., rational activity in confoPmity to moral principles) then the moral chaos of higher
education would be eliminated.
Objectivists believe that the primary mission of education is to aid in the development of man as a rationally
thinking creature with reason as his only absolute.

---------·

21 Ibid., p. 117.

In the
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novels, Rand provides the reader with models
social institutions.

o~

ideal

Educationally, the .ideal university

{named in Atlas Shrugged Patrick Henry University) is one
in which her concept

o~

the educated roan might best be

realized.

The school's outstanding scholar a philosophy

pro~essor

named Hugh Askton serves as spokesman, and de-

scribes the university as " • • • a monument to unenslaved
thought. 1122

His words are the key which unlocks the door

to Randian educational philosophy.
tion

~or

pursuit

An educational institu-

her must be totally and exclusively devoted to the
o~

truth by means of rational inquiry, and the

learners therein must likewise dedicate themselves.
Dr. Askton summarizes the ideal learner when recalling three

i

o~

his

students:

They never spoke o~ l-Ihat they wished they might do in
the future, they never·wondered whether some mysterious
omnipotence had ~avored them with some unknowable talent
to achieve the things they '\-ranted-they spoke of what
they would do • • • • Every man builds his world in his
own image. -.-• • He has the power to choose, but not the
poHer to escape the necessity o~ choice. I~ he ~bdicates
his povTer, he abdicates the status o~ man • • • J
In essence, this

-1I

~orroer

cated man.

de~ines

the Objectivist concept of the edu-

He exists as a goal orientated moral being--

two characteristics vital to both Rand's and Aristotle's
I

thinking.

He must be willing to value productive work

t

because he knows it is the only way in which human lif'e will

22Ayn Rand, Atlas Shru~~Jd (Nevl York:
can Library, Signet Press, 19 7 , p. 733.
23rbid., pp.

732-35.

The New Ameri-

Italics in original.
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ever become something or value.

He does not ask ror the

unearned, but he does request as a man the right to use his
mind to pursue the truth.

Parenthetically, it is interest-

ing to note how Rand's concept of art prevails in Atlas
Shrugged.

Believing in the educative value or Romantic

literature, she presents in that novel examples of the ideal
learner or institution so that the reader may observe moral
values operative in the concrete.
The Objectivist model of a good teacher, of course,
is personified by Dr. Askton, a man whose " • • • intransigent devotion to the pursuit of truth • • • n24 separates
him from the incompetency of his colleagues.

To be a good

teacher, in other words, one must be dedicated to respect
for the truth and to the belief that students' minds, properly guided, are sufficient to locate and explore it.

A

teacher must impress upon his students that there are no
other means, save the mind, to survive.25
Examining the state of current educational practice,
Rand decries the £light £rom the ideal which such an exam-

j

-J

ination reveals.

She notes that teachers r~ve £ailed in

24rbid., p. 728.
25rt should be recalled here that Objectivists reject faith aiJ a valid means to knowledge. This position
might have serious consequences for education. Formal education 1-JOUld be impossible if students had to personally
verif'y every comment a professor made. 'l'his is not to deny
the learner's right to rationally investigate and question
his teacher's conclusions but unless proof to the contrary
exists, the learner usually places his trust in the teacher's
authority as an expert in his field.
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I
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•

'

l

their duty, observing professors,
who refuse to answer questions.;_the professors who answer
by evE.3ion and ridicule-the professors who turn their
classes into bull-sessions on the premise that "we 1 re
here to mull things over together11 -the professors who
do lecture, but, in the name of "antidogmatism," take
no stand, express no viewpoint, and leave the student in
a maze of contradictions with no lead to a solution-the
professors who do take a stand and invite students' comments, and then:Penalize dissenters by means of lower
gra d es • • • 26
Believing that many students desire more of a college education than 'relevant discussions' and refusals to uphold
moral principles in order to be flexible, Rand indicts the
faculty for failing to correct such abuses.

The lack of a

sound educational philosophy usually results in such classroom conduct.

For example, Objectivism traces moral flexi-

bility to the Progressive schools in -vrhich future teachers
learned that the moral rigidity of objective principles
only stifles the search for truth.27
Unfortunately for the young minds being so conditioned,

2 6Ayn Rand, "The Cashing-In: The Student 'Rebellion',"
in The Ne,.,-J" Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, p. 32.
Ital~cs

~n

or~g~nal.

2 7nr.

s. I. Hayakawa comments on one eff'ect of' this:
"Now, professors tend • • • to give A's in their courses to
students that [sic] are alienated. And as the students get
A's they get appointed graduate assistants. Then they soon
become proi'essors themselves. And then they p_ass on this
alienation to another generation of' students, and college
generations of students come i'ast, after all. And bei'ore
you know it, you have whole departments lrrhich are basically
sources of resistance to the culture as a whole." See:
S. I. Hayakawa's testimony before the San Francisco State
College Study Team in \rJilliam Orrick, Jr. (director), Shut
it Dmm.l A College ?-n Crisis ( Snn Francisco State Col~,
October~ l96b-·April, 1969) A Stai'.f Heport to the lJational
Co:rnrniss~on on the Causes and I'frovontlon of Violence 0-JashIngton, D.c.: 'l'he United States Government ?rintlng Office,
June, 1969), p. 57.
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the railure to respect morally binding absolutes leads to
ethical nihilism in which anything goes ir it works.

For

this reason, students who riot or cheat when taking examinations simply are practicing a moral code they learned as
children. 2 8
This chapter will conclude with two educational proposals of a procedural nature which Rand advocates:

the

"rairness doctrine" for education and "tax credits."
The fairness doctrine has already been considered
and critiqued when discussing the Randian notion of compromise, but now its educational specifics must be considered.
The doctrine, borrowed from the Federal Government's regulation regarding broadcasting, might serve higher education

1

by exposing students to ideas different from what a given
department presents.

Rand notes:

There are philosophy majors who graduate without having
taken a single course on Aristotle (except as part of a
general survey). There are economics m.aj ors "tcTho have
no idea of what capitalism is or was, theoretically or
historically, and not the faintest notion of the mechanism of a free market. There are li ter~~ure majors vTho
have never heard of Victor Hugo • • •
In order to avert domination of ideas which Objectivism
considers inimical to student growth, the fairness doctrine

I

28This writer once asked a college class hrn..r they
complete term papers. Immediate answers included asking
a friend for one he had dono in a previous semester, or
copying from books. No consideration was paid to the moral
issue involved.
2 9Ayn Rand, "Fairness Doctrine for r:::du.cation, 11 The
Ayn Rand Letter, I, No. 18 (June 5, 1972), 3. Parentheses
in original. · -

Iii
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would permit student (intellectual) minorities to demand
courses on Aristotle and capitalism.

These subjects, Rand

believes, are currently being neglected by universities,
resulting in the various educational ills discussed in the
previous chapters.30

Further, it would demand that raculty

be hired on the basis

or

or

scholarly achievement; not because

ethnic origin. Rand notes:

"rr the rights

or

various

physiological minorities are so 1ouc.ly claimed, what about
the right

or

intellectual minorities?n31

Rand states that the implementation

''

or

the doctrine

would be contingent upon " • • • subjective interpretation,
which ·t-~ould orten be arbitrary and, at best, approximate.n3 2
rr this appears vague, the reason probably is that ror the
most part she has not bothered with speciric pedagogical
techniques, choosing instead to emphasize educational reror.m
in a philosophical context.

1

'

But the problem

or

implementa-

3°Rand is not the only observer to express alarm.
An article published in Nation's Business suggests that
students lack correct knmvledge of capitalism. The author,
Jerf'rey St. John, comments: "Does the rejection of business
as a career by some students stem from the unbalanced, often
biased, vieu they receive in the classroom on the moral
meaning of capitalism?" St. John continues, praising Rand
for providing a moral defense of capitalism: ttshe maintains
that young people today have no idea of what capitalism is.
• • • She charges that capitalism and businessmen have been
the willing victims of smears and distortions that have
part of their origins in the classrooms of the nation's
colleges and universities." For Rand, the fairness doctrine
might help to correct these abuses. See: Jeffrey St. John,
"A:re America's Students Flunking Capitalism?," Nation's
Business, LV (July, 1967), 90.
31Ayn Hand, "Fairness Doctrine for Education," The
Ay_n Rand Letter, I, No. f91June 19, 1972), 4.
32 Ibid., p. 1.

I~

I

I'
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tion remains.

As Rand herself admits, arbitrary and sub-

jective criteria govern the fairness doctrine's operation.
\Yho, then, for example, determines what is fair--students,
faculty, department chairman, or perhaps a combination of
these?

What subjects fall under the fairness doctrine

classification, and to what degree ought they to be integrated with existing courses?

The list of difficulties

appears endless, and such a policy might result in a continuous proliferation of administrative directives, further
complicating the already bureaucratically orientated structure of the university.
While the philosophical construct implicit in the

I
I
f

fairness doctrine (i.e., exposing students to Aristotle,
Montessori, capitalism etc.) is valid, the very subjectiveness of its nature would make enforcement impossible.
Other, more suitable means, such as requiring philosophy
majors to take courses on Aristotle, are needed.

The

fairness doctrine is consistent in principle with the Objectivist belief that the university provide courses designed
to reflect and develop man's rational nature.
Tax credits are intended to remedy an educational
problem discussed earlier:

whether or not the state has

the moral and legal right to require compulsory education
at the taxpayer's expense.

To break this goverrunent mono-

poly on schooling, Rand (among others) arg1Aes that quality
education can only be achieved if private schools are
allowed to flourish.
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For example, economist Milton Friedman suggests a
voucher system, designed to operate in much the same way as
tax credits.

~
'j
'

i

Essentially, he posits (as do Objectivists) a

derinite relationship between economics and individual rreedom, noting that capitalism ("rree private enterprise

~

change economy • • • competitive capitalismn) is the only
economic system conducive to rreedom and individual
growth.33
Educationally, he argues that the only justirication
ror governmental control or schools (that or Americanizing
diverse ethnic groups) has long since dissipated, and that
the decentralization or the educational establishment might
enhance quality and raise teachers' salaries.

Specirically,

his plan requires the issuance or vouchers by the government
to individual citizens who could redeem them
• • • ror a speciried maximum sum per child per year ir
spent on "approved" educational services. Parents would
then be rree to spend this sum a~d any additional sum
they themselves provided on purchasing educational services from an 11 approved 11 institution of their own choice •
• • • The role of government would be limited to insuring
that the schools met certain minimum standards, such as
the inclusio~ or a minimum con~on content in their programs • • • 4

j

33r1il ton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Capitalism and
Freedom (Chicago: The University or Chicago Press, 1962'),
p:--1~· Italics in original.
Friedman argt1es that while
monopoly practices are generally exaggerated and arise because of governn1ent action, the governmentts intervention
may be required to preserve free competition. Objectivists,
or course, disagree vlith Friedman, opting instead for total
separation between the government and the economy.

3~-Ibid., p. 89.
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Although Objectivists reject government interference o£ any
type, they no doubt would agree with Friedman's contention
that a voucher system, " • • • would meet the just

•

I
i
t

i
'

l

complai~ts

or parents that i£ they send their children to private, nonsubsidized schools they are required to pay twice ror education • • • it would permit competition to develop • • • • The
development and improvement or all schools would thus be
stimulated.n35
Such a plan might have a desirable errect on higher
education as well.

In The Report or the President's Task

Force on Higher Education, entitled "Priorities in Higher
Education," John A. Houard, President or Rockford College,
argues:
Suppose legislation were enacted which permitted each
taxpayer the option of paying the fir.st $100 of his
£ederal taxes directly to the college of his choice, so
that his payment to the Internal Revenue Service would
be the amount of his tot~G tax bill less the $100 which
he donated to a college.j

j

Howard continues, suggesting that the advantages of the plan

t

include allowing the universities to use the money as they
see £it, and permitting smaller colleges to survive, thereby
protecting " • • • the diversity and the autonomy or the
educational institutions.n37
35Ibid., p. 93.
36 James H. Hester, (Chairman), The Report of the
President's Task Force on Higher Ecluca~ion, ( 11 Priorities in
iilgher Educa tion 11 ) (Hashington, D. c.: 'I'he United States
Government Printing Ofi'ice, 1970), p. 21.
37Ibid., pp. 21-22. Opposition to tax credits is
voiced by-James c. Fletcher, President of the University of
Utah, who critiqued the Ho1vard proposal: 11 This proposal,
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200
In arguing ror the acceptance

or

tax credits, Rand

calls attention to the plight or the poor but talented stu-

'

I
t
1

dent who tries to work his way through school:
While millions of dollars are being spent by the government on attempts to educate young people most or vrhom
have no ability and/or no desire to get an education,
what happens to the young man who has both? rr he is
poor, he has to work his way through school. • •• Yet,
out or his meagre income, he has to pay taxes--not only
the hidden ones in the cost or everything he buys, but
income taxes as well. Thus while he is allowed no
deductions for the costs or his own education, he is
paying for the .rree ~gucation or youths enrolled in
government proJects.j
.
rr education were decentralized, then students

j

or

superior

ability would have the financial means to at tend private
schools, which are presently beyond their reach.

She rea-

sons that the brighter learners Hould avoid having to
attend public schools, which have " ••

~

railed so dis-

astrously. • • • »39
Rand cites three examples of the failure--drug
addiction of youth, functional illiteracy and student
violence4°--and goes on to suggest that the remedy for
such abuses would consist in giving a citizen,
• • • tax credits for the money he spends on education,
along with most tax credit proposals, has the very great
difficulty that it represents the support of the middle and
upper class groups of our society and therefore will tend
to promote institutions Hhich are primarily associated Hith
these t-vro groups of people, 11 p. 25. The Task Force did not
endorse President Hovmrd' s tax credit proposal.

3BAyn Tiand, "Tax-Credits for Education," The A~
Rand Letter, I, No. 12 (March 13, 1972), 4• Italics 1n
original.
39rbid., p. 2.
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whether his own education, his children's. or any person's ho wants to put through a bona-fide school of his
own choice l.fncluding primary, secondary, and higher
education).'+
If tax credits were implemented, Rand argues that those sincerely interested in acquiring an education might be given

t

'

!

the opportunity to attend quality schools.

At least it

would grant them the basic right of every citizen in a free
society--freedom of choice.
The Nixon administration has voiced support for tax
credits.

On April 30, 1973 President Nixon introduced tax

credit legislation to Congress,42 but opposition to the

j

plan has come from Federal Courts which regard the measure

I

as violating the First P~endment.

At present, therefore,

the future of tax credits remains in doubt.
Before closing this chapter, an apparent contradiction in Rand's thinking must be considered.

Previous chap-

ters have suggested that she does not advocate religious
training.

If this be true, then it might be rightly asked

how she can favor tax credits for private schools, many of
which are religiously affiliated?

Rand comments:

• • • I am not an advocate of religion or of religious
education; but the double burden of a forced necessity
to pay for the support of secular schools is a violation
of' the parents' right to religious freedom. The parochial schools are collapsing financially • • • it is
unjust that the children of' religious taxpayers are
denied the special advantages granted to the children of
41Ibid.

Parentheses in original.

42Edv-mrd Rohrbach, "End Tax Shelters, Nixon Bill
Urges," The Chicago Tribune (Hay l, 1973), p. 1.
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nonreligious ones.43
Despite the :fact that Rand disf'avors religious education,
she remains philosophically consistent.

Her regard :for the

rights or individual citizens includes granting them the
choice to educate their children in religious schools if'
they so desire.

The point to remember is that Objectivism

disclaims as immoral the

11

double burden" which parents must

assume who wish to exercise their choice.
SUMMARY

The purpose or this chapter has been to develop the
Objectivist view or what education ought to do if' its concept or the educated man is to be realized.

When discussing

means, we have shown that Rand :fav.ors Aristotle and 11ontessori as the only :figures devoted to preserving cognitive
and ethical concepts needed by man to live as man.

Roman-

tic literature :for moral guidance provides the necessary
means to achieve her end.

A study of' Aristotle's philos-

ophy as an extension, and philosophical :foundation of'
Romantic literary concepts will lead--she believes--to
happy men, men who pursue intellectually excellent activity, thereby alJ.owing :for the growth of' self'-esteem, productive Hork and pride.
If' students con:fronted 'tvi th the cognitive and moral
anarchy of contemporary schooling -vrere only given the proper
43rbid., p.

5.

Italics in original.
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guidance, notes Rand, then the new intellectual could become
a reality.

Practicing the virtues of rationality, independ-

ence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and
pride, the new intellectual would achieve the happiness
proper to a man living on earth.

Contingent upon the real-

ization of happiness, of course, is the existence of' objective moral principles which man must recognize and use to
guide his actions.

It cannot be repeated often enough that

Rand's educated man is above all a profoundly moral being,
devoted to the preservation of his own happiness in a
rational way.
It would be well to conclude with the 'lrTords of John

I

!

Galt, the central protagonist in Atlas Shrugged 1-1ho, in
this context, speaks of the ideal man Rand hopes education
will produce:

My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a
single axiom: existence exists--and in a single choice:
to live. The rest proceeds f'rom these. To live, man
must hold three things as the supreme and ruling values
of' his life: Reason-Purpose-Self'-esteem. Reason, as
his only tool of' knowledge-Purpose, as his choice of'
the happiness which that tool must proceed to achieve-Self-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his mind
is competent to think and his person is vJorthy of' happiness, which means: is worthy of living. These three
values imply and require all of' man's virtues, and all
his virtues pertain to the relation of' existence and
consciousness: rationality, indopendencL~ integrity,
honesty, justice, productiveness, pride.~...:>
43nand, Atlas Shrugged, p. 9114.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
What may be said of Objectivism and American formal
education?

At first, there appears to exist a number of

obstacles s l.fficiently damaging as to prevent acceptance of
the philosophy by American schoolmen.
Objectivist ethics present a formidable instance.
As often suggested throughout this study, few parents would
be willing to commit their children to a school governed by
a philosophical code advocating the nvirtue of self'isbness,
much less "atheism.n 1
the lesser di.fi'icul ty.

11

By comparison, the former presents
He have shown that within the con-

text of' Objectivist ethics, selfishness means not a ruthless
or ai•rogant violation o.f someone t s rights, but rather a
rational concern with one's self-interest.

Such becomes a

necessary condition for healthy self-esteem, which is so
crucial to the learning process.

This explains why Rand's

definitional thinking must be understood if one wishes to
accurately grasp her moral philosophy.

Once understood,

opposition might diminish.
1 Ttvo comments, both coming from Roman Catholics,

crystallize the issue. On learning that Rand advocates
atheism one co1-r.monted, 11 She cant t be intelligent if she's
an atheist. 11 '!'he second responded, 11 HoH cotlld any educated
person f'avor selfishness? 11 Significantly, both individuals
never read any of Hand's materials.
20~.
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Atheism, however, is not so easily dismissed.

Rand's

antireligious stand could very well :forestall any national
acceptance of' Objectivism.

Traditionally, Americans have

been religious people, incorporating religious sentiments
and ref'erences to God in the basic documents of' the land:
The Constitution and the Declaration of' Independence.
Indeed, one of' the :first political documents in our nation's
history, the :Hayf'lower Compact (1620), begins with the words,
"In the name of' God, Amen. 112
The question to be resolved then centers on the pos_sibility of' Objectivism without atheism and religious hostility.

Rfu~d's

position, of' course, is quite clear.

When

asked if' Objectivism could possibly become dogma, she
replied:
No. A dogma is a set of' belief's accepted on :faith; that
is, without rational justif'ication or against rational
evidence. A dogma is a matter of' blind :faith. Objectivism is the exact opposite. Objectivism tells you
that you must not accept any idea or conviction unless
~ou can demonstrate its truth by means of' rea~on • • • •
lDo you believe in God?] • • • Certainly not.j
But, in the opinion of' this writer, if' Objectivism desires
acceptance by Americans, its antireligious position will
require modif'ication and/or dismissal.

As argued earlier,

2r·Tilton Viorst, (ed.), The Great Docu.ments of' \'lestern
Civilization (NevT York: Bantam Books, l-'latrix edition,
~),

pp. 160-61.

3Alvin Toff'ler, (Interviewer), "Playboy's Intervie1.1
with Ayn Rand," Playboy, XI (Harch, 1964), 39. Hy brackets.
(Ironically, it rs-the-tb.esis of' Albert Ellis 1 Is Objectivism a Religion? that Objectivism is dogma in that it postulates a set--of principles which must be accepted in toto,
if' one is to be a f'aithf'ul practitioner.]
-- ----
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there exists no epistemological hostility between reason and

j

£aith.

One needs both in order to survive as a man.

Exclu-

sive reliance on £aith or reason would destroy human learning.
Objectivism is internally consistent when, as advocating laissez-£aire Capitalism, it argues against the concept
o£ state supported schools.
equivocal:

Again, Rand's position is un-

"My position is .fully consistent.

Not only the

post of£ice, but streets, roads, and above all, schools
should all l>e privately owned and privately run. 11 4 Unt'ortunately, his tori cal evidence tveighs against the cone ept o£
non-public education.

By the end or the Nineteenth Century,

American schools were £airly well established at the primary
and higher levels.

Prior to about 1874 (the Kalamazoo

Case), a ya1-n:1ing gap existed bet1-veen the

two~

A laissez-

£aire system o.f private academies attempted to £ill the
need for adequate secondary education, but their very diversity produced graduates of such uneven academic quality
that standards set by universities for admission were in
g:r•ave danger.

College administrators had no idea o.f a stu-

dent's background or his intellectual competency.

Accord-

ing to one historian of American education,
• • • the academies' energies were di.f.fused • • • the
lack of any common standards applied to education inevitably produced several patent weaknesses. There was
chaotic prolii'eration Hithout organization in course
orrerines, including numerous short courses in subjects
sometimes taught f'or only a few weeks. There Has no
established system of accreditation for either teachers
4rbid., p. 12.

.I
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or schools.5
Thus, the very laissez-£aire £abric or the academies ultimately

un~ermined

their existence, being replaced by the High

School.
Even if the merits of a laissez-faire educational
system were not in doubt, the chances of such a system being
implemented today are at best slim.

As with religion,

Americans remain firmly committed to public schools, locally
controlled and financed, as the means of introducing the
young to the culture.

Although often pitifully w·eak and

ineffective, and plagued with the naive faith endowed them
by the culture, few citizens would opt for the absolute
dismantling of the system.

At least for the foreseeable

future, any reforms such as tax credits will probably have
to occur within the framework of the public school system.
Returning to the original questipn, then, "What may
be said of Objectivism and American education?"

Despite

the foregoing limitations, it remains the author's firm
conviction that Objectivism offers substantial and qualitative contributions to American formal education.
Man is a rational being, but schools by their
slaughtering of self-esteem, cognitive development, and
individual effort seem to dishonor his rationality more
than encourage its fruition.
for good is enormous.

Here Objectivism's potential

By postulating a heroic and moral

5Ger•ald Gutek, An Historical Introduction to American
Education {NGiv York: Thomas Y. CroHell Company, 1970},
pp. 7h-75.

,,,
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individual as its concept
offers much.

o~

the educated man, Objectivism

Specifically, the following summary of educa-

tional aims, including the teacher, learner, and institution
is offered as evidence:
The teacher:
1.

A teacher must be dedicated to the pursuit of truth and
lmowledge.

2.

Academic freedom (freedom

~rom

violence, especially), is

most essential if the learning process is to operate.

3.

Teachers must allow their students to develop selfesteem, and cognitive self-reliance.

They must aid in

the process.

4.

The teacher must be a man of moral conviction, willing
to state and

de~end

his convictions but not force them

on others.

5.

The teacher must cultivate the mind by stressing the
role of reason and concept formation in the educative
process.

The leal'ner:
1.

The learner has a right to an education, but not to a
formal education unless that right is earned and sustained by productive work.

2.

The learner must value cognitive excellence and productive work.

3.

The learner must abhor the use o:r violence in the academic community, realizing that J.orce may be a threat
to rational inquiry.

r

l
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The learner must rely on his own efrorts to acquire a
formal education, seeking help only after sustained
efrort on his own.

5.

The learner must be a moral being, dedicated to the
concepts of reason, purpose and selr-esteem with their
corresponding virtues of rationality, pride, honesty,
integrity, justice, productiveness, and independence.

The institution:
1.

It must roster rationality.

2.

It must devote itselr to the free pursuit of truth.

3.

It must not rall prey to violence and brute rorce as
means or persuasion.,

4.

It may allow the learner freedom of choice, provided
he has proven himself r·esponsible to make decisions.

5.

It must not fall prey to government intervention, which
tends to substitute race or "welfare socialism" as the
basis for evaluation.
It is the author's belief that unless formal educa-

tion in America first stipulates and then Dnplements these
principles consistent \vi th Objectivism, little hope remains
for any viable educational reform.

If the above concepts

could be summarized in one sentence, it might read--man has
a mind; allow him the opportunity to cultivate and sustain
it.

It i.s a plea educators dare not ignore any longer.
This study will conclude by offering suggestions ror

further research.

Since Objectivism is just gaining the

recognition it deserves, many areas of investigation m.;ait

r
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~

the potential researcher.
include the following:

A

~ew

of the more important ones

a study of Objectivist epistemology,

especially the process of concept formation.
severely critiqued the behaviorism school,
B. F. Skinner.6
might prove

~rui t~ul.

use~ul

speci~ically

A comparison between the two approaches
In this context, Nathaniel B1•anden' s

writings, especially The Psychology of
be very

Rand has

as he has

~or.mulated

Sel~-Esteem,

would

a psychology based on

Objectivist philosophy.
Rand's approach to

~or.mal

logic and the Laws

Thought could also be investigated.

Her

o~

re~utation o~

the

"analytic-synthetic" dichotomy plus deriving ethical postulates

~rom

criticism.

the laws has, as we have seen, resulted in much
The entire role of logic in Objectivist philos-

ophy deserves treatment.
Of course, Objectivist ethics might also be examined
in a separate study.

Comparisons with Christian moral

beliefs might help to lessen the attacks leveled against
the

~ormer.

Contingent upon such an investigation would

be an examination of the definitional thinking implicit in
so much of Objectivist moral philosophy.
Objectivism can no longer be ignored by the academic
cmr..muni ty.

Students are discovering its championing of

6see: Ayn Rand, "The Stimulus • • • ," The All Rand
Letter, Parts I -II, Nos. (f-:"9" 1 J-anuary 17, 31, 1'91"2l, -4,
I-6, and 11 • • • And the Response, 11 The Avn Rand Letter,
Parts I-II, I, Nos:-H'f.:'Iltp7ebruary 14, 2~2), 1-4-, 1-L~.
The attack centers on Skinne1.. ' s Beyond Freedom and Digni tl
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 197
.I

;I
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rational

sel~-interest

and individualism to be a

re~reshing

change from current intellectual practice which may be described as an odd mixture of existentialism, Rousseau's
naturalism and anarchy.

For example, students at Rice Uni-

versity, in 1965, voted overv1helmingly to read The Virtue
of Selfishness as their "Book of the Semester," despite
opposition from the campus liberals.?

It is hoped that this

study will serve to introduce students and faculty to Objectivism and thus serve as a springboard for further discussion and investigation.
?Nathaniel Brm1den, "A Report to Our Readers-1965,"
The Objectivist Newsletter, IV, No. 12 (December, 1965}, 57.
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